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ESTABLISHING AN INTEGRATED PAYMENT SYSTEM 
(REAL-TIME GROSS SETTLEMENT) IN ASEAN  
 A Proposal for a Cross-Border Mechanism  
to Support the AEC 2015   
 
 





1. Background Issue 
GLOBALIZATION: one of the most popular words in the last two decades. Everyone 
knows the word globalization on television, radio, from friends and any media. Some people 
think that it is the global world influence; others think that it is a disclosure of internal nation 
to the outside world. Many countries in every region in the last three decades try to integrate 
their economy, culture and society among each other. By the definition of Bhagwati,
1
 the 
economic globalization means the integration of national economies into international 
economies through trade, FDI, capital flows, migration, the spread of technology and military 
presence.  Europe has been united since 1958, by the Treaty of Rome, which created the 
European Economic Community (the EEC), or called ‘Common Market’. In the Asian region, 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was established in 1967
2
, is 
now trying to be one of the most considerable economic regions in the world. A more detailed 
description of these two regions can be found in Chapter II and III. 
Globalization itself has different meanings. The ESCW of UN3, in its annual review 
stated as follows:  
"Globalization is a widely-used term that can be defined in a number of different 
ways. When used in an economic context, it refers to the reduction and removal of 
barriers between national borders in order to facilitate the flow of goods, capital, 
services and labour... although considerable barriers remain to the flow of 
labour... Globalization is not a new phenomenon. It began towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, but it slowed down during the period from the start of the First 
World War until the third quarter of the twentieth century. This slowdown can be 
attributed to the inward-looking policies pursued by a number of countries in 
order to protect their respective industries... however, the pace of globalization 
picked up rapidly during the fourth quarter of the twentieth century..." 
So, in this case, the term “globalization” has not always had a positive connotation, it 
has also had a negative one. Accomplishing something through globalization will not always 
                                                 
1
Bhagwati, Jagdish, “In Defense of Globalization” Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 2004,pp.3. 
2
ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization established on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok (Bangkok Declaration) 
by the five founding fathers Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and 
Thailand.  Then Brunei Darussalam joined on January 8, 1984 and the followed by Vietnam on July 28, 1995, 
Lao PDR and Myanmar on July 23, 1997 and lastly was Cambodia on April 30, 1999 and now called ASEAN+5 
or ten member states of ASEAN. Available at http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview, last accessed 
on January 9, 2015. 
3United Nations, “Summary of the Annual Review of Developments in Globalization and Regional Integration in 
the Countries of the ESCWA Region, 2002”, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, United 
Nations, 2002, pp. 1. 
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be smooth; it will have its obstacles and challenges.
4
 The main dilemma is typically the 
frequently unfair distribution of the benefits of globalization between parties, and this 
phenomenon is a challenge to be considered by members in the regions. 
With regard to this, Hveem divided the regional phenomenon in the era of 
globalization into three generations, as follows:
5
  
- “The first generation is from the end of World War II, which the projects was to 
achieve the goals of security and political stability.
6
   
- The second-generation episode started with decolonization in the 1960s and 
faded out early in the 1970s.
7
 
- The advance of globalization process after the end of the Cold War.”8 
Another scholar, Takis Fotopoulos, argues that globalization refers to the case of a 
borderless global economy in which economic nationalism has been eradicated and 
production itself has been internationalized in the sense that the big corporations have become 
stateless bodies involved in an integrated internal division of labour which spans many 
countries9. Moreover, Acharya utters that global democratization has had several implications 
on the regional development:
10
 
“1.   It alters the political climate on which regional interactions are based;  
2. It calls into question the legitimacy of existing regional norms and the relevance 
of existing institutional mechanisms;  
3. The transition to democracy allows for newly installed governments to adopt bold 
foreign policy leading to better cooperation and conflict management;  
4. It creates more domestic transparency that regional integration needs;  
5. It creates a deeper basis for regional socialization by according space to civil 
society and accommodating its concerns;  
                                                 
4
The effect of globalization is not always more connected or integrated but also less connected or disintegrated, 
like the crisis in 1997 in Asia and in 2007 in Europe. 
5
Helge Hveem, “Explaining the Regional Phenomenon in an Era of Globalization”, in Richard Stubbs and 
Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (ed.), “Political Economy and the Changing Global Order”, Oxford University Press, 
2000, pp.70-71. 
6
Liberalizing international economic transactions (within the Western world) would be done (only) along with 
social stabilization and state-building. 
7
The second generation is building the Westphalian state system and it was to serve economic growth; as well as 
security motives in their assistance to achieving state-building goals. 
8
It is not only they have given more weight to regional power but they have also reordered the relative salience 
of economic growth and sociopolitical stabilization goals, but with different effects on different parts of the 
world.  They may also have put Westphalia behind them. 
9
Fotopoulos Takis, “Globalization, the reformist Left and the Anti-Globalization ‘Movement’, Democracy & 
Nature”, The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, Vol.7, No.2, July 2001, pp.234. 
10
Amitav Archarya,  “Democratization and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, Third 
World Quarterly Vol.24-2, 2003a. pp.375-390. 
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6. It broadens the scope of agenda for regional institutionalization; and finally, 
democratisation may secure greater support for regional integration and 
cooperative projects with outside powers.” 
Furthermore, Tom G. Palmer defines globalization as the diminution or elimination of 
state-enforced restrictions on exchanges a cross-borders and the increasingly integrated and 
complex global system of production and exchange that has emerged as a result.
11
  One 
important thing that should be considered is that economic globalization is not independent, it 
is interdependent with culture and politics. Even though the separation is obvious, the political 
globalization is a necessary complement to economic globalization, whereas social and 
cultural globalizations are the inevitable effects of economic globalization.
12
 In this regard, 
the author concludes that the impact of political globalization is one of the most influential 
factors for the economic globalization of any region compared to social culture globalization. 
ASEAN countries have political, economical, social and cultural differences amongst 
its members. With regard to the globalization, according to KOF Globalization Index
13
, most 
of the ASEAN members are least globalized. The ASEAN countries categorized as most 
globalized are Singapore and Malaysia (ranked at no. 5 and 24), and the least globalized 
members are Brunei (55), Thailand (57), followed by Philippines (83), Indonesia (91), 
Cambodia (118), Vietnam (124), Myanmar (178), and Lao PDR (187).  
No country can avoid globalization. China (72), for example, which is known as a 
solitary country, is also impacted by globalization and has now become more open to the 
outside world.  Zha Peixin stated that China has learnt from her long history that isolation 
leads to backwardness.
14
  It means that the Great China reformed its political policy to be 
open-minded. These days, countries from all over the world try to embrace the opportunities 
of globalization and undergo reformation to adapt to a changing world.  
The historical roots of globalization are undetermined. Some people think it was from 
a very long time ago, but scholars placed the beginning of globalization in the modern age.  
Globalization began around the 19
th
 century, when industrialization arose. In this era of 
imperialism, European countries became one of the first global economic powers. They had 
superior manufacturing and technology, such as steel and coal.  On the other hand, 
globalization also impacts negatively and is one of the factors creating the need for war to 
conquer other countries to integrate into their economic region.  During World War II the 
global economy broke down into a global war. Nazi Germany in Europe and Imperial Japan 
                                                 
11




KOF Index Globalization 2014, at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2014/04/15/rankings_ 
2014.pdf, last accessed on January 12, 2015.  The KOF Index of Globalization measures the three main 
dimensions of globalization i.e. economic, social, and political. 
14
Speech by H.E. Ambassador of China, Zha Peixin at Chinese Economic Association Annual Conference (14 
April 2003), http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/dsjh/t27161.htm, last accessed on January 12, 2015. 
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in Asia endeavoured their own fascist manners of regional economic integration in the form 
of the New Order and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
15
 
During the great depression of the 1930s, countries became the agents of economic 
revival and the defenders of domestic welfare and employment against disturbances from the 
outside worlds.
16
 This is one of the conditions that prompted the leaders of European 
countries to design or create a common market among its member through the eradication of 
trade barriers and the setting up of a common external trade policy. The European leaders 
politically created the EEC by the Treaty of Rome (the EEC Treaty) in 1957.
17
  The EEC 
governance required political collaboration along with its members through official 
supranational cooperation. A more detailed elaboration on supranational institution will be 
explained in the specific chapter.
18
  
After World War II, the eastern region countries did the same as the countries in the 
west who aligned themselves with neighbouring countries in the region. According to 
Laurence Henry,
19
 regionalism is a process of drawing together states in the same geographic 
region or sub-region, most often within a regional international organization. The state 
members within the region are joined to solve their common problem and pass them onto the 
association or international organization that they built with specific functions.   
Matt Rosenberg divides the 196 countries of the world into eight regions, and one of 
the biggest regions is Europe with 48 countries.
20
  The European founding countries, which 
started the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 by Treaty of Rome, were 
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany.  Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, followed by Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain 
in 1986.
21
  In 1992, it then became the European Union (EU) by the Maastricht Treaty (TEC). 
Later, other European countries joined this union.
22
 The author concludes that the EU used 
treaties to create a project. 
Like in their European counterparts, countries in the Southeast Asian region 
established ASEAN in 1967, and also started their aspiration to consolidate by making a 
                                                 
15Karl Moore, “Globalization and the Cold War: the Communist Dimension”, at  http://people.mcgill.ca/ 
files/karl.moore/GlobalizationColdWar.pdf, last accessed on January 12, 2015. 
16
Robert W. Cox,” Problems of Power and Knowledge in a Changing World Order”, in Richard Stubbs (ed.), 
“Political Economy and the Changing Global Order”, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.40. 
17
See further on Europa website at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/ 
treaties/treaties_eec_en.htm, last accessed on January 12, 2015. 
18
See further sub chapter on Supranational vs. Intergovernmental Institution. 
19Laurence Henry, “The ASEAN Way and Community Integration: Two Different Models of Regionalism”, 
European Law Journal, Vol. 13-6, 2007, pp. 857.  
20Matt Rosenberg, “Official Listing of Countries by World Region”, can be seen at http://geography.about.com/ 
od/lists/a/officiallist.htm, last accessed January 12, 2015. 
21
See further on Europa Commission website, “European Enlargement”, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-28-members/index_en.htm, last accessed on January 12, 2015. 
22
Ibid. 
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cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields amongst its members since 
1976 (the ASEAN Concord). After several meetings, at the 12th Summit in January 2007, the 
ASEAN leaders declared their commitment to the creation of the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) by 2015 and to transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of 
goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and freer flow of capital. The AEC will transform 
ASEAN into a single market and production base by: i) accelerating regional integration in 
the priority sectors, ii) facilitating movement of business personnel, skilled labour and talents, 
and iii) strengthening the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN. The author shares the idea that 
one of the important roles in facilitating free movement of goods and services is the utilization 
of existing payment systems by integrating all members. 
With respect to the benefits of creating a regional integration in ASEAN, Richard 
Stubbs argues that there are three reasons for this growing sense of an Asia-Pacific 
regionalism. These are as follows:
23
 
“(1)  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade have become increasingly regionalized; 
(2)  The advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which set the 
stage for a North American economic region, and the Single European Act (SEA) 
and the Maastricht Treaty, which created the Single European Market and 
European Union (EU), forced the Asia-Pacific region to think of itself as a region 
in contradistinction to North America and Europe; and 
(3)   Neo-liberalism association with globalization and the resulting collapse of time and 
space in international economic transactions challenge many of the values and 
practices that are to be found throughout the Asia-Pacific region.” 
 
Consequently, the author is focusing in this research on the influence of cross-border 
transactions known as cross-border payment system in the region in order to support the 
objectives of the AEC. Globalization prompts people to want to fulfil their needs with goods 
from outside of their countries. Neighbouring states fulfil their needs of goods and services by 
exchanging products and services among its region. The movement of exchanged products 
and services needs to be effective and efficient, using an instrument, which could fulfil 
everyone’s wishes. An integrated payment system supports their needs to facilitate exchange 
in the region.   
2. Research Questions 
In creating an integrated payment system for the member countries of ASEAN, a legal 
foundation is needed to provide legal certainty in order to make the system effective and 
efficient. It also needs a mechanism to solve problems when a dispute arises due to different 
laws. Therefore, this research will focus on the following questions: (1) how to provide a 
                                                 
23
Richard Stubbs, “Asia-Pacific Regionalism versus Globalization” in William D. Coleman and Geoffrey R.D 
(ed.)., “Regionalism & Global Economic Integration”, Routledge, 1998, pp.68-69. 
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sound legal basis for a cross-border payment system within the ASEAN region countries. The 
next question is (2) how to resolve a dispute due to conflict of law. For these two questions, 
the author will analyse particularly from the “applicable law” and “applicable forum in the 
event of dispute settlement”. Additionally, the last question is (3) how ASEAN could 
implement a cross-border transaction system.
24
 To answer these questions, the author has 
chosen the EU for comparison, as one of the best regions  which first to unite and having a 
respectable payment system integration mechanism and legal instruments. They have what are 
known as Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system 
(TARGET)
25
 and Single Euro Payments Area  (SEPA).
26
, These two are integrated payment 
systems for the EU member states. Both seem to have a systematic payment system 
regulations and institutional body for the payment system, which ASEAN is likely to be able 
to be adopted. In this research, the author will focus only on the instrument of TARGET as a 
comparison, because TARGET uses the RTGS system as a cross-border transaction. 
3. Scope of the Research 
As the main issue of this topic is how to provide a legal basis for member countries in 
a region, there will be unavoidable challenges in developing the regional law in this regard.  
This dissertation will only focus on discovering a proper legal basis for an integrated payment 
system (RTGS) in ASEAN, which might be applied for the ASEAN members. Such legal 
basis should be implemented by all members and it should include settlement of disputes. In 
order to accomplish these main objectives, the author will analyse the experience of the 
European Union and will research the question of whether or not a payment system, such as 
TARGET might be adopted by ASEAN. 
Furthermore, since the legal setting of a region contains national and supranational, the 
interaction between the members’ legal systems becomes unavoidable. A supranational 
organization
27
 as institutional bodies is also one of the issues that should be considered for 
discussion as a consequence of creating integration. The interface between the members’ 
national law will be one of the issues to be addressed. Moreover, supranational governance is 
usually applied to situations outside the perimeter of corporate or governmental hierarchies, 
mostly between the countries.   
                                                 
24
In this research, the author will look at the EU’s experience in a comparative perspective in order  to have a 
better understanding on the idea of proposing an RTGS integrated payment system as a tool to support the 
financial integration of the ASEAN region. 
25
TARGET, stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System, is a 
cross-border payment system within the banks for the real-time processing throughout the European Union. 
26
SEPA, stands for Single Euro Payments Area, is a payment-integration system, applied amongst the European 
members for bank transfers/transactions. 
27
Supranational organizations are defined as being beyond the scope or borders of any one nation. 
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As we know, globalization is a complex concept. Globalization is regarded as a 
concept to capture the recently changing political interactions.
28
 So, again, the author 
emphasizes that this situation is influenced by political deals, but the author will limit this 
only to the legal aspect of the issues involved. 
We can say that globalization and institutionalization are mutually inter-related 




“The relationship between globalization and institutional change does not only 
work in one direction.  Globalization is fundamentally a social process, not one 
that is technologically predetermined. Like all other social processes, it requires 
the underpinning of appropriate social institutions. [...]  Globalization and 
international institutionalization are mutually contingent.” 
It can be said that the multi-level structure of decision-making is no longer fully 
controlled by states, although they still play an important role, but is populated by non-state 
actors. The role of non-state actors could support government’s project and more participatory 




With regard to international institutionalization, the creation of Europeanization needs 
the interaction of three principal actors – states, supranational institutions and non-state 
actors. According to S. Tarrow:
31
  
“… the map of Europe today offers the potential for coalition building, political 
exchange, and the construction of mechanisms of alignment and conflict among 
social actors across states, sectors and levels of decision-making.  These can take 
horizontal as well as vertical form.  Regional governments, political parties and 
even social movements are reaching across and above their territories to exercise 
leverage against other actors, national states and supranational authorities.” 
Based on Tarrow’s model of triangular relations among states, supranational 
authorities and non-state actors, the form of Europeanization by the EU needs a supranational 
institutional arrangement with the involvement of those three actors. 
                                                 
28
Ondrej Cisar, “Between the National and Supranational?: Transnational Political Activism, Conflict, and 
Cooperation in the Integrated Europe”, Contemporary European Studies, 1/2007. 
29
Robert Keohane, “Hobbes’s Dillema and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International 
Society”, in Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, London and New York: Routlege, 2002, 
pp. 81. 
30
The role of non-state actors will be elaborated in chapter 3 and 4. 
31
Sidney Tarrow, “Centre-Periphery Alignments and Political Contention in Late-Modern Europe”, in 
Christopher Ansell and Giuseppe di Palma (eds.), “Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States 
Compared”, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 60.  
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In the case of the Southeast Asian countries, they have different stages of economic 
development, different political ideologies and different legal systems. These various 
differences among the member states are challenges for the ASEAN member states to adjust 
and make more cohesive and integrated. In order to reach this goal, the ASEAN member 
states need to consolidate and expand the association’s legal basis. The integration of a 
payment system (RTGS) should be the focal points for ASEAN, in order to face the AEC 
2015, especially to facilitate the trades and investments. Thus, in this dissertation, the 
proposed project of the integrated payment system (RTGS) does not for monetary union's 
objective, like the EU, but rather to facilitate the trades and investments program of the AEC 
2015 for its financial integration and to support the single market project. In this dissertation, 
the author only selects a number of countries of ASEAN and the EU as an example, which 
will sufficiently represent both regions.
32
 
4. Main Objectives of the Research 
Since this dissertation will focus on the question of how to develop a sound legal basis 
for the establishment and development of the payment system (RTGS) integration among the 
ASEAN member states, it is very important to know the EU’s approach in developing its 
integrated payment system (TARGET) for cross-border transactions among the members and 
how the EU settles disputes regarding payments through TARGET. Concerns and issues often 
arise in terms of choice of law and choice of forum.  
This dissertation will describe and analyse what formal institutions will be needed to 
be involved at the regional and national level in order to balance the interests of the member 
states, on the one hand and the protection of customers in each member state, on the other 
hand.  
This dissertation aims to create an appropriate ASEAN legal basis for payment system 
integration. Therefore, the main objectives of the research are: 
- To propose an initiative for establishing an integrated payment system (RTGS) for 
the ASEAN member states in order to support the objectives of the AEC 2015. 
- To provide a proper legal basis for payment system integration in ASEAN, 
especially for settling disputes. 
5. Research Method 
In order to achieve these main objectives, the author will analyse the development of 
the European Union’s payment system integration as a comparison. The scope of this analysis 
will cover the history of European integration, the making process of the creation of the 
                                                 
32
The author will use and choose at least 3 member countries from each of both regions as examples which are 
sufficient and reasonable to represent both regions. 
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institutions and regulations.  Considering that the ASEAN Economic Community is a new 
transformation of ASEAN and now is in the process of establishing the integration in payment 
systems, the assessment of the prospect of unification or harmonization of law on this topic at 
the ASEAN level will take a very important part in this research.  In the end, the author will 
propose measures to determine a proper legal basis for payment system integration for 
ASEAN and also necessary steps via bilateral and/or multilateral agreement among the 
ASEAN participants, for the purpose of attaining safety and efficiency in payment systems 
and finally, protecting the interest of the ASEAN member states. 
The method employed in this research will be applied by engaging a normative legal 
approach. The outcome of such an approach would provide beneficial input for deliberating 
the problems, which might occur, and finally will prescribe conclusions in respect of relevant 
issues discussed. Bearing in mind that the author’s background knowledge is predominantly 
the legal discipline, data that entails economic or other methods of data collecting will be 
retrieved from existing data banks that have been sourced or collected by preceding 
researches and organizations, such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), ASEAN, the EU, and the Central Banks. 
This dissertation will be divided into six chapters, which will be elaborated, as 
follows: 
In chapter one, the area of concern is to have a better understanding on the key 
concepts of a payment system in general and the RTGS in particular as the author’s choice 
instrument for a payment system. This will become the main research subject, including its 
characteristics and benefits. This chapter also describes the Core Principles of Systemically 
Important Payment System (CP-SIPS) and the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures 
already used for assessment of the payment systems of most of the countries, including the 
ASEAN and the EU countries.   
After describing the payment system, the author will describe in chapter two the 
history of the European monetary integration and also the European institutions, which play a 
role in the payment system area i.e. the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National 
Central Banks (NCBs). This chapter also describes the cross-border payment system which 
they use i.e. the integrated RTGS namely TARGET, and how they develop TARGET as a 
comparison, starting from the beginning of its establishment and including its structure of 
organization, objectives, features, and other measures.   
The description in the previous chapter will then be followed by the situation in 
ASEAN itself in chapter three, which will describe two subjects i.e. ASEAN and the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC). In the first section, the author analyses the history and the 
scope of ASEAN; followed by the fundamental principles and the objectives of ASEAN, 
including the relations with countries outside of ASEAN; and ended with the conception of 
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the ASEAN Charter. The second section will explain the role of AEC, and then focus on the 
Role of the ASEAN Economic Committee as well as on the characteristic of AEC and its 
objectives. An overview of AEC from a legal and a political perspective is also elucidated. 
Here the characteristics and the objectives of ASEAN and the AEC will be presented. An 
integrated cross-border payment system (RTGS) is one of the instruments, which will help to 
achieve these objectives.  In this chapter the author also provides the general description of 
the AEC priority sectors to face in 2015. The author will also deliver in the last part of this 
chapter the impact of the economic/financial integration onto the region’s character of its 
organization i.e. intergovernmental vs. supranational, learning from the EU for ASEAN’s 
dimension. The chapter will end with a glimpse of other region’s association in Latin America 
i.e. the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERSOSUR) as an additional comparison for ASEAN. 
In chapter four, the author will analyse from a legal perspective, the legal basis that 
might fit the proposed project and its measures on a regional and national level. The analysis 
is including the capacity and role of both Public and Private International Law for settling the 
disputes that may arise by proposing a mechanism, which fits best for settling the disputes of 
this initiative and is expected to be used for other economic matter settlements. This chapter 
also describes the role of related parties that support the author's proposal. This chapter will 
describe also the key issues, which should be taken into consideration for further research 
related to such initiative. In this chapter, the author would like to explain the role of the 
Working Committee on Payment and Settlement System (WC-PSS) and the relation to the 
proposed project, which also might be able to support the author’s proposal and finally 
supporting the objective of the WC-PSS and ultimately, the objective of the AEC.   
The author will then elaborate in chapter five the role of Indonesia in ASEAN and the 
development of Payment Systems to support the AEC, including the challenges for Indonesia 
in facing the AEC 2015. 
Finally, the conclusions will be presented in chapter six and this will be the end of the 
discussion on the legal basis of implementing the initiative for an integrated payment system 
(RTGS) and the possibility of adopting the conduct of the EU. In this chapter, the author also 
includes suggestions and recommendations for the next step and for further research. 





A PERSPECTIVE TO AN INTEGRATED 
PAYMENT SYSTEM (RTGS) IN ASEAN 
 
1. The Key Concept of Payment System 
1.1 Introduction 
The commitment of AEC 2015 triggered the ASEAN members to raise the level of 
economic integration. The movement to conclude Free Trade Agreements prompted the 
ASEAN leaders to start the creation of a common market through the strengthening of 
financial cooperation. The rapid movement of cross-border transactions among the ASEAN 
members and global trends such as the formation of regional economic zones in European 
Union, inspired the ASEAN leaders to create a single market among its members. 
From this perspective, it can be seen that the purpose of establishment is not only for 
common interests, but also for the long-term economic development in the region. The 
payment systems integration is one of the targets that ASEAN need to achieve. Properly 
functioning payment systems enhance the stability of the financial system, reduce transaction 
costs in the economy, promote the efficient use of financial resources, improve financial 
market liquidity and facilitate the conduct of monetary policy.
33
 Payment systems may be 
beneficial not only for government but also for private sectors and customers. The key factors 
in payment systems are safety, reliability and efficiency. Safety means that every transaction 
should be safe starting from the sender to the receiver, no matter what the amount is. 
Reliability means that the system can be trusted and can be developed accordingly. Efficiency 
means that the transaction should be less costly and should arrive in a timely manner in the 
hand of beneficiary (receiver).  
In this chapter, the author provides an overview of the concept of payment system, 
such as instruments, principles and responsibilities for Financial Market Infrastructures 
(FMIs) and Payment System (RTGS) as key concept of integration for ASEAN; the role of 
payment system in a market economy and regional payment system integration. 
                                                 
33
Wilhelmina C.Mañalac,  Agnes M. Yap and Magno Torreja, Jr., “Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System 
and Its Implications for Central Banking”, Bangkok Sentral Review, 2003, pp.23. See further at 
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/publications/2003/BSR2003_03.pdf, last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
   
12 
 
1.2 Global Perspectives on Payment Systems 
A payment system, according to Humphrey, at its most basic level, is merely an agreed 
upon way to transfer value between buyers and sellers within a transaction.
34
 Rodrigo in his 
opinions states that a payment system is a network of banks in which funds transfers are made 
during the day.
35
 Torreja points that the payment system is important for the smooth 
functioning and integration of the financial market.
36
 The payment system also affects the 
transmission process in monetary management, the pace of financial deepening, and the 
efficiency of financial intermediation. Thus, monetary authorities have typically been active 




A country’s payment system relies on both cash and non-cash payments. Cash is 
provided by the government, while non-cash payments are typically provided by the banking 
system using either deposit balances in transaction accounts or credit balances.
38
 The further 
shift from paper to electronic payments is quite recent, starting only about 20 years ago.
39
 
Many countries around the world have already recognized the alterations of the payment 
systems. Payment systems at the beginning were provided by the central bank. Later, new 
technology became so rapid and the involvement of private sectors as a provider of payment 
systems plays an important role in the payment systems industry, such as the Singapore dollar 
(SGD) cheque clearing, the US dollar (USD) cheque clearing and the interbank GIRO 
clearing services provided by the Singapore Automated Clearing House (SACH), which is 
operated by the Banking Computer Services Pte Ltd (BCS).
40
 
The term “clearing” is the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, 
confirming payment orders or security transfer instructions prior to settlement, possibly 
including the netting of instructions and the establishment of final positions for settlement. 
Sometimes the term is used (imprecisely) to include settlement.
41
 In other words, it is a due 
process that serves as a mechanism for the settlement of obligations among the parties, 
usually between banks. In this case, two or more banks should fulfil their obligation for 
                                                 
34David. B. Humphrey,  “Payment Systems: Principles, Practice, and Improvements”, World Bank Technical 
Paper vol.23 No. 260, 1995,pp.3. See further at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent 
Server/IW3P/IB/ 1999/08/15/000009265_3970311122858/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf, last accessed on 
January 15, 2015. 
35Rodrigo Penaloza, “A Duality theory of payment system”, Journal of Mathematical Economics 45, Elsevier 
B.V, 2009, pp.679-692. 
36Magno L. Torreja Jr., “The Payment and Settlement Systems in the Seacen Countries”, The South East Asian 




Diana Hancock, and David B Humphrey, “Payment Transactions, instruments, and systems: A Survey”, 




Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) appoints the private sector as a provider for clearing house. 
41Committee on Payment and Settlement System, “A Glossary of Terms Used in Payment and Settlement 
Systems”, Bank for International Settlements, March 2003, p.13. 
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money exchanged which effected from their transactions and this must be cleared and settled 
among them before final payment. The term of settlement signifies the completion of a 
transaction, wherein the sellers transfer securities or financial instruments to the buyer and the 
buyer transfers money to the seller, usually known as final settlement which is an irrevocable 
and unconditional transfer which effects a discharge of the obligation to make the transfer.
42
 
In this sense, a payment system comprises of three main elements or processes:
43
 
“1. payment instruments, which are a means of authorizing and submitting a 
payment (i.e. the means by which the payer gives its bank authorization for 
funds to be transferred or the means by which the payee gives its bank 
instructions for funds to be collected from the payer); 
2.  processing (including clearing), which involves the payment instruction 
being exchanged between the banks (and accounts) concerned;  
3.  a means of settlement for the relevant banks (i.e. the payer’s bank has to 
compensate the payee’s bank, either bilaterally or through accounts that the 
two banks hold with a third-party settlement agent).” 
A payment system also relies on institutions that provide payment accounts, 
instruments and services to customers (including consumers, businesses and public 
administrations) and also on organizations that operate payment, clearing and settlement 
services (such as interbank funds transfer systems).
44
  
Nakajima states that the evolution of the payment systems will never stop. Payment 
systems are social infrastructures that support all economic activities, and the financial market 
will require in the future more sophisticated payment systems with greater safety and 
efficiency.
45
 The author agrees with Masashi’s opinion that the payment system development 
is always revolutionized and should be followed by dynamic regulations, but the regulation 
itself usually comes up relatively late. The author also argues that safety and efficiency are the 
most important elements in the payment systems development and they support the functions 
of the financial market and the financial system. 
1.3 The Component of Payment Systems 
Payment systems, which consist of a legal framework, rules, institutions, and technical 
mechanisms for the transfer of money, according to B. Summers are an integral part of the 
monetary and financial systems in a smoothly operating market economy.
46
 According to 
                                                 
42
Ibid., pp.24 and 45. 
43




Masashi Nakajima, “The Evolution of Payment Systems”, The European Financial Review, Feb 12th, 2012, at 
http://www.Europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=2032, last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
46B. Summers (ed.), “The Payment System: Design, Management, and Supervision”. International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC. 1994. 
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Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia),
47
 the payment system is a 
system that covers the legal and regulatory framework, institutions and mechanisms used to 
transfer funds in order to settle liabilities arising from economic activities. The payment 
systems have components or elements, which explain the complexity of handling an efficient, 
effective and reliable payment system. To a large extent, the efficiency of transactions in a 
market economy is determined by the efficiency of the payment system.
48
 
The components of the payment system contain six elements i.e. policy, institutions, 
payment instruments, operational mechanisms, infrastructure, and legislation. These elements 
are elaborated by the author as follows:
 49
 
 Policy  
The policy component means that a country requires its payment system to match with 
the history, characteristics and needs of that payment system of its country. For 
example, the country whose history and characteristic is a trade nation, has a totally 
different policy in making the payment system from a country in which trade is not so 
needed. The trade countries will need more efficient and sophisticated systems to meet 
their needs, whereas the countries in which trade is not so important will only need a 
simple system to meet their requirements. From this, we can understand that the needs 
of each country in building a payment systems differ from one to another, so that the 
policy to create a payment system will also differ for each country. For example, 
Indonesia and Singapore created a payment system which is also facilitating the use of 




The players who provide payment services generally can be categorized into two big 
parties i.e. banks and non-bank institutions. In Indonesia, the players can be grouped 
into banks and other related institutions.
51
 The banks itself includes the central banks 
                                                 
47
See Sistem Pembayaran Indonesia, at http://www.bi.go.id/en/sistem-pembayaran/di-




See “Know the National Payment System”, at http://www.bi.go.id/en/sistem-
pembayaran/edukasi/Pages/nps.aspx, last accessed on January 15, 2015.  The author summarizes these elements 
with additional explanations. 
50
Giro instrument, is a method of payment which is different from Cheque instrument, where the recipient 
disbursement of funds cannot be received in cash, but through the book-entry to the relevant account (Bank 
Indonesia definition see at. In Indonesia, the total amount of volume/transaction and value of Giro instrument 
always greater than the use of cheque instrument as seen in the statistic in November 2014, at 
http://www.bi.go.id/en/statistik/sistem-pembayaran/kliring/contents/kliring%20debet%20penyerahan.aspx, last 




accessed on January 15, 2015  
51
See EMEAP Red Book 2002 – Indonesia, at http://www.emeap.org/emeapdb/upload/WGMeeting/ 
Payment,clearing%20and%20settlement%20systems%20in%20Indonesia.pdf, last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
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and the commercial banks. The other related institutions called non-bank financial 
institutions, such as leasing companies, venture capital and also postal offices, also 
play an important role as a source of finance but they undertake very limited activities 
with respect to payment services. Malaysia also has two big group play-actors i.e. the 
Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) and the commercial banks in one group and finance 
companies  such as credit/charge card companies.
52
   
 Payment Instrument 
Payment instruments usually are used for retail transactions and divided as follows: 
- Cash Payment  
Cash payment consists of coins and bank notes. Indonesian currency is Rupiah 
and the currency of the other ASEAN countries are Ringgit (Malaysia), 
Singapore Dollar (Singapore), Brunei Dollar (Brunei), Peso (Philippines), Baht 
(Thailand), Vietnamese Dong (Vietnam), Kyat (Myanmar), Cambodian Riel 
(Cambodia), and Lao Kip (Lao PDR). 
- Non-Cash Payment 
 A Cheque is a written order from a customer (the drawer) to his bank (the 
drawee) to pay a specified amount to a third party specified by the drawer.
53
 
Cheques are generally valid until six months after the date of issue and these 
are used for future promise to pay the amount specified on them and must be 
presented to the issuing bank in order to get the payment. 
 A Debit Card is a card enabling the holder to have his purchases directly 
charged to funds on his account at a deposit-taking institution.
54
 From an 
academic perspective, Indiana University has defined the debit card as a 
payment card whose funds are withdrawn directly from the cardholder’s 
checking account.
55
 It means that if the funds in the account of the card 
holders are not sufficient, they are not be able to pay or to make transactions 
with their card. It can be used also for online purchases. The cardholders 




                                                 
52
EMEAP Working Group on Payment and Settlement Systems, Payment System in EMEAP Economies, 
EMEAP Working Group Publication, July 2002, pp. 279-280, at 
http://www.emeap.org/emeapdb/upload%5CPublications%5Credbook.pdf,  last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
53Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), “A glossary of Terms Used in Payments and 
Settlement Systems”, Bank for International Settlements, 2003, pp.12, at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d00b.pdf, 
last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
54
CPSS, Opcit., pp.19. 
55Indiana University website, “Glossary of Payment Card Term”, at http://www.indiana.edu/~iutreas/ 
pmtcardterms.html, last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
56
See Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 7/52/PBI/2005, at http://www.bi.go.id/en/peraturan/sistem-
pembayaran/Pages/pbi_075205_eng.aspx, last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
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 A Credit Card by the definition of Bank Indonesia57 is a Card-Based 
Payment Instrument that may be used to execute a payment of an obligation 
incurred in an economic activity, including purchase transaction and/or a 
cash withdrawal, in which the payment obligation of the cardholder is 
settled in advance by the acquirer or issuer and the cardholder is required to 
fulfil the payment obligation at an agreed term in a single payment or in 
instalments.  It is used for the actual transaction but the payment itself will 
be fulfilled in the future by the cardholders. Credit cards are developed to 
make payments from credit accounts instead of deposit accounts, so 
cardholders can consume first and pay later.
58
 The transactions themselves 
have a limitation amount.  The settlement is at a later date and the 
cardholders are billed on a monthly basis with financial charges (interest 
rate and late charges) for outstanding payment and not made the payment by 
the due date. Additionally, a credit card is a revolving credit instrument, 
which does not need to be paid off in full.
 59
 No late fee is charged as long as 
the minimum payment is made, which carries a balance forward as a loan 
charging interest. The credit card can have a grace period, which the 
customer has to pay only the interest. In addition to payment services, 
international credit cards also offer insurance, concierge and other value-
added services that come to cardholders with the card.
60
   
 Internet and Mobile Banking, according to Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), 
provide a fast and convenient way of performing common banking 
transactions.
61
 According to KPMG, mobile banking refers to platforms that 
enable customers to perform banking activities by way of accessing their 
accounts and doing other financial services such as transfers, bill payments, 
balance information and investment options.
62
 BNM also enables payments 
                                                 
57
Ibid. 
58Kuo Hsing Chang, “The Development of E-Payments and Challenges in the Republic of China (Taiwan)”, in 
Vincent Lim Choon Seng (Project Leader), “The Development of E-Payments and Challenges for Central Banks 
in the SEACEN Countries”,  the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN Center), 2008, pp.230.  See further 
at http://www.seacen.org/GUI/pdf/publications/research_proj/2008/rp71/rp71_complete.pdf, last accessed on 
January 15, 2015. 
59
Monetary Institutions and Mechanisms, available at, http://www.econ.ubbcluj.ro/programe_practica/Manual 
_pentru_examenul_de_licenta_Finante_banci_linia_engleza.pdf last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
60
Ann Borestam, Heiko Schmiedel, European Central Bank, Occassional Paper Series No.131/September 2011, 
Interchanges Fees in Card payment System at http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp131.pdf, last 
accessed in January 15, 2015.  In the EU, for example, the credit card schemes as three -party schemes are 
American Express and Diner’s Club, and four-party schemes are debit and credit card schemes comprise Visa 
Europe, MasterCard and Cartes Bancaires. 
61BNM website, “Types of retail payment channels”, at http://www.bnm.gov.my/payment/0104_types.htm, last 
accessed on January 15, 2015. 
62See KPMG website, “Monetizing Mobile: How banks are preserving their place in the payment value chain”, 
July 2011, at https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Monetizing-
mobile-201107.pdf, last accessed January 15, 2015.  There is a difference with mobile payment which is defined 
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to selected merchants by using mobile phones. Other ASEAN countries, 
which also develop the use of mobile payment, are Indonesia and 
Philippines. 
 Operational Mechanisms 
An operational mechanism means that the system should ideally guarantee the smooth 
transfer of funds and security, as well as certainty of the receipt of funds by the 
recipient. In this regard, the system that will be discussed in this research is the Real 
Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system. 
 Infrastructure 
The payment system infrastructure depends on the needs and policies of the central 
bank as the primary role of a country. The more advanced the demands of the capacity 
and capability of the technology, the higher the budget for the system. The payment 
system should have a standard platform based on interoperable standards. This is very 
important in making a uniform platform for the ASEAN member states, as it will be 
easier for the members to run it. 
 Legislation 
The other important component is legislation. The rules will govern the numerous 
participants involved, such as, banks, the capital market, clearing institutions and even 
between central banks. The regulations are needed to legitimate the implementation of 
payment systems. They are also needed to support the development of the payment 
systems, and hence, is one of the most important aspects for the payment systems. 
1.4 Types of Payment System 
There are many types of payment systems, but among the members of ASEAN and the 
EU, the categories of types of payment systems seem to be similar. There are basically two 
types of payment systems: the Deferred Net Settlement (DNS) system and Real Time Gross 
Settlement (RTGS) System, which is recommended by the Bank for International Settlement 
(BIS).
63
 Like the above mentioned, with net settlement system, banks obviously spend less on 
liquidity needs, but are vulnerable to systemic risks. By using gross settlement system 
(RTGS), interbank payments are settled at once as they send the money. Hence, this clearly 
reduces the risks because there is no time lag between delivery of payment order and 
settlement.  
                                                                                                                                                        
as  the process of using a hand-held device to pay for a product or service, either remotely or at a point-of-sale. 
KPMG International conducted a set of studies to develop a clearer picture of the current – and more 
importantly, the future – mobile banking landscape. 
63
Penaloza, Opcit. 
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1.4.1 Types of Payment System in ASEAN 
- In Indonesia, Bank Indonesia divides payment systems into eleven parts64. But the 
Interbank payment system itself in Indonesia is divided into two types of payments i.e. 
the Large Value Payments named BI-RTGS and the Retail Payments. Retail Payments 
are settled at BI and are divided into two types i.e. Clearing system and ATM Bersama 
(Credit Card/Shared ATM). The other credit card/shared ATM transactions settled by 
commercial banks are ALTO, CAKRA, Flash and ATM BCA. The securities settlement 
system is regulated by a Security Body and its sub body, PT KSEI whereby transactions 
are settled by its appointed settlement banks
65




Various Payment Systems in Indonesia 
 
System Transactions Processed Operator Members 
Bank Indonesia Real Time Gross 
Settlement (BI-RTGS) System 
-    High value interbank 
electronic funds transfers 
-    Settlement: interbank 
money market, customer 
transfers, government 
transactions and monetary 
management 
-    Funds settlement for 
Bank Indonesia Certificates 
and Government Securities 
traded on the BI-Scripless 
Securities Settlement System 
(BI-SSSS) 
Bank Indonesia -    All banks in Indonesia, 
including sharia divisions (143 
banks) 
-    One switching company 
Bank Indonesia Clearing System -    Debit funds transfers by 
means of electronically 
processed cheques, bilyet 
giro, debit notes 
-    Credit funds transfers 
processed electronically for 
small payments 
Bank Indonesia All banks in Indonesia (143 
banks including all branch 
offices numbering about 2100) 
  
Central Depository and Book 
Entry Settlement System (C-
BEST) 
Funds settlement for 
securities transactions on the 
capital market 
Indonesian Central 
Depository (PT KSEI) 
All stock exchange members, 
funds settlement conducted 
through 4 settlement banks 
where stock exchange members 
maintain settlement accounts 
Shared ATM Network – 
National Brands 
Electronic funds transfers by 
means of ATM cards 
PT Artajasa Pembayaran 
Elektronis (ATM 
67 banks are members of the 
ATM-Bersama network, 
interbank settlement processed 
                                                 
64
Bank Indonesia website, “Payment System in Indonesia”, at http://www.bi.go.id/en/sistem-pembayaran/di-
indonesia/perkembangan/Contents/Default.aspx, last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
65
Ibid. 
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System Transactions Processed Operator Members 
Bersama) through the BI-RTGS system 
  LINK 4 state banks, interbank 
settlement processed through the 
BI-RTGS system 
  PT Rintis Sejahtera 
(PRIMA) 
ATM and Debit Prima network 
settlement processed through 
member accounts at BCA. 
Membership totals 25 banks. 
  PT Daya Network Lestari 
(ALTO) 
15 banks are members of the 
ALTO network, settlement 
processed through member 
accounts at one member bank. 
  Cakra 3 banks are members of the 
Cakra network, settlement 
processed through member 
accounts at one member bank. 
Intrabank ATM Networks Electronic funds transfers 
using ATM cards for book 
entry account transfers at 
the same bank. 
70 banks provide this 
facility 
- 
Shared ATM Network – 
International Brands 
  MasterCard International 
(Cirrus) 
9 banks are Cirrus members, 
settlement processed through 
member accounts at one 
member bank. 
  Visa International (Plus) 10 banks are Plus members, 
settlement processed through 
member accounts at one 
member bank. 
  Others - 
Debit Card Networks – National 
Brands 
Electronic transfer at Point 
of Sale (POS) 
BCA (Debit BCA) 16 banks are members of Debit 
BCA 
  Kartuku 2 banks are members, settlement 
processed through member 
accounts at one member bank.  
Debit Card Networks – 
International Brands 
  Visa International (Visa 
Electron) 
10 banks are members, 
settlement processed through 
member accounts at one 
member bank. 
  MasterCard International 
(Maestro) 
9 banks are members, settlement 
processed through member 
accounts at one member bank. 
Credit Card Networks Electronic payment by credit 
card 
Visa International 15 banks are members, 
settlement processed through 
member accounts at one 
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System Transactions Processed Operator Members 
member bank. 
  MasterCard International 13 banks and 1 NBFI are 
members, settlement processed 
through member accounts at one 
member bank. 
  JCB 2 banks are members, settlement 
processed through member 
accounts at one member bank. 
  Diners Club 1 member (Diners) 
      
Funds transfers/remittances – 
domestic networks 
  PT Pos Indonesia (postal 
money orders) 
- 
  Courier companies 
providing cash delivery 
services 
- 
  Other companies 
specialising in remittance 
services 
- 
  Money changers offering 
remittance services 
- 
  Shops and travel agents 
also offering remittance 
services 
- 
  Others (not identified)   
Funds transfers/remittances  - 
international networks 
Funds transfers/remittances 
with receipt in cash or 
beneficiary account - 
international payments only. 
Western Union One bank, PT Pos Indonesia and 
non-bank companies operating 
as agents for Western Union 
    Money Gram Some banks and non-bank 
companies, such as shops and 
travel agents, operating as 
agents for Money Gram. 
    Others (not identified) - 
Source: Bank Indonesia 
- In Thailand, Bank of Thailand (BoT) classifies payment instruments into seven 
channels,
66
 i.e. use of cash, cheque, high-value funds transfer called BAHTNET, bulk 
payment, retail funds transfer
67
, electronic card and e-money.    
                                                 
66Bank of Thailand website, “Payment Systems Report 2012”, Payment System Committee of BoT, 2012, pp. 48-
70.  See further at http://www.bot.or.th/English/PaymentSystems/Publication/ps_annually_report/Documents/ 
Payment_2012_E.pdf,  last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
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- In Malaysia, BNM68 categorizes payments into two groups: Large Value Payment 
Systems (RENTAS) and Retail Payment System. The latter is further divided into three, 
based on the types of retail payment systems, payment instruments and payment 
channels (see Figure 1). Amir
69
 in his paper categorizes payment systems into four big 
groups: The Large Value Payment Systems named the Real-Time Electronic Transfer of 
Funds and Securities (Sistem Pemindahan Dana dan Sekuriti secara Elektronik Masa 
Nyata, also known as RENTAS); the National Image-based Check Settlement System, 
(Sistem Penjelasan Imej Cek Kebangsaan, also known as SPICK); the Automated Teller 
Machine (ATM) and other retail payment networks; and the Clearinghouse operating 
under the control of the Malaysia Securities Exchange Berhad and the Malaysia 


















Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
- Vietnam, as the new ASEAN member, also has similar payment system types.  
According to Le Anh Dung, the electronic payment systems are divided into three i.e. 
the inter-bank electronic payment system (IBPS), Electronic Clearing System and Card 
Payment System.
70
  The IBPS is composed of two sub-systems: High Value Sub-system 
                                                                                                                                                        
67
Ibid. Retail funds transfer is divided into in-house funds transfer and Online Retail Funds Transfer (ORFT). 
ORFT is a service where a customer can transfer funds through the ATM, at the counter, or through the internet 
where the receiver’s bank account will be credited instantaneously. 
68
BNM website, “Payment systems in Malaysia”, at http://www.bnm.gov.my/payment/0104_types.htm, last 
accessed on January 16, 2015. 
69Basir, Amir Akmar, “Payment Systems in Malaysia: Recent Developments and Issues”, ADBI Working Paper 
Series No. 151, 2009, pp.1. 
70Le Anh Dung, “The Development of E-Payments and Challenges in Vietnam”,  in Vincent Lim Choon Seng 
(Project Leader), “The Development of E-Payments and Challenges for Central Banks in the SEACEN 
Countries”,  the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN Center), 2008, pp.318.  See further at 
http://www.seacen.org/GUI/pdf/publications/research_proj/2008/rp71/rp71_complete.pdf, last accessed on 
January 16, 2015. 
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(HVTS), the RTGS for large-amount remittances on a gross basis, and Low Value Sub-
system (LVTS) for small-amount remittances on a net basis.
71
  
- In Philippines, there are six major payment, clearing and settlement systems i.e. 
Electronic Check Clearing System (ECCS), Electronic Peso Clearing and Settlement 
System (EPCS), Philippine Domestic Dollar Transfer System (PDDTS), Philippines 
Dealing System (PDS) Settlement Highway (PSH), Automated Teller Machine (ATM) 




- In Cambodia, they divide the payment mechanisms and credit instruments into two 
distinct major types based on The Negotiable Instruments and Payment Transactions 
Law (The NIPTL of Cambodia).
73
  The first one is Negotiable Instruments, namely 
checks, bills of exchange and promissory notes. The second type covers payment 
transactions: non-cash payments carried out through banks, executed in either electronic 
or paper-based systems. 
1.4.2 Types of Payment System in the European Union  
- In De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), payment systems are categorized into two: Interpay 
and Top/Target (see Table 2). Interpay Nederland B.V. is the central clearing institute 
for retail payments set up by the banks with a view of promoting and maintaining 
efficient payment processing and reliable payment systems.
74
 Large value payments are 
processed via TOP, the RTGS system, which is owned and operated by the Netherlands 
Bank. TOP was also developed to cross-border payments via TARGET
75
, to which TOP 
is linked.
76
 The European Union countries have all installed RTGS systems.
77
  These 
systems, in turn will be linked through the proposed Trans-European Automated Real-











 See BSP website, “What is a Payment System?”, at http://www.bsp.gov.ph/financial/payments/PhilPaSS.pdf, 
last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
73Geva, Benjamin, “Payment System Modernization and Law Reform in Developing Nations: Lessons from 
Cambodia and Sri Lanka”, Banking Law Journal, ALEXeSOLUTIONS, Inc, May 2009. 
74The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Group of Ten Countries in Red Books, “Payment 
and settlement systems in selected countries”, Bank for International Settlements, 2003, pp.297. 
75
After the RTGS is linked with the TARGET system, the RTGS system is replaced by TARGET which is 
operated by the DNB but is no longer owned by the DNB. 
76
Red Books, Opcit, pp.291. 
77Furfine,Craig H. and Jeff Stehm, “Analyzing alternative intraday credit policies in real-time gross settlement 
systems”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30, Ohio State University Press, 1998, pp.833. 
78
European Union Report 1992, 1993 and Gianninni and Monticelli 1995, in Craig H. Furfine, and Jeff Stehm, 
“Analyzing alternative intraday credit policies in real-time gross settlement systems”, Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking 30, Ohio State University Press, 1998, pp.833. 




Payment systems in the Netherlands 
 
Payment systems Assessment of setup Assessment of operation 
Interpay DNB DNB 
TOP/TARGET DNB DNB 
Source: http://www.bis.org/cpss/paysys/NetherlandsComp.pdf, last accessed on January 15, 2015. 
(modified)  
 
- The structure of the French payment systems is also divided into two types of payment 
systems: retail payment system and large value payment systems (see Figure 2).
79
 The 
single retail system is operated by the French automated clearing house, SIT, which is 
managed by the GSIT, a group of 17 participants (including the Bank of France). The 
large value operations are processed in two systems: the RTGS system Transferts 
Banque de France (TBF), which is the French component of TARGET, managed and 
operated by the Bank of France; and the Hybrid system Paris Net Settlement (PNS), 
managed and operated by the Centrale des Reglements Interbancaires (CRI), an 
























Retail payment system Large-value payment system 
 
Source: BIS – Red Books, pp.122 
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BIS, Red Books, Opcit.,pp.122. 
80
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1.5 Payment System Risks 
Like other systems, payment systems also have risks. The Federal Reserve states that 
the basic risks in payment and settlement systems are credit risk, liquidity risk, operational 
risk, and legal risk.
81
 In the context of this policy, these risks are defined as follows:
82
 
“ -  Credit Risk. The risk that a counterparty will not settle an obligation for full 
value either when due, or anytime thereafter. 
-    Liquidity Risk. The risk that a counterparty will not settle an obligation for 
full value when due.  
-  Operational Risk. The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people, and systems, or from external events. This type of risk 
includes various physical and information security risks. 
-   Legal Risk. The risk of loss because of the unexpected application of a law or 
regulation or because a contract cannot be enforced.” 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), 
also identified the possible risks related to payment systems, as follows:
83
  
“- Credit risk.  The risk that a party within the system will be unable to fully 
meet its financial obligations within the system either when due or at any 
time in the future; 
- Liquidity risk.  The risk that a party within the system will have insufficient 
funds to meet financial obligations within the system as and when expected, 
although it may be able to do so at some time in the future; 
- Legal risk.  The risk that a poor legal framework or legal uncertainties will 
cause or exacerbate credit or liquidity risks; 
- Operational risk.  The risk that operational factors such as technical 
malfunctions or operational mistakes will cause or exacerbate credit or 
liquidity risks; and 
- Systemic risk.  The risk that the inability of one of the participants to meet its 
obligations, or a disruption in the system itself, could result in the inability of 
other system participants or of financial institutions in other parts of the 
financial system to meet their obligations as they become due.  Such a failure 
could cause widespread liquidity or credit problems and, as a result, could 
threaten the stability of the system or financial markets.” 
                                                 
81See FRB, “Risks in Payment and Settlement Systems”, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems 
/psr_policy.htm#risks, last accessed on January 19, 2015. 
82
Ibid.  These definitions of credit risk, liquidity risk, and legal risk are derived from those presented in the Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (Core Principles) and the Recommendations for 
Securities Settlement Systems (RSSS).  The definition of operational risk is derived from the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision's "Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk,".  Each of 
these definitions is largely consistent with those included in the Recommendations for Central Counterparties. 
83Committee on Payment and Settlement System, “Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment 
Systems”, BIS Information, Press and Library services, 2001, pp.5, and see also BSP website, BSP website, 
“What is a Payment System?”, Opcit.. 
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Hancock has a different opinion. Fraud, operational and systemic risks exist in all 
payment systems.
84
 Hancock further explains that: 
“Fraud risk is addressed through proper internal payment processing 
procedures and insurance. Operational risk is addressed through limited access 
to sensitive facilities and, especially for large-value payment networks, the 
establishment of back-up or duplicate computer facilities.
85
 The systemic risk 
involves the potential for a domino-like series of failures among participants on 
a payment network resulting from the unexpected failure of one or more 
participants to settle their intra-day net debit positions.”  
In gross settlement, such risks is less than in net deferred settlement. In gross 
settlement, for example, credit risk and settlement risk, is reduced because cash is transferred 
between banks continuously in real time, transaction by transaction. Every payment is settled 
finally and irrevocably in central bank money.
86
 Bank of Thailand also states the following
87
:  
“Risks in payment systems refer to the possibility of payments being incomplete.  
Such risks generally exist in the payment systems that are not settled on a real-
time basis i.e. net settlement systems, whereby the longer the time difference 
between payment and settlement time, the higher the risk exposure it is.  
Moreover, the risks will also depend on the volume and value of transactions in 
the payment system.  Causes of payment system risks vary to the type of risks, 
major causes are counter party risk i.e., Liquidity and Credit Risks” 
 
So, the author argues that a net settlement system is a designated time settlement 
system, in which final settlement takes place at a certain time, at the end of the day. On the 
other hand, the RTGS system has two structures. The first one is that the settlement of funds 
occurs on a gross basis and the second part is the payment becomes final immediately. We 
can conclude that the RTGS system is less risky than the netting system. 
Masashi emphasizes that the RTGS system is far superior to the DNS system in terms 
of settlement risk.
88
 He describes that the RTGS system achieves finality earlier, which 
reduces credit and liquidity risk. On top of this, he states that there is no “systemic risk” in the 
RTGS system. The author agrees with his statement that the RTGS diminishes credit and 
                                                 
84
Hancock, Opcit. 
85In some cases, the duplicate facilities are “hot” meaning that in the event of a breakdown there is an automatic 
transition to the other facility.  
86SWIFT, “Reducing Risk and Increasing Resilience in RTGS Payment Systems”, MIRS SWIFT, 2014, pp.4. In 
an RTGS system, individual payments are settled one by one, usually in central bank money, with immediate 
finality. As a result, RTGS settlement in central bank money eliminates credit risk for other participants in the 
system.  See further:  Tom Kokkola, (ed).,  “The Payment System”, Opcit. 
87
See Bank of Thailand, “Risks in payment systems”, at http://www.bot.or.th/English/ 
PaymentSystems/Others/PS_Risk /Pages/ PS_Risk.aspx, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
88
Masashi Nakajima, Opcit. This “settlement risk” includes, in particular, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational 
risk and legal risk. See also: Tom Kokkola, (ed).,  “The Payment System”, Opcit. 
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liquidity risk because the RTGS’ maxim is “no funds no game”. The author adds that a good 
system should be followed with sufficient regulations. 
1.6 Significant Factors in Payment and Settlement System 
A payment system must be tailor-made or specially designed to meet and satisfy the 
unique requirements of a particular country.
89
 This means that each country is able to design 
the payment and settlement system according to its own characteristics. However, there are 
significant factors that should be complied with for the success of the systems. Negret, et al, 
describe these factors as follows:
90
 
“-  Speed. Users must be confident that a payment, which has been initiated, 
will be completed to the right party for the correct amount and within a 
prescribed period of time. 
- Certainty.  A critical requirement in any payment system concerns certainty 
of payment, that is, the point at which funds are irrevocably available for 
use and there is settlement finality.  Payments can carry immediate finality, 
so that the funds are irrevocably available for use without delay. 
- Reliability.  A payment system must be reliable if it is to maintain user 
confidence.  Although no system will always operate faultlessly, all systems 
must have adequate contingency or fall-back provisions and controls, and 
adequate backup capabilities in case one or more major processing 
stations fail. 
- Safety and Security.  The safety and security of payments are important.  
Particular attention must be given to fraud control and credit risk control 
related laws and rules to resolve disputes promptly and fairly.  Special 
attention must likewise be given to adequate arrangements for protection 
against unauthorized access or tampering with payment system data, and to 
a mechanism that will ensure confidentiality and minimize exposures 
among participants.” 
2. RTGS System 
The author would like to focus on, and bring the attention to the inter-bank funds 
transfer system called Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) also known as a Large Value or 
High Value payment system (HVPS) transfer transaction which has no credit risk.  The RTGS 
is the continuous (real-time) settlement of funds or securities transfers individually on an 
order-by-order or gross basis (without netting).
91
  Real time means that the processing of 
                                                 
89
Torreja Jr., Opcit. pp.18. 
90Negret F.M., Keppler R., “Project Design for Payment System,” Public Policy for the Private Sector, The 
World Bank, FPD Note No.37, March 1995, pp.2-5, in Magno L. Torreja Jr., “The Payment and Settlement 
Systems in the Seacen Countries”, The South East Asian Central Banks Research and Training Centre, vol.1. 
2001. pp.18. 
91Committee on Payment and Settlement System, “A Glossary of Terms Used in Payment and Settlement 
Systems”, Opcit., pp.41. 
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instructions is done on an individual basis at the time they are received rather than at some 
later time
92
 or the transaction takes into effect as soon as funds are transferred by the remitting 
bank. Gross basis means that the transaction is settled on one to one basis without being 
bundled with any other transaction. This payment and settlement system clearly reduces the 
risks of the member of banks and provides speed, certainty of finality, reliability and safety 
and security. This system would be further explained and discussed, as part of an integration 
payment and settlement system among the ASEAN members. 
As mentioned above, an RTGS system is defined as a gross settlement system in 
which both processing and final settlement of funds transfer instructions can take place 
continuously (i.e. in real time).  As its name, all settled transactions are considered as final 
and irrevocable. Thus the receiver is able to use the funds immediately without being exposed 
to the risk of the funds not being settled.
93
 
As its name, indicates, it is used for a large value or wholesale intra banks payment, so 
for these large transactions, the participating banks should have the holding of liquid assets in 
their central bank accounts, which is costly for them.  Related to this issue, Charles and 
William state that in almost all RTGS systems, central banks provide intraday credit to 
participating banks.
94
 The terms for such credit vary from system to system, though, in most 
cases, credit is only available in limited amounts or at some cost. 
With respect to the cost, Furfine and Stehm take into account the design of an RTGS 
payment system, especially concerning the intraday credit.
95
 The design of placing intraday 
credit must be well organized in order to avoid the participants’ reluctance in processing 
payments using an RTGS system as a consequence of certain expenses that the system 
imposes on its members.  This should be the ASEAN central banks’ concern to manage the 
cost of intraday credit as one important factor in determining the cost of RTGS for 
participants.  Since it is technical, the author will not discuss this issue.
96
  The flow of RTGS 








Torreja Jr., Opcit., pp.78. 
94Charles M. Kahn., William Roberds., “Real-time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics 47, Elsevier Science B.V. 2001, pp.200-319. 
95Craig H. Furfine, Jeff Stehm, “Analyzing alternative intraday credit policies in real-time gross settlement 
systems”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30, Ohio State University Press, 1998, pp.832-848. 
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The author does not want to describe further of intraday credit because it is too technical.  It simply can be said 
that intraday credit is for a participant that needs some loan for smoothing its transaction because on that day the 
participant does not have sufficient funds to make transactions. This credit should be paid back in the end of the 
day. There is a right and obligation related to this credit. 






Source: the author 
 
2.1 The Characteristics of the RTGS 
The characteristics of the RTGS are similar in most countries. The author would like 
to summarize the key characteristics Bank Indonesia provided, as an example:
97
 
1. V-shaped structure.   
It means that the message is conveyed from sending members to receiving members 
through BI-RTGS. This structure explains that all information pertaining to a 
transaction will be transmitted by the sending member to the RTGS Central Computer 
(RCC) and forwarded to the receiving member if the transfer is settled by BI.
98
  
2. Members.  
The BI-RTGS has two categories of members: Principal members (direct participants) 
and subsidiary members (indirect participants).  There are two tier systems. 
                                                 
97Bank Indonesia, “The Bank Indonesia Real Time Gross Settlement (BI-RTGS) System”, 2006.  See further at 
http://www.bi.go.id/id/sistem-pembayaran/sistem-setelmen/bi-rtgs/Documents/SistemBIRTGS.pdf, last accessed 
on January 16, 2015. 
98
V-shaped structure with messages, conveyed from sending members to receiving members through Bank 
Indonesia in its capacity as the RTGS operator.  In this structure, the message with all the information related to 
the payment is initially passed to the central bank and is simultaneously sent to the receiving bank after the 
transfer has been settled by the central bank. Y-shaped structure uses the swift network and the information 
exchanged between the sending and the receiving bank is not acknowledged by the central bank as a settlement 
operator. The central bank only checks the sufficient money of the account of the participants and then informs 
the network. 
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3. Mechanism.   
The mechanism of BI-RTGS is similar to other RTGS among the ASEAN members. 
There are two terminals, i.e. RTGS Terminal (RT) for sending a message which is 
received by BI in RTGS Central Computer (RCC).  RCC then checks for sufficient 
balance in the account of the sending member and if it is the case, the transactions will 
be posted simultaneously to the account of the sending members and the receiving 
members. 
4. Window Time.   
The time available is from 06.00 until 16.30 hours of local time.  It can be prolonged 
to accommodate needs.  The window time depends on the policy of each central bank, 
including holidays.  
5. No Money No Game.   
This is also similar to other RTGS system. This means that the members have to 
manage their liquidity with great care to ensure that all transactions can be duly 
settled. This is what we call a credit transfer, which means that if there is no sufficient 
money in the account of the bank,
99
 the transaction will be stopped or delayed by the 
system. 
6. Capping.   
BI has determined a cap on clearing transactions in order to reduce the number of 
transactions processed in clearing so that the net settlement risks are minimized.   
7. Queue Management and Gridlock Resolutions (GR).   
Once the balance account of the member to be debited is less than the transaction that 
they sent, the transaction will be placed in the BI-RTGS queue system. The system has 
priority levels to settle the queuing transaction. BI-RTGS can also detect gridlock, and 
then this GR facility will operate either automatically or manually. 
8. Intraday Liquidity Facility (FLI) and Short-Term Funding Facility/STFF (Fasilitas 
Pendanaan Jangka Pendek/FPJP).   
As explained above, members of RTGS are required to maintain considerably large 
amounts of liquidity during the day.  To have this facility, the members must have a 
fairly sound rating and must pledge collateral with very liquid assets, such as 
government bonds.  Should the members be unable to make repayment of the FLI they 
received from Bank Indonesia, it will be converted into an overnight FPJP. Until T+1, 
if the members still have insufficient funds for repayment of the FPJP, then the 
repayment shall be settled by liquidating the collateral. 
These characteristics, once again, are generally similar to the ones seen in the ASEAN 
members and most of the countries in the world.  The differences in the system of every 
member country are commonly concerned with: (1) the amount or percentages of the 
                                                 
99
When the banks have no sufficient money, they can use intraday liquidity facility to continue transactions. This 
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collateral that should be pledged in the Central Bank account; and (2) the repayment period or 
what we call the management credit and liquidity risks policy. In Vietnam, for example, SBV 
requires the member banks to deposit valuable securities (including government bonds) as a 
collateral with SBV before they may receive such facilities. SBV will sell the collateral if, 
after providing overnight facilities, there is still no fund repayment within four days.
100
 
2.2 The Benefits of RTGS system 
The benefits of an RTGS system to its major users are the following:
101
 
1. Flexible liquidity management. 
In RTGS, liquidity will be available to participants at all times through provision of 
collateralized intraday credit to the participants. The participants can ask for the 
liquidity at any time during the window time. This system is better than netting 
settlement, where the liquidity is trapped until end-of-day settlement. 
2. Risk reduction. 
An RTGS system can provide a firm foundation for the management of  payments 
system risks as it can give participants the possibility of settling payments in central 
bank money with immediate finality, thus eliminating the settlement risk between 
participants, which is inherent in other payments mechanisms. This means that 
participants will, in principle, only pass on customer money that they receive to the 
final beneficiary without any credit risk (no money no game). 
3. Real-time operation. 
For cross-border RTGS payments, under normal circumstances, the lag time between 
the debiting of the account of the sending participant and the crediting of the account 
of the beneficiary participant will almost be nil.
102
 The rapid processing of funds, 
which will be credited to the appropriate account with finality, will yield direct 
benefits for participants. Moreover, with RTGS, international corporate cash 
management will be able to make substantial efficiency gains. The real-time execution 




                                                 
100Naoyoshi Kinukawa and Sumino Kamei, “Settlement Systems of East Asian Economies: Vietnam”, Institute 
for International Monetary Affairs, March 2004, pp.100.  See at: https://www.mof.go.jp/english/ 
international_policy/others/sseae2004/ , last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
101
Summarizing from Wilhelmina, Opcit.
 
Major users in this term are the participants in the following 
transactions: a) business to corporate; b) corporate to corporate; and c) bank to bank
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Theoretically, according to the ECB, the RTGS system needs less than 5 minutes to process the money from 
the transferring to the receiving money. See at http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/paym/t2/html/index.en.html, last 
accessed on January 16, 2015. 
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4. Accurate and reliable transmission of information in RTGS payment messages. 
No payment-related information will be lost in RTGS. The payment instruction, if 
provided in accordance with the standards, will always be forwarded in its entirety to 
the beneficiary participant. It means that the participants will get the complete 
confirmation report.  
5. Cost savings. 
The fee charged for RTGS transactions will be based on the number of transactions 




“-  Incoming funds will be available for immediate re-use; 
- It will be possible to reconcile accounts on an intraday basis; 
- Immediate reaction will be possible should any problem arise with 
regard to the transfer of a payment; and 
- The need to split liquidity among several payments systems during the 
day can be avoided.” 
It is clear that by using an RTGS system, the results in terms of cost saving by some 
means will add profit for the users. 
6. Cost of the RTGS system: liquidity requirements    
Intraday liquidity requirements raise important issues for both the central bank and the 
private sector. Central banks, for their part, face a choice of whether or not to provide 
banks with intraday liquidity and if so, what form will that provision take (e.g., by 
what mechanisms and on what terms will the credit be provided and how will any 
resulting exposures be managed). Each central bank has its own policy standpoints to 
decide a mechanism to provide liquidity for their participants, but generally the central 




From the perspective of individual banks, intraday liquidity requirements can lead to 
concerns about the associated costs. The author argues that usually there will be other 
related costs, which may include interest paid or fees on central bank credit or 
opportunity costs of tying up collateral or securities. 
The intraday liquidity requirements under an RTGS system depend critically on:
106
  
                                                                                                                                                        
offsetting entry is made to the account of the entity receiving the payment. Because of the float, some parties 
may have the use of funds that enter the payment process at the expense of others who are legally due the funds. 
104
Wilhelmina, Opcit., pp.27. 
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The rules and procedures are referring to BIS Core Principles (CP-SIPS) and Financial Market Infrastructures 
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“(a) the structure of the financial markets and systems (e.g., the 
adequacy of private sector sources of liquidity, the amount of 
collateral/securities available, reserve requirements); and  
(b)   the central bank’s policy regarding the provision of intraday 
credit.  The means by which intraday liquidity is provided can 
significantly affect the extent to which immediate, or at least 
timely, final settlement occurs.  
Ultimately, it can influence the balance between the potential benefits 
and costs of RTGS systems.” 
One important thing that should be well considered is that the RTGS, as a high value 
payment system, must have no credit risk.
107
 In this case, the RTGS or LVPS must be 
categorized as a Systemically Important Payment System (SIPS). Why? Because the safety 
and efficiency of payment systems in the RTGS are significantly important for the effective 
functioning of the financial system. These SIPS principles will be further discussed in the next 
sub chapter.     
2.3 Core Principles for the Systemically Important Payment Systems (the CPSIPS-
RTGS) 
According to Kay Barvell, in the late 1980s, the central bank governors of the G-10 
countries
108
 expressed their concerns about issues involved in cross-border payments.
109
 The 
G-10 decided to create a study group that published a report in 1990,
110
 which analysed issues 
affecting cross-border and multi-currency payment netting schemes. The G-10 also decided to 
create the Committee on Payment and Settlement System (CPSS) and a secretariat under the 
auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), in Basel, Switzerland.   
The BIS has provided guidelines to encourage the design and operation for the safety 
and efficiency of the systemically important payment systems worldwide. CPSS has 
published a report addressed to all central banks and other interested public sector agencies, 
plus all private sectors and operators of payment system. This publication, called the Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (CP-SIPS),
111
 consists of ten 
                                                 
107Based on the rule of game: “No Money No Game”. 
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The Group of Ten is made up of eleven industrial countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) which consult and co-operate 
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109Kai Barvell, “Risks and Developments in Payment Systems”, International Monetary Fund, August 2002, at 
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principles that should be complied with by all systemically important payment systems.
112
  
These principles become a guideline for the oversight of those payment systems that are 
categorized as systemically important payment system. 
The report also explains the key role of central banks and sets out their responsibilities 
in applying the core principles.
113
 The author summarizes these ten core principles for 
systematically important payment systems (CPSIPS) based on the BIS report below:
114
 
I. The system should have a well-founded legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions. 
It means that the rules and procedures of a system should be transparent, 
comprehensible and enforceable. In this regard, not only are safety and efficiency the 
objectives of payment systems, but customer protection and competitive policy also 
play a role in this system. The regulations can also be relevant for other jurisdictions. 
This should be considered for cross-border transactions.
115
 
II. The system’s rules and procedures should enable participants to have a clear 
understanding of the system’s impact on each of the financial risks they incur through 
participation in it. 
This means that all parties involved in this system should be provided with 
explanatory substance to be able to clearly understand their financial risks.  
III. The system should have clearly defined procedures for the management of credit risks 
and liquidity risks, which specify the respective responsibilities of the system operator 
and the participants and which provide appropriate incentives to manage and contain 
those risks.          
Under this principle, the mechanism for addressing the financial risks must be clear 
and understandable by all parties. Then, the rules and procedures of this system must 
be acknowledged by all parties and the procedures should, therefore ensure that the 
parties have the capabilities to manage each of the pertaining risks.  
                                                 
112Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, “Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment 
Systems”, Bank for International Settlements Information, Press & Library Services, 2001 (CPSS, 2001).  These 
principles are already replaced by the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI’s, 2012), which 
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IV. The system should provide prompt final settlement on the day of value, preferably 
during the day and at a minimum at the end of the day. 
This principle explains that the final statement must occur at the end of the day of 
value.  Thus, the intraday liquidity mechanism is necessary for this condition to ensure 
prompt and final settlement. 
V. A system, in which multilateral netting takes place, should, at a minimum, be capable of 
ensuring the timely completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability to settle 
by the participant with the largest single settlement obligation. 
This principle means that netting settlements need strong controls in order to address 
this settlement risk. This netting system should comply with the Lamfalussy Standard 
IV, which specifies that a netting system must, at a minimum, be able to withstand the 
failure of the largest single net debtor to the system. This principle is not relevant to 
the real-time gross settlement system that we discuss. 
VI. Assets used for settlement should preferably be a claim on the central bank; where other 
assets are used, they should carry little or no credit risk. 
This principle describes that the settlement asset must be transferable when the 
liquidity risk arises. Balances at the central bank are generally the most satisfactory 
assets used for settlement, because of the lack of credit or liquidity risk for the holder, 
and they are typically used in systemically important payment systems. Other assets 
that may be used must carry little or no financial risk. 
VII. The system should ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and 
should have contingency arrangements for timely completion of daily processing. 
This principle is dealing not only with security and technology but also with the 
competent personnel who operates the system safely and efficiently, and ensures that 
the correct procedures are followed. The degree of security and reliability require an 
adequate safety and efficiency depends on the importance of the system as well as any 
other relevant factors, such as alternative arrangements for making payments in 
contingency situations. 
VIII. The system should provide a means of making payments, which is practical for its users 
and efficient for the economy. 
This principle is related to the design and operation of the system, which needs to 
consider how to provide a given quality of service in terms of functionality, safety and 
efficiency at a minimum resource cost. The design of the payment systems should, 
therefore, be appropriate for the country’s geography, population, and its 
infrastructure, such as telecommunications, transportation and banking structure. A 
particular design or technological solution that is suitable for one country may not be 
right for another. It should be designed and operated to adapt the developments of the 
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market for payment services both domestically and internationally.  Their technical, 
business and governance arrangements should be sufficiently flexible to respond to the 
changing demands, for example, in adopting new technologies and procedures. 
IX. The system should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, 
which permit fair and open access. 
The rationale behind this principle is that all access criteria should be stated explicitly 
and disclosed to interested parties. This advantage may need to be weighed against the 
need to protect systems and their participants from the participation of institutions 
which would expose them to excessive legal, financial, and operational risks. 
X. The system’s governance arrangements should be effective, accountable and 
transparent. 
This principle describes the role of the central banks in providing the payment 
system’s governance, which encompass the relationships between the payment 
system’s management, on the one hand, and its governing body, its owners and its 
other stakeholders, on the other hand. This should be arranged because SIPS have the 
potential to affect the wider financial and economic community, hence, there is a 
particular need for effective, accountable and transparent governance, no matter 
whether the system is owned by central bank or by the private sector. 
All central banks have responsibility in applying the CPSIPS by conducting what is 
known as self-assessment as part of oversight, and then this assessment is undertaken by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This whole process is called 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).  All the RTGS should comply with these 10 
CPs in pursuing the objectives of safety and efficiency.   
2.4 Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI) 
The financial crisis in 2007 has prompted the important actors, i.e. firms and officials 
such as regulatory agencies on the financial markets, to seek a guarantee on the safe operation 
of financial markets and to protect investors and customers. The extreme volatility in the 
markets has both increased worries that the market infrastructure institutions central to the 
operation of financial systems may fail, and also increased pressures for trading, clearing and 
settlement to be centralized on precisely such institutions.
116
  
In US, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York formed the payment risk committee, 
which consists of a private sector group of several major banks. The committee published the 
                                                 
116Ruben Lee, “Running the World's Markets: The Governance of Financial Infrastructure”, Princeton University 
Press, 2011, pp.2. 
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report of the Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI) Risk in May 2007.
117
 The committee 
identifies and analyses issues of mutual interest related to the risk in payment and settlement 
systems. The task force has developed 10 recommendations for sound management practices 
for banks to consider and apply as appropriate within their institution.  The author further 
elaborates the recommendations as follows: 
 118
  
1. A bank should have documented its risk practices and policies for addressing its 
memberships and transactions with the FMI identifying responsibilities for assessing, 
approving, reporting and managing the risks.  It means that banks should have a good 
documentation and administration of risks in order to  have a better understanding and 
identifying of the system’s impact related to the financial risks; 
2. A bank should conduct the appropriate level of due diligence in analysing and 
approving the risks of being a member of or transacting with an FMI. This is related to 
the understanding of the management to define and specify its responsibilities to 
manage the risks; 
3. A bank should have a clear understanding and reporting of any membership-related 
credit risks and exposures to an FMI. This includes loss-sharing of the financial 
obligations to cover the default of another member and direct credit risks to an FMI, 
which serves as a central counterparty to trades/transactions. This means that banks 
should understand the system’s procedures to manage credit risks and liquidity risks 
related to the default of other members. 
4. A bank should have a clear understanding of any material operational risks that it takes 
as a member of or a counterparty of  an FMI. A bank should consider the need to 
perform periodic assessments (on-site or via inquiry) of the FMI’s operations where the 
bank conducts significant activity. A bank should have a good understanding on rules 
and procedures of the operational system, including monitoring and assessing that 
system. 
5. A bank should have a clear understanding of any material legal risks that it assumes as a 
member of an FMI. An analysis should be conducted when a bank first joins an FMI 
and it should identify and assess any undue contractual liability, the lack of legal 
support for key activities of the FMI (e.g., finality, netting, collateral rights), and any 
important/undue compliance requirements. A bank should have practices and policies in 
place to ensure that its understanding of any of its material risks to an FMI is current. 
This includes monitoring and assessing the material developments of an FMI and/or 
                                                 
117The Payment Risk Committee, “Financial Market Infrastructure Risk: Current Report of the Financial Market 
Infrastructure Risk Task Force”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2007, at http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
prc/files/FMIMay07.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
118
Ibid. 
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performing periodic risk assessments. This relates to the rules and procedures for 
operating a system. 
6. A bank should have practices and policies in place to ensure that is understanding of 
any of its material risks to an FMI is current. This includes monitoring and assessing 
material developments at an FMI and/or performing periodic risk assessments. This is 
about the rules and procedures for operating a system. 
7. A bank should require appropriate level management review of participation in the 
choice of FMIs that present material adverse risks, such as exposure to open-ended 
liability.  This relates to the quality of management in administering the risk exposure 
when joining the system. 
8. A bank should establish a framework for mitigating risks to FMIs as appropriate. This 
includes, but is not limited to, negotiating contractual provisions, using a small 
capitalized subsidiary as the member to limit liability, setting transaction/trading limits, 
accessing the FMI indirectly via a correspondent, or via active governance by serving 
on boards, industry groups, committees, etc. This is related to having rules and 
procedures for mitigating risks. 
9. A bank should ensure that its own continuity of business planning takes into account 
operation failures at major FMIs. A bank should have a business continuity plan and a 
disaster recovery plan in order to face the operation failures of the system. 
10. A bank should consider whether having a centralized risk management approach to FMI 
risk where a small risk management staff specializes in bank-wide FMI risk analysis 
and performs portfolio level monitoring and reporting -- is a more effective and efficient 
way to manage the ongoing risks with FMIs than through a decentralized approach.  A 
bank should have a centralized control management in order to manage risks. 
Furthermore, in 2012, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and 
the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) have made new standards, called “principles” for facilitating the clearing and 
settlement of monetary and other financial transactions.
119
 These principles are designed to 
ensure that the infrastructure supporting global financial markets is more robust and thus well 
placed to withstand financial shocks.
120
 These principles are regularly updated.
121
 The author 
observes that this FMI is more comprehensive and accustomed to the current conditions than 
CPSIPS.  
                                                 
119
Committee on Payment and Settlement System and Technical Committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions,  “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (FMI)”, Bank for International 
Settlements and International Organization of Securities Commissions 2012. (CPSS, 2012) 
120
The Bank for International Settlement, see “Final version of the Principles for financial market 
infrastructures”, at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101.htm, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
121
Ibid. 
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As mentioned above-, FMIs play a critical role in the guideline of oversight of the 
financial system and the broader economy. These FMIs have 24 principles and for the 
purposes of this report, an FMI refers to payment systems, Central Securities Depositories 
(CSDs), Securities Settlement Systems (SSSs), Central Counterparties (CCPs), and Trade 
Repositories (TRs).
122
 They replace the existing set of international standards set out in the 
Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (CPSS, 2001). The main public 
policy objectives of the CPSS and the Technical Committee of IOSCO in setting forth these 
principles for FMIs are to enhance safety and efficiency in payment, clearing, settlement, and 
recording arrangements, and more broadly, to limit systemic risk and foster transparency and 
financial stability.
123 
With regard to the risks, FMIs allow participants to manage their risks more 
effectively and efficiently, and, in some cases to reduce or eliminate certain risks.
124
 There are 
specific key risks delivered by FMIs: systemic, legal, credit, liquidity, general business, 
custody and investment, and lastly, operational risks. 
The principles focus on risks and efficiency. There are a few exceptions: they do not 
recommend a specific instrument or procedure to achieve their goals but they tolerate 
different means to satisfy a particular principle. Where appropriate, some principles establish 
a minimum requirement to help contain risks and to provide a level playing field. The 
principles are made to be applied completely because of the substantial collaboration between 
the principles; principles should be applied as a package and not on a stand-alone basis. Some 
principles connect to others and some complement each other.  For instance, in handling 
financial risk of RTGS, one principle should allude to other related principles such as the 
principles on the framework for the comprehensive management of risks, credit risk, 
collateral, liquidity risk, settlement finality, money settlements, and exchange-of-value 
settlement systems. Other relevant principles such as legal basis, governance, participant-
default rules and procedures, general business risk, custody and investment risks, and 
operational risk, are also important to be assessed. They complement to each other and also 
should be taken into account. Failure to apply all of these principles as a set may result in less 
than an adequate risk management. In addition, authorities have the flexibility to consider 
imposing higher requirements for these principles in their jurisdiction either on the basis of 
specific risks posed by an FMI or as a general policy. 
                                                 
122
Ibid. In some cases, exchanges or other market infrastructures may own or operate entities or functions that 
perform centralized clearing and settlement processes that are covered by the principles in the report. In general, 
however, the principles in this report are not addressed to market infrastructures such as trading exchanges, trade 
execution facilities, or multilateral trade-compression systems; nonetheless, relevant authorities may decide to 
apply some or all of these principles to types of infrastructures not formally covered by this report.   
123
Ibid. These objectives are consistent with the public policy objectives of previous reports by the CPSS and the 
Technical Committee of IOSCO.  Other objectives, which include anti-money laundering, antiterrorist financing, 
data privacy, promotion of competition policy, and specific types of investor and consumer protections, can play 
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This is a basic guideline for countries to implement the settlement of monetary and 
other financial transactions. These standards for FMIs are expected to be part of the body of 
international standards and codes recognized by international financial institutions.  
From these FMI’s principles, most principles are relevant for the Systemically 
Important Payment Systems (SIPS).
125
 The author tries to sum up the FMI’s principles used 
for SIPS of High Value Transfer System (RTGS).
126
  The principles, which are published by 
BIS, are concise as follows:
127
 
a. Principle 1: Legal Basis 
An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis 
for each aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions. 
This means that an FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, 
understandable, and consistent with relevant domestic laws and regulations and also 
enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions.   
With regard to dispute,  legal risk due to conflict of laws may arise if the FMI is 
subject to the laws of various other jurisdictions, for example, when transaction is 
conducted in multiple jurisdictions. In such case, the FMI should identify and examine 
potential conflict of laws issues and develop rules and procedures to mitigate this risk. 
In other words, the regulations governing its activities should clearly indicate the law 
that it intends to apply to each aspect of the FMI’s operations.  
The FMI and its participants should be alert to relevant constraints on their abilities to 
choose the law that will govern such activities when there is a distinction in the 
substantive laws of the relevant jurisdictions.  For example, such constraints may exist 
because of jurisdictions’ differing laws on insolvency and irrevocability.  A 
jurisdiction ordinarily does not permit contractual choices of law that would 
circumvent that jurisdiction’s fundamental public policy.  Thus, when uncertainty 
exists regarding the enforceability of an FMI’s choice of law in relevant jurisdictions, 
the FMI should obtain reasoned and independent legal opinions and analysis in order 
to address properly such uncertainty.  
The FMI should be able to articulate its legal basis for such activities to relevant 
authorities, participants, and participants’ customers in a transparent and 
comprehensible means. A legal opinion or analysis should, to the extent practicable, 
confirm the enforceability of the FMI’s rules and procedures and must provide 
reasoned support for its conclusions. An FMI should consider sharing these legal 
                                                 
125
From 24 principles, 18 principles cover the SIPS. 
126
Some countries still consider the netting settlement is also SIPS.  In this paper, the author only focusing the 
RTGS system is SIPS. 
127
These FMI principles are based on BIS, “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures”, Bank for 
International Settlements and International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2012. 
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opinions and analyses with its participants in an effort to promote confidence among 
participants and transparency in the system. 
b. Principle 2: Governance 
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, 
promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader 
financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of 
relevant stakeholders. 
This principle states that an FMI should have documented governance arrangements 
that provide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability for all related 
parties which place high priority of safety and efficiency of the FMI. The governance 
in this principle also relates to the management of the FMI, which needs to be highly 
skilled and experienced. Also should be taken into account of their accountability, 
transparency, and independency. 
c. Principle 3: Framework for the comprehensive management of risks 
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively 
managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks. 
An FMI should have a good risk-management framework, i.e. policies and procedures, 
which enable to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in 
or are borne by the FMI. The risk-management framework should be subject to 
periodic review. 
An FMI’s framework should include the identification and management of 
interdependencies.  An FMI should also provide appropriate incentives as well as 
proper information for its participants and other entities to manage and contain their 
risks in relation to the FMI. 
d. Principle 4: Credit risks 
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to 
participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. 
An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to 
each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is 
involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important 
in multiple jurisdictions should maintain sufficient additional financial resources to 
cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited 
to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause 
the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market 
conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to 
cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited 
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to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the 
largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market 
conditions. 
Credit risk is broadly defined as the risk that a counterparty will be unable to meet 
fully its financial obligations when due or at any time in the future.
128
 The default of a 
participant (and its affiliates) has the potential to cause severe disruptions to an FMI, 
its other participants, and, more broadly, financial markets.
129
 Therefore, an FMI 
should establish a robust framework to manage its credit exposures to its participants 
and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. 
A payment system may face credit risk from its participants, its payment and 
settlement processes, or both. This credit risk is driven mainly by current exposures 
from extending intraday credit to participants.
130
 The type and level of credit exposure 




e. Principle 5: Collateral 
An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants’ credit exposure 
should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should 
also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits. 
An FMI should use a collateral management system that is well designed and 
operationally flexible. The use of collateral can provide participants with incentives to 
manage the risks they pose to the FMI or other participants.  An FMI that accepts 
collateral with credit, liquidity, and market risks above minimum levels should 
demonstrate that it sets and enforces appropriately conservative haircuts and 
concentration limits.
132
 However, an FMI should regularly adjust its requirements for 
acceptable collateral in accordance with changes in the underlying risks. 
If an FMI accepts a cross-border (or foreign) collateral, it should identify and mitigate 
any additional risks associated with its use and ensure that it can be used in a timely 




Ibid. An affiliate is defined as a company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the 
participant. Control of a company is defined as (a) ownership, control, or holding with power to vote 20 percent 
or more of a class of voting securities of the company; or (b) consolidation of the company for financial 
reporting purposes. 
130
Ibid. Many payment systems do not face credit risk from their participants or payment and settlement 
processes, although they may face significant liquidity risk.   
131
Ibid. In considering its credit exposure to a central bank, on a case-by-case basis, the FMI may take into 
account the special characteristics of the central bank. 
132
Ibid. In general, guarantees are not acceptable collateral. However, in rare circumstances and subject to 
regulatory approval, a guarantee fully backed by collateral that is realizable on a same-day basis may serve as 
acceptable collateral. An explicit guarantee from the relevant central bank of issue would constitute acceptable 
collateral providing it is supported by the legal framework applicable to and the policies of the central bank. 





 An FMI also should consider the foreign-exchange risk where the collateral 
is denominated in a currency different from that in which the exposure arises, and set 
haircuts to address the additional risk to a high level of confidence. 
f. Principle 7:  Liquidity risk 
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI 
should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-
day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations 
with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that 
should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates 
that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme 
but plausible market conditions. 
An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity risks from the full 
range of participants and other entities.
134
  An FMI should also regularly assess its 
design and operations to manage liquidity risk in the system. For the purpose of 
meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI’s qualifying liquid 
resources in each currency include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy 
commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and 
committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and 
investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and 
highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. 
g. Principle 8: Settlement Finality 
An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of 
the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement 
intraday or in real time. 
An FMI should be designed to provide clear and certain final settlement of 
payments,
135
 transfer instructions, or other obligations.  An FMI’s rules and 
procedures should clearly define the point at which settlement is final and the system 
should complete final settlement no later than the end of the value date, and preferably 
intraday or in real time, in order to reduce settlement risk. 
An FMI should take reasonable steps to confirm the effectiveness of cross-border 
recognition and the protection of cross-system settlement finality, especially when it is 
                                                 
133
Cross-border collateral has at least one of the following foreign attributes: (a) the currency of denomination, 
(b) the jurisdiction in which the assets are located, or (c) the jurisdiction in which the issuer is established. 
134
Other entities are parties which are associated to the FMI, such as its settlement banks, nostro agents, 
custodian banks, and liquidity providers. 
135
Final settlement is defined as the irrevocable and unconditional transfer of an asset or financial instrument, or 
the discharge of an obligation by the FMI or its participants in accordance with the terms of the underlying 
contract. 
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developing plans for recovery or orderly wind-down or providing relevant authorities 
information relating to its resolvability. Because of the complexity of legal 
frameworks and system rules, particularly in the context of cross-border settlement 
where legal frameworks are not harmonized, a well-reasoned legal opinion is 
generally necessary to establish the point at which finality takes place. 
h. Principle 9: Money Settlement 
An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical 
and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimize and strictly 
control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money. 
It is clear that an FMI can use central bank money or commercial bank money.
136
  
There is a model that an FMI typically establishes an account with one or more 
commercial settlement banks and requires each of its participants to establish an 
account with one of them. In some cases, the FMI itself can serve as the settlement 
bank. Money settlements are then effected through accounts on the books of the FMI, 
which may need to be funded and defunded. An FMI may also use a combination of 
central bank and commercial bank monies to conduct settlements, for example, by 
using central bank money for funding and defunding activities and using commercial 
bank money for the settlement of individual payment obligations 
i. Principle 12: Exchange-of-Value Settlement systems 
If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for 
example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal 
risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of 
the other. 
The settlement of a financial transaction by an FMI may involve the settlement of two 
linked obligations, such as the delivery of securities against payment of cash or 
securities or the delivery of one currency against delivery of another currency.
137
 In 
this context, a principal risk may be created when one obligation is settled, but the 
other obligation is not (for example, the securities are delivered but no cash payment is 
received). Because this principal risk involves the full value of the transaction, 
substantial credit losses as well as substantial liquidity pressures may result from the 
                                                 
136
Central bank money is a liability of a central bank, in this case in the form of deposits held at the central bank, 
which can be used for settlement purposes.  Settlement in central bank money typically involves the discharge of 
settlement obligations on the books of the central bank of issue.  Commercial bank money is a liability of a 
commercial bank, in the form of deposits held at the commercial bank, which can be used for settlement 
purposes.  Settlement in commercial bank money typically occurs on the books of a commercial bank.   
137
In some cases, the settlement of a transaction can be free of payment, for example, for the purposes of 
pledging collateral and repositioning securities.  The settlement of a transaction may also involve more than two 
linked obligations, for example, for the purposes of some collateral substitutions where there are multiple 
securities or for premium payments related to securities lending in two currencies.  These cases are not 
inconsistent with this principle. 
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default of counterparty or, more generally, the failure to complete the settlement of 
both linked obligations. 
An FMI that is an exchange-of-value settlement system should eliminate the principal 
risk by linking the final settlement of one obligation to the final settlement of the other 
through an appropriate DvP, DvD, or PvP settlement mechanism. DvP, DvD, and PvP 
settlement mechanisms eliminate the principal risk by ensuring that the final 
settlement of one obligation occurs if and only if the final settlement of the linked 
obligation occurs. 
j. Principle 13: Participant-Default Rules and Procedures 
An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a 
participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the 
FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to 
meet its obligations. 
An FMI should have default rules and procedures that enable the FMI to continue to 
meet its obligations in the event of a participant default and that address the 
replenishment of resources following a default.   
Participant-default rules and procedures facilitate the continued functioning of an FMI 
in the event that a participant fails to meet its obligations. These rules and procedures 
help limit the potential for the effects of a participant’s failure to spread to other 
participants and undermine the viability of the FMI. The key objectives of the default 
rules and procedures should include (a) ensuring timely completion of settlement, even 
in extreme but plausible market conditions; (b) minimizing losses for the FMI and for 
non-defaulting participants; (c) limiting disruptions to the market; (d) providing a clear 
framework for accessing FMI liquidity facilities when needed; and (e) managing and 
closing out the defaulting participant’s positions and liquidating any applicable 
collateral in a prudent and orderly manner. 
k. Principle 15: General Business Risk 
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold 
sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses 
so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses 
materialize. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a 
recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services. 
An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and 
manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business 
strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses. 
General business risk refers to the risks and potential losses arising from an FMI’s 
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administration and operation as a business enterprise that are neither related to 
participant default nor separately covered by financial resources under the credit or 
liquidity risk principles.  
An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold 
sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan.  At a minimum, an 
FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of 
current operating expenses.  An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity 
(such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or retained earnings) so that it can 




l. Principle 16: Custody and Investment Risks 
An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants’ assets and minimize the risk of 
loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI’s investments should be in 
instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks. 
An FMI should hold its own and its participants’ assets at supervised and regulated 
entities that have robust accounting practices, safekeeping procedures, and internal 
controls that fully protect these assets.  An FMI should have prompt access to its assets 
and the assets provided by participants, when required.  An FMI should evaluate and 
understand its exposures to its custodian banks, taking into account the full scope of its 
relationships with each of them. 
m. Principle 17: Operational Risk 
An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and 
external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, 
procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of 
security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. 
Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and 
fulfilment of the FMI’s obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major 
disruption. 
An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management framework with 
appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and 
manage operational risks.
139
 An FMI’s board of directors should clearly define the 
                                                 
138If the FMI’s corporate structure is such that it cannot legally or institutionally raise equity (for example under 
certain structures of mutual ownership or when the FMI is run by a central bank) or if the FMI is a new start-up 
and cannot initially raise the required level of equity, it should ensure an equal amount of equivalent loss 
absorbing financial resources is available. 
139
Operational risk is the risk that deficiencies in information systems, internal processes, and personnel or 
disruptions from external events will result in the reduction, deterioration, or breakdown of services provided by 
an FMI. 
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roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI’s 
operational risk-management framework.  Systems, operational policies, procedures, 
and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant 
changes.   
An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a 
significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale 
or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and 
should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can 
resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The plan should be 
designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the day of the 
disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should regularly test these 
arrangements.   
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key participants, other 
FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations. In addition, an 
FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations might pose to other 
FMIs. 
n. Principle 18: Access and Participation Requirements 
An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for 
participation, which permit fair and open access. 
An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, 
where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related 
participation requirements. 
An FMI should always consider the risks that an actual or prospective participant may 
pose to the FMI and other participants. Accordingly, an FMI should establish risk-
related participation requirements adequate to ensure that its participants meet 
appropriate operational, financial, and legal requirements to allow them to fulfil their 
obligations to the FMI, including the other participants, on a timely basis. For 
participants, act for other entities (indirect participants), it may be appropriate for the 
FMI to impose additional requirements to ensure that the direct participants have the 
capacity to do so. 
o. Principle 19: Tiered Participation Arrangements 
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising 
from tiered participation arrangements. 
An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather 
basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and 
manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation 





  An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and 
indirect participants that might affect the FMI. 
An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of 
transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes 
or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they 
access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.  An FMI 
should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and 
should take mitigating action when appropriate. 
p. Principle 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness 
An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants 
and the markets it serves. 
An FMI is not only should be efficient and effective
141
 in meeting the requirements of 
its participants and the markets it serves, but also should be maintaining appropriate 
standards of safety and security as outlined in the principles in this report.
142
   
One mechanism which an FMI’s design and operation might use to gauge its success 
in meeting the needs of its participants and the markets it serves are periodic 
satisfaction surveys of its participants and other relevant institutions in the market. 
q. Principle 22: Communication Procedures and Standards 
An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted 
communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, 
clearing, settlement, and recording. 
An FMI’s adoption of internationally accepted communication procedures and 
standards for its core functions can facilitate the elimination of manual intervention in 
clearing and settlement processing, reduce risks and transaction costs, improve 
efficiency, and reduce barriers to entry into a market.   
                                                 
140
Tiered participation arrangements occur when some firms (indirect participants) rely on the services provided 
by other firms (direct participants) to use the FMI’s central payment, clearing, settlement, or recording facilities.  
For the purposes of this principle, an FMI can have two types of relationships that affect tiered participation 
arrangements.  The first type of relationship is with participants in the FMI that are bound by the FMI’s rules and 
agreements.   Such “direct participants” and the management of the risks they present should be fully covered by 
the rules and agreements of the FMI and are generally dealt with in other principles in this report.  The second 
type of relationship is with entities that are not bound by the rules of the FMI, but whose transactions are cleared, 
settled, or recorded by or through the FMI.  These entities are defined as “indirect participants” in the FMI in this 
principle. 
141“Efficiency” refers generally to the resources required by the FMI to perform its functions, while 
“effectiveness” refers to whether the FMI is meeting its intended goals and objectives. 
142
There may be different ways for an FMI to meet a particular principle, but the objective of a particular 
principle should not be compromised. 
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With regard to cross-border transactions, an FMI that settles a chain of transactions 
processed through multiple FMIs or provides services to users in multiple 
jurisdictions, should strongly consider using internationally accepted communication 
procedures and standards to achieve efficient and effective cross-border financial 
communication. Moreover, implementing these communication procedures can 
facilitate interoperability between the information systems or operating platforms of 
FMIs in different jurisdictions, which enable market participants to acquire access to 
multiple FMIs without facing technical obstacles (such as having to implement or 
support multiple local networks with different characteristics). 
r. Principle 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures and Market Data 
An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should 
provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate 
understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in 
the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.  
An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully 
disclosed to the participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be 
publicly disclosed.  An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system’s design 
and operations, as well as the FMI’s and participants’ rights and obligations, so that 
participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI. 
An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to 
ease participants’ understanding of the FMI’s rules and procedures and the risks they 
will face when participating in the FMI. An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at 
the level of individual services, as well as its policies on any available discounts. The 
FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes. 
An FMI should regularly complete and publicly disclose responses to the CPSS-
IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also 
should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values. 
Generally, there are not much differences between 10 CPSIPS and 24 FMIs for the 
RTGS system.  From the above descriptions, again, it is clear that the FMIs provide more 
detailed guidance and broadens the scope of the standards to cover new risks management 
area, such as, exchange-of-value settlement systems, general business risk, and tiered 
participation arrangements, which standards are implicitly covered in 10 CPSIPS. The new 
standard seems to emphasize that all aspects are important and need to be assessed and taken 
into account according to the new circumstances. 
In certain extreme atmospheres, all precautionary measures are very important.  
Failure or disorder in a payment system, in this case, RTGS, would potentially lead to 
systemic disruptions to the related institutions and markets. This would also result in a 
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negative implication to any other FMI to which the failing FMI is linked and would impact 
the financial system in general. 
With regard to the possibility of integrating all RTGS systems among the ASEAN 
members, the principle of exchange-of-value settlement systems is an important one to be 
considered.  Since these PFMIs were just published in April 2012, these should be taken into 
consideration by all members in order to prepare for the integration of payment system in 
ASEAN. 
2.5 Assessment of RTGS in ASEAN and the EU 
The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), launched in 1999, is a wide-
ranging and comprehensive assessment of a country’s financial sector.143 It is a key 
instrument of the Fund’s surveillance and provides input to the Article IV consultation.144 
These assessments include two components: a financial stability assessment, which is the 
responsibility of the IMF, and a financial development assessment, which is the responsibility 
of the World Bank.
145
 
Since the 10 Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (CP-SIPS) 
was published in 2001, most of the ASEAN members and the EU members have participated 
in The FSAP.
146
 These CPSIPS is part of the whole assessment of financial sectors. Four 
standards and codes were assessed in FSAP according to the IMF Report on Indonesia in 
2010, namely:
147
 (i) Banking Industry - Basel Core Principles (BCP); (ii) Securities - 
International Organization of Securities Commissions Principles of Securities Regulation 
(IOSCO) (iii) Payment System (RTGS) - Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment 
Systems (CPSIPS); and (iv) Monetary Policy Transparency (MPT). 
In this dissertation, the author would like to describe the result of the FSAP 
assessment on payment systems based on IMF Country report from several of the ASEAN 
members and the European Union members. 
                                                 
143
The assessment has been developed to assist countries to identify and manage weaknesses in their financial 
sector structure. Thus, it improves their resilience to macroeconomic shocks and cross-border negative impact. 
144International Monetary Fund, in “Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)”, at http://www. 




These assessments are mandatory for financial sectors which deemed by the Fund to be systemically 
important, based on part of Article IV surveillance, and are supposed to take place every five years. The 
publication itself is voluntarily, so ASEAN members’ reports are not all published. 
147
See the report of IMF on Indonesia: Financial System Stability Assessment”, IMF Country Report No. 10/288, 
September 2010, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10288.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 
2015. 
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2.5.1 RTGS Assessment in ASEAN 
- The FSAP summary report on Indonesia (2010 and 2012) states that: 148 
“Indonesia recovered quickly after being hit hard by contagion from the 
global financial but still faces challenges to preserve the financial stability 
and develop its financial system. The challenges that have to handles are the 
weaknesses in the legal and governance framework undermine the investor 
confidence. More fundamentally, the most critical gap in the oversight of the 
financial system is the absence of legal protection for the financial sector 
regulator and supervisor.” 
With regard to the payment systems, since 1999, Bank Indonesia (BI) has become 
an independent institution, thus its monetary policy and payment system policy 
cannot be influenced by any parties, including the government. BI considers BI-
RTGS system to be the only systemically important payment system (SIPS) in the 
country, although there are several systems in operation in Indonesia. The 
payment system has been empowered by BI Act 23 of 1999,
149
 to oversee, 
regulate and impose sanctions on the payments system, meaning that BI holds the 
authority in payment system. A number of statutes have been enacted, supported 
by regulations and circular letters issued by BI from time to time.
150
 The 
authorities should however consider enacting a specific law that governs payment 
systems and also should address any areas that need further strengthening and 
clarity.
151
 BI-RTGS is owned and operated by Bank Indonesia (BI). BI-RTGS has 
a contractual arrangement between BI and participants and has a code of conduct 
amongst the participants codified in a bylaw.
152
  
In general, the RTGS system is observed and has complied with the 10 CP-SIPS. 
There are several issues that need to be noted. For example, when considering the 
enactment of  a specific law that governs payment systems, it should be noted that 
the process of enacting acts needs time and involves many parties and it should be 
considered that the extending its oversight to the operational of the securities 
settlement system which is still under other authorities i.e. Bapepam-LK and 
Ministry of Information and Communication, which BI does not have an authority 
to regulate and oversee it.  BI already designed the next generation RTGS, called 
BI-RTGS 2 generation. 
                                                 
148International Monetary Fund, “Indonesia: Financial System Stability Assessment”, Opcit. and “Indonesia: 
CPSS Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems”, IMF Country Report No. 12/187, July 
2012, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12187.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
149
Act No.23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia in chapter III, Article 8(b) and chapter V Articles 15-23. 
150




The BI-RTGS bye-law is a rule of game made by the bank association’s members to regulate themselves, 
concerning technical matters. 
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- The summary FSAP report on Singapore (2004) states that:153 
“Singapore’s financial sector, which is dominated by the banking sector, 
remains robust despite a series of economic downturns and substantial asset 
price declines. Economic developments in the past few years have 
highlighted Singapore’s vulnerability to exogenous shocks, including the 
outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). The Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS) should more closely monitor to enhance the 
MAS early warning capabilities on the financial linkages of the global 
financial system, include local banks’ operations overseas and in the Asian 
Dollar Market. Systemic liquidity is well managed and regulatory and 
supervisory practices exhibit a high degree of observance of international 
standards and codes across all segments of the financial sector. MAS need a 
further deepening of the corporate bond market would help diversify funding 
sources for the corporate sector.” 
With regard to the payment system, Singapore has a technologically advanced 
payment system for both retail payments and large value payments.  Singapore 
has MAS Electronic Payment System (MEPS) for interbank payment transfers
154
, 
and also for the settlement of multilateral netting of cheques and interbank Giro 
retail transfers and the settlement of SGS on delivery versus payment basis. The 
report stated that the legal basis of MEPS is well founded and supported by 
Section 29A of the MAS Act and on the Payment and Settlement Systems 
(Finality and Netting) Act.   
In relation to the management of risks, the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) has the rules and procedures, which indicates that MEPS is an RTGS 
system where each settled transfer is final and irrevocable. MAS had a goal to 
upgrade the system to a so-called MEPS+. MEPS+ also provides prompt and final 
settlement during the day. MEPS+ settles in central bank money, thus participants 
are not exposed to settlement bank risks. 
MEPS also has contingency measures and offers an efficient set of functional 
facilities, such as introducing the SWIFT standard message types. The access is 
open for all banks, excluding merchant banks, and has broadened so that the CDP 
Securities Settlement systems can become members of the SGX-ST in the central 
bank money.  
                                                 
153International Monetary Fund, “Singapore: Financial System Stability Assessment, including Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Banking Supervision, Insurance Regulation, 
Securities Regulation, Payment and Settlement Systems, Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency, and Anti-
Money Laundering” IMF Country Report No. 04/104, April 2004,  at http://www.imf.org/external /pubs/ft/scr/ 
2004/cr04104.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 2015.  
154
See further at http://www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-Financial-Centre/Payment-and-Settlement-Systems/Clearing-
and-Settlement-Systems/MEPS.aspx, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
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Overall, Singapore already complied with 10 CPSIPS, but there is a 
recommendation related to MEPS that needs to be followed i.e. to amend 
Singapore’s law related to collateralized loan in the form of repos, when an 
automatic intraday liquidity facility will be introduced in MEPS.
155
 
- The summary FSAP report on Thailand (2009) states that:156 
“The soundness of Thailand’s financial system has been strengthened since 
the financial crisis of the late 1990s. Banking fundamentals have 
strengthened, with most Thailand banks reporting high levels of capital and 
solid profitability. Notwithstanding these improvements, policymakers face 
several critical challenges to further enhance the stability and efficiency of 
the financial system such as need for continued and close supervisory 
attention to weaker banks, address remaining legacy problems associated 
with the financial crisis, particularly reducing the high level of NPL and NPA 
in the financial system.” 
In relation to the payment system, Thailand has no explicit legislation for such 
payment systems. However, the legal basis for BAHTNET and payment transfers 
executed in this system is defined by a set of laws, regulations, and contractual 
arrangements.
157
 Bank of Thailand (BOT) has BATHNET for interbank payments 
and for the settlement of interbank obligations of the net clearing arrangements of 
the low-value payment transactions and those equities transactions. BAHTNET 
also settles the cash leg of the transactions in government bonds deposited at 
Thailand Securities Depository Co., Ltd. (TSD) on a real time gross basis.   
Generally, based on the IMF report, BOT has complied with the 10 CPSIPS but 
there are several recommendations to be followed-up. BOT needs to revise the 
BOT act, which would provide more transparency and details in the field of 
                                                 
155
Ibid 
156International Monetary Fund, “Thailand: Financial System Stability Assessment”, IMF Country Report No. 
09/147, May 2009, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09147.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 
2015 and  “Thailand: Financial Sector Assessment Program—Detailed Assessment of Observance of CPSS Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems”, IMF Country Report No. 09/149, May 2009, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09149.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
157
 The regulations that are important related to the payment system has spread out in several acts and contracts 
such as The Bank of Thailand Act, B.E. 2485 (1942) stipulates the roles of the BOT in issuing, managing, and 
printing of notes and bank notes; and the management of the country’s reserves; The Royal Decree Regulating 
the Affairs of the Bank of Thailand B.E. 2485 (1942) authorizes the BOT to administrate interbank clearing 
systems; The Commercial Banking Act, B.E. 2505 (1962) empowers BOT to directly supervise commercial 
banks and local foreign bank branches; The Currency Act, B.E. 2501 (1958) governs issue and management of 
banknotes; The Civil and Commercial Code, B.E. 2468 (1925) covers other financial papers used as means of 
payments such as checks, bills of exchange, and promissory notes (the Law relating to Legal instruments, 
Contracts and Obligations); The Securities and Exchange Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) regulates securities business and 
securities market infrastructure; The Electronic Transaction Act, B.E. 2544 (2001) provides the legal recognition 
of electronic data messages intended for promoting the reliability of electronic transactions; Consumer 
Protection Law, B.E. 2522 (1979) provides consumer protection, including payment transactions; and The 
Bankruptcy Act, B.E. 2483 (1940) governs insolvency and bankruptcy issues, including the liquidation of 
financial institutions as well as branches or agencies of foreign banks. 
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payment systems. BOT should eliminate the risks of settlement finality in the 
event of insolvency, where the payment transaction still can be revoked in 
BAHTNET system, by amending the Bankruptcy law.  Oversight responsibility 
should be strengthened by BOT in coordination with SEC. BAHTNET should 
also review and audit in the contingency plan test and set up a permanent advisory 
group that meets on a regular basis to discuss issues related to technical and 
business features of BAHTNET. 
- Based on the summary of the IMF report on the Philippines (2005), the report 
stated that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), clearing house and major banks 
play significant roles in the Philippines payment systems.
158
 The IMF identified 
the Systemically Important Payment Systems (SIPS) in the Philippines as Multi-
transactions Interbank Payment System (MIPS2), cheque clearing and the 
Philippine Domestic Dollar Transfer System (PDDTS-U.S. dollar) gross systems.  
The Philippines has the legal and regulatory framework for the establishment of 
interbank clearing facilities, but the finality of settlement for both public and 
private systems is concluded through contractual obligations and it does not have 
as strong a legal basis as compared to a central bank law. This may tie the 
enforceability to the judicial processes, which may complicate the effectiveness of 
systemic risk reduction. There is also vagueness regarding the oversight 
responsibilities and the central bank power over the payment system operators 
such as the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) and the Philippine 
Central Depository (PCD), particularly the PDDTS which is facilitated by the 
private sector.  This may pose some risks not only on the cheque clearing but also 
on inter-regional clearing. The offsite back up facilities need to be improved to 
strengthen the security and operational reliability of MIPS2 and the cheque 
clearing systems. The general criteria for participants are not explicit. There are 
no anti-competitive practices or methods that might compromise the safety, 
fairness and efficiency within the systems. 
- Based on the summary FSAP report on Malaysia (2013)159, the IMF stated that 
there was a clear distinction of oversight, regulatory and supervision jurisdiction 
between the Securities Commission and the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). The 
BNM is responsible for the oversight of the payment systems and settlement 
                                                 
158
International Monetary Fund, “Philippines: Report on Observance of Standards and Codes – Payment 
Systems”, IMF Country Report No. 05/22, January 2005. This report based on the information that compiles by 
IMF on September 16, 2002.  See further at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0522.pdf, last 
accessed on January 16, 2015. 
159International Monetary Fund, “Malaysia: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation 
– Detailed Assessment of Observance of the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures”, IMF  
Country Report No. 13/58, March 2013, at  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1358.pdf, last 
accessed on January 16, 2015. 
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systems for unlisted government, and private debt securities.
 160
 The BNM has 
RENTAS which functions as a Real-Time Gross Settlement System, which is also 
integrated with a CSD and also handles securities settlement of unlisted 
Government, and private debt securities.  Regarding the legal basis, the legal 
framework explicitly provides for finality. However, the certainty of protection of 
collateral placed for liquidity support and protection of repo arrangements is not 
explicit. With regard to CSD, the segregation arrangements for the customers that 
have been provided for in the legal framework should be tested and the procedures 
for implementing portability should be verified as well. 
It seems to the author that from these summary reports of the IMF, it is obvious 
that ASEAN, represented by these countries, in general already complies with the 
CP-SIPS.  The RTGS systems of the relevant countries have strong legal basis, 
which binding to all the participants.
161
  Aside from a set of regulations, they have 
contractual agreements among the parties. They also have standards and 
procedures to run the RTGS system. With regard to the rules and procedures, the 
respective countries need to review their regulations accordingly and test the 
system periodically. 
2.5.2 RTGS Assessment in the EU 
The IMF and the World Bank have also assessed the RTGS system of the EU 
members as developed countries. The assessment also resulted in some recommendations 
from the IMF that are to be complied with. It is important to know, that in the EU there is an 
integrated payment system which is connected to all of the RTGS system in each of the EU 
members, called TARGET, so that the assessment is related to and have to comply with the 
TARGET rules. This TARGET system will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
- The IMF report on Germany (2003).162 Germany has the largest banking sector, 
insurance and pension sector, and non-financial institution sector. The regulatory 
framework and financial sector supervision are of high quality. 
With regard to the payment system, the report stated that the payment system is 
functioning well and does not give rise to any systemic vulnerability. The RTGS-
                                                 
160
The legal framework for payment systems and government securities consists of (1) The Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act 2009 (CBA) that provides the mandate for Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) to own and operate 
payment and settlement systems, and (2) The Payment System Act 2003 (PSA) that strengthens the payment and 
settlement systems oversight powers and firmly establishes the BNM as the authority which is responsible for 
promoting the reliable, efficient and smooth operation of the national payment and settlement systems. 
161
Except the Philippines which still uses contractual obligations for the finality settlement. 
162International Monetary Fund, “Germany: Financial System Stability Assessment, Including Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes on the Following Topics: Banking Supervision, Securities Regulation, 
Insurance Regulation, Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency, Payment Systems, and Securities 
Settlement”, IMF Country Report No. 03/343, November 2003, at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/ 
2003/cr03343.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
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plus is connected to the European TARGET system. The assessment of the CPSS 
core principles for SIPS of RTGS-plus, operated by the Bundesbank, are fully 
observed.  
This report indicated that Germany was well prepared for implementing the 
payment systems in complying with the CPSS core principles. 
- The IMF report on France (2005).163 France fulfils all prerequisites for effective 
payment clearing and settlement systems. The legal framework is sound. France 
has French law and contractual agreements within the framework of Transferts 
Banque de France (TBF), the RTGS system, which provide a well-established and 
reasonably comprehensive legal basis for fund transfers. All relevant laws are 
fully enforceable.  France’s payment systems need an improvement towards 
transparency in a problematic situation with respect to the behaviour of the 
participants. Such problems are technical failures of the platform or in case of 
bankruptcy of the participants. It also needs a handbook that could be made 
obtainable in which the pertinent topics would be more user-friendly and more 
practical. The overall assessments are generally observed. 
- The IMF report on Italy (2004 and 2006).164 The Banca d’Italia RTGS System for 




The legal basis, the rules, guidelines, and other documents related to BIREL
166
, 
and to its operating procedures, have to be set by the Banca d’Italia (BdI) within 
the constraints of the TARGET rules that have been issued by the European 
Central Bank (ECB), under Article 22 of its Statute.
167
 The procedures for 
                                                 
163International Monetary Fund, “France: Financial Sector Assessment Program—Detailed Assessment of 
Observance of Standards and Codes including Banking Supervision, Insurance Regulation, Securities 
Legislation, Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency, Payment System, Securities Settlement, and Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism”,  IMF Country Report No. 05/186, June 2005, at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05186.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
164International Monetary Fund, “Italy: Detailed Assessment of Compliance with the Committee for Payment 
and Settlement Systems (CPSS) Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems”, and “Italy: 
Financial Sector Assessment Program – Detailed Assessment of Observance of the IMF Code of Good Practices 
on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies—Payment Systems Oversight”, IMF Country Report No. 
04/132, May 2004 and IMF Country Report No. 06/77, March 2006, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04132.pdf and http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/ 
cr0677.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
165
The authority of the BdI over payment systems and the legal basis of banking industry are based on the Italian 
Banking Law (IBL) 1993 and payment systems Oversight Provisions (OP) in 2004 issued by the Governor of the 
BdI . In Article 146 of IBL states: “Banca d’Italia shall promote the regular operation of payment systems. For 
this purpose, it may issue regulations to ensure the efficiency and reliability of clearing and payment systems.”  
166
Since 2003 (during the assessment of IMF), BIREL has been replaced by the New BIREL. 
167
The Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_statute_2.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
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operating and managing BIREL are clearly and publicly set out in the Italian 
legislation
168
, within the context of the TARGET rules and guidelines. 
With regard to the provisions that are specifically governing the BIREL system, 
the Governing Council has drawn up the guidelines for the TARGET system 




Some recommendations from the IMF’ report,170 need to be applied by BdI, such 
as the inconsistencies in the application of the requirement for a capacity opinion 
and a country opinion that should be obtained every two years, especially from the 
outside European Economic Area (EEA) on the finality and irrevocability of their 
payment through the system. The BdI should have more closed discussion with 
the ECB on the legal foundation and should seek the decree which is covering the 
technical rules on the standards of security, authenticity and integrity for the 
electronic processing of instructions for payments that are to be done by BIREL. 
- The IMF Report of the FSAP on Netherlands (2004).171  This assessment stated 
that the major features of the Netherlands’ payments system were reflected in the 
assessment of the Europe-wide TARGET payments system undertaken in 2001. It 
was found that the TARGET system was broadly compliant with the Committee 
on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) Core Principles for Systemically 
Important Payments System (CPSIPS). The FSAP on payment systems were not 
formally assessed in the Netherlands. Their attention in this assessment was 
focused on the securities settlement systems in light of the recent and pending 
developments in this area, using the CPSS/IOSCO RSSS. The assessors advised 
that the DNB should have a new law to address the need for a stronger legal basis 
for the supervision of such systems (of securities settlement systems and as well 
as of payments systems more generally). 
                                                 
168
Italy has the 1993 Banking Law and the 1998 Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation. Italy has also  
Legislative Decree No.43 of March 10, 1998 which incorporated the provisions of the Community law 
concerning the ESCB into the Italian laws. With regard to the cross-border credit transfers, Italy also has a 
Legislative Degree No.253 of July 28, 2000, adapting Directive 97/5/CE, which governs credit transfers of up to 
€50.000. Finality settlement and insolvency issues are stated in Legislative Decree No.210 of April 12, 2001. 
169
Guideline ECB/2001/3 of April 26, 2001 defines TARGET as the Trans-European Automated Real-time 
Gross settlement Express Transfer system for the Euro; it is composed of the domestic RTGS systems, the ECB 
payment mechanism and the Interlinking system. Annex 1 to the Guideline lists the real-time gross settlement 
systems which are part of TARGET, including the “Sistema di regolamento lordo BIREL”. See the official 
journal of the European Community, L.140 of May 24, 2001 (2001/401/EC). 
170
Italy – IMF Report No. 04/132, Opcit. 
171International Monetary Fund, “The Kingdom of the Netherlands—Netherlands: Financial System Stability 
Assessment, including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Banking 
Supervision, Securities Regulation, Insurance Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Payment Systems, 
Securities Settlement Systems, and Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism”, IMF 
Country Report No. 04/312 September 2004, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04312.pdf, last 
accessed on January 16, 2015. 
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- Spain has also been assessed by the IMF in 2005 and 2012.172  In its report, Banco 
de España (BE) has a legal basis for the RTGS, which is sound and contains clear 
rules and procedures such as the Law 13/1994, the Law 41/1999, known as the 
Settlement Finality Law for authorization on payment systems, and the Circular 
3/2000.
173
   
Spain has one large value payment systems (RTGS), named Servicio de 
Liquidación del Banco de España (SLBE), owned, operated, and controlled by the 
BE, which is considered as the only systemically important payment system.
174
 
This is a part of the TARGET, and it settles both domestic and cross-border 
transactions. IMF has some recommendations for the BE, especially in 
consolidating its payment circulars to improve readability and transparency for 
participants and in monitoring the use of the liquidity reservation facility to avoid 
possible discrimination against certain payments that may have to wait until the 
end of the day to be settled, and to make sure that it does not unduly prevent the 
central bank from debiting accounts during the day.
175
 In a 2012 IMF Report, is 
stated that “Overall, the authorities’ responsibilities with respect to the FMIs are 
clearly defined in the law, but further transparency on the Banco de España’s 
(BdE) responsibilities with respect to the FMIs other than payments systems is 
recommended.”176 




In the IMF report, the Danish authorities declared that there were two payment 
systems that are systemically important: (i) KRONOS, the RTGS system for 
large-value payments; and (ii) Sumclearing, a multilateral netting system.
178
   
The legal basis for KRONOS can be divided into five categories
179
: 
                                                 
172International Monetary Fund, “Spain: Financial Sector Assessment Program—Detailed Assessment of the 
CPSS Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems” and “Spain: Oversight and Supervision of 
Financial Market Infrastructures Technical Note”, IMF Country Report No. 06/221, June 2006 and IMF Country 
Report No. 12/144, June 2012,  at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06221.pdf and http://www. 
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12144.pdf,  last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
173
Article 7.3.d) of Law 13/1994 on the Autonomy of the Banco de España, establishes that the central bank is in 
charge of promoting the well-functioning of the national payment system.  Law 41/1999 of November 12 on 
Payment and Securities Settlement Systems, the Settlement Finality Law, defines the terms acceptance, 
irrevocability and settlement finality (art. 10 and 11).  Art. 13 regulates the insolvency procedure for the clearing 
and transfer of order. Circular 3/2000, in accordance with Law 41/1999 establishes that payment orders are 
irrevocable. 
174




Spain - IMF Country Report No. 12/144 , Opcit. 
177
International Monetary Fund, “Denmark: Financial Sector Assessment Program—Detailed Assessment of the 
Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems”, IMF Country Report No. 07/120, March 2007, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07120.pdf, last accessed on January 16, 2015. 
178
The author only describes the report on RTGS system 
179
 IMF Country Report No. 07/120, Opcit. 
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“ a.  Danmarks Nationalbank Act; 
b.   General Danish law of contracts and property; 
c.  Regulations governing payment systems and collateral arrangements; 
d.  The contractual basis for KRONOS; and 
e.   The conditions of the ESCB for the participation of non-Euro area 
national central banks in TARGET.” 
Danmarks Nationalbank considers that the act is needed for its operational role 
and for its catalyst and oversight role.
180
 In general, the KRONOS system has 
complied with the CP-SIPS, but there are some recommendations to be followed 
up such as the transparency on pricing; a reconsideration at the discretion powers 
with respects to access and exit; an analysis of the effects of language barrier, 
especially for remote members with regard to the open access and the promotion 
of the Danish financial markets; and formulating explicit exit procedures in rules 
and regulations. 
Based on the IMF reports on the assessment on ASEAN and the EU members 
mentioned above, the author analyses that the RTGS system, in general, complies with the 
Core Principles Systemically Important Payment System (CP-SIPS), especially TARGET, 
which has been used by the EU. It is interesting to note that some recommendations were 
emphasized on every report, and were all in the same aspect i.e. legal issues or technical 
aspects related to the other core principles such as transparency and dissemination of rules 
and procedures, pricing, liquidity aspect, oversight and governance.  But again, in general 
they already comply with CPSIPS.  
The author may also note that a sound legal basis is one of the very important 
principles that are required not only for the RTGS system but also for all the systems.
181
 The 
systems need to be tested periodically. The regulations, rules and procedures need to be 
updated and be accessed accordingly, in line with the development of economy and 
technology. Furthermore, the regulation should be clear, transparent and enforceable, in order 
to provide legal certainty. They also need to be disseminated and to be known and 
understandable to all parties involved. Last but not least, the author emphasizes that the 
important role of these principles are to be a guideline for the central banks to carry out an 
oversight of their payment systems for the safety and efficiency of transactions, so the risks 
which may arise can be reduced or prevented, then the transactions run smoothly. 
                                                 
180
Effective as of March 1, 2006, the Danish Parliament approved the amendment on the Securities Trading Act, 
in which the oversight task of the central bank with respect to payments and clearing and settlement systems is 
explicitly set out in this act. 
181
The author observes that the principle of a well-founded legal basis becomes a principle no. 1 in both, CP-
SIPS Principles and Principle of FMI, because it is a very fundamental principles for creating and implementing 
a wide-range financial system. 
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Based on the FSAP report, the author does not see the big differences between the 
RTGS system used by the ASEAN countries and the one used by the EU countries, because 
both systems have the same standard and procedures.
182
 They also have similar features. It 
seems to the author that the integration of the RTGS system among the ASEAN members will 
run smoothly and may be adopted by following the EU’s experience. However, before 
adopting it, it is better to understand the background of the integration of the RTGS system 
operated by the European Central Bank (ECB).   
With regard to the EU members’ RTGS assessments, the system is linked to the 
TARGET system for all the EU members so that it integrates their cross-border transactions. 
How it works and how it is managed will be described in the next chapter.  
3. Summary 
This chapter provides a better understanding on the payment systems, especially the 
RTGS and its guiding principles. The author concludes that a payment system basically is 
categorized in two types: cash payment and non-cash payment. The non-cash payment is 
generally divided into two groups: large value payment system (RTGS) and retail payment 
systems (clearing, credit card, debit card, mobile payment, etc.). Payment systems also have 
risks: credit risks, liquidity risks, legal risks, operation risks, and systemic risks.  The payment 
systems also have lots of benefits, especially the RTGS systems.  
With regard to the risks, the BIS endeavours to diminish or mitigate such risks by 
providing guidelines/core principles on payment systems, known as the CPSIPS-RTGS and 
the FMI, to reassure that the design and operation of the payment systems, especially the 
RTGS, meet the requirements for safety and efficiency of the systemically important payment 
system worldwide. These principles cover all the risks mentioned above, so that such risks 
can be reduced or even eliminated.  These principles have become the international standard 
and are part of the whole assessment of the financial sector. 
Since the EU countries and the ASEAN countries have participated in the RTGS 
system, they should comply with these principles, which will be periodically assessed by the 
BIS and/or the IMF. 
                                                 
182
The IMF and the World Bank use the CPSIPS and the PFMI for conducting their assessment. 




THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
BACKGROUND OF PAYMENT SYSTEM INTEGRATION OF THE 
TRANS-EUROPEAN AUTOMATED REAL-TIME GROSS 
SETTLEMENT EXPRESS TRANSFER (TARGET) SYSTEM IN 
EUROPE 
 
1. The Establishment of the European Union 
1.1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU), one of the most influential regional organizations in the 
world, consists of 28 European members
183
 and governing mutual economic, social, and 
security strategies.  The EU was established by the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty), which 
came into effect on November 1, 1993.  Undoubtedly, the EU is the most far-reaching form of 
regional integration, not least because it also stands for an advanced, albeit far from optimal, 
system of macroeconomic coordination and monetary policy integration.
184
  
Furthermore, the EU is based on the rule of law. This means that every action taken by 
the EU is founded on treaties, which have been approved voluntarily and democratically by 
all EU member states.
185
 
This chapter will discuss the history of the EU and the ECB as well as the payment 
system integration (TARGET) within the European area, conducted by the ECB. 
1.2 The History of the Monetary Integration in the EU 
The EU is a unique economic and political partnership between 28 European 
countries, which covers much of the continent.
186
 The EU is set up with the aim of ending the 
frequent and bloody wars between neighbours, which culminated in the Second World War. 
As of 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) began to unite the European 
                                                 
183
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countries economically and politically in order to secure lasting peace.
187
 This then became 
the foundation of the establishment of the EU in the spirit of economic association with the 
signing of the Treaty. The Treaty was reflected further to enhance the European political and 
economic integration by creating a single currency - the Euro. 
The establishment of the ECSC in July 1952 was the first step towards a supranational 
Europe.
188
 In March 1957, the six ECSC members
189
 signed the two Treaties of Rome, one of 
which designed the European Economic Community (EEC) aiming to attain integration via 
trade with a view of economic expansion. This establishment, in the opinion of the author, is 
the starting point of the realization of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and the ECB 
decades later, although the aims and objectives of the original treaty was much more limited 
because the idea of a single currency was not yet in mind of the founders of the Treaties of 
Rome. The ECSC Treaty established four major governing institutions namely: a High 
Authority or Commission, a Ministerial Council, an Assembly and a Court of justice.
190
  The 
Commission drafts the proposals; the Council prepares the standards; the 
Assembly/Parliament plays an advisory role and/or also one of the EU’s main law-making 
institutions; and the Court provides justice and settles legal disputes in all EU countries. 
In 1969, the Commission had an initiative to set up the need for "greater co-ordination 
of the economic policies and the monetary cooperation".
191
 This initiative was then followed 
up by the Heads of State or the Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
member states of the European Communities in their summit meeting at The Hague on 1 and 
2 December 1969
192
 agreed to the establishment of the EMU, and they also decided that the 
Commission should have a draft by the end of 1970, a stage-by-stage plan with a view to 
creating an economic and monetary union.  The proposal was set up by a group under the 
Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Luxembourg, Pierre Werner, (known as Werner 
Plan). It completed the task of looking into various aspects of the realization of economic and 
monetary union within the Community.  
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The Werner plan, however, was ahead of its time and failed. To a large extent, that 
fact also contributed to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system – due to the monetary 
policy of Nixon in 1971
193
 - which rendered the entire project a failure because of the 
catastrophic basic conditions.
194
 Then, in April 1972, the currency “snake” was established by 
limiting the margin of fluctuation between the exchange rates of the currencies within the EC 
to + 2.25% vis-à-vis the central parities, but it failed to stay linked to the US dollar (the 
“tunnel”).195 Furthermore, not all of the EEC countries were able to retain fixed exchange 
rates. With the quickly changing external circumstances such as inflation and increasing oil 
prices and the lack of common priorities and policy objectives, the EMU failed to be re-
launched during the 1970s.
196
  
Although the EMU plan was unsuccessful in the 1970’s, there were still last efforts to 
push for a European monetary integration. One of these plans was the proposal to launch an 
EEC system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, framed as the European Monetary System 
(EMS),
197
 launched in March 1979. Scheller describes that some features of the EMS were 
similar to the “snake”. For example the EMS was also built around a grid of fixed but 
adjustable central rates among the participating Community currencies.
198
 He also explains 
that a new feature, however, was the introduction of the European Currency Unit (ECU), 
which was defined as a “basket” of fixed quantities of the currencies of the member states.199 
The EMS was not very successful in the early period, but was in some respects 
somewhat successful in the period of the EMU re-launching. It began when the Committee of 
Governors of the Central Banks of the member states
200
 supported and adopted measures 
designed to strengthen the EMS in 1985.
201
 Amy Verdun affirms that this period became the 
symbol of the successful European integration during which the member state Governments 
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In February 1988, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a German Minister of Foreign Affairs 
proposed a memorandum with the title ‘A European Currency Area and a European Central 
Bank’ which presented both as an economically necessary completion of the European 
Internal Market.
203
 He emphasized that the ECB should be set up and he wished to promote 
the use of the ECU as a general means of payments in Europe and reduce European 
dependence on the dollar.
204
 Genscher also insisted on the autonomy of the ECB and the 
NCBs from political instruction and on the sole goal of price stability.
205
 In June 1988, the 
Heads of State and Governments decided at a European Council meeting in Hanover to set up 
a committee to study and propose “concrete stages leading towards this union”. 
The committee was chaired by Jacques Delors, President of the European 
Commission.It comprised (i) the presidents or governors of member countries’ central banks, 
(ii) another commissioner (iii) and three experts.
206
  The Delors Committee in its unanimous 
report, submitted in April 1989, defined the monetary union objective as a complete 
liberalization of capital movements, full integration of financial markets, irreversible 
convertibility of currencies, irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, and the possible replacement 
of national currencies with a single currency.
207
 This could be accomplished in three stages 
and Scheller called it in three “discrete but evolutionary steps”.208  Furthermore, Jakob de 
Haan and Helge Belger also argue that these three-stage programmes of Economic and 
Monetary Union will turn the European Community into a true single market.
209
 
The three stages towards EMU can be described as follows:
210
 
“-  Stage 1 (1990-1994) Complete the internal market and remove restrictions 
on further financial integration. 
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- Stage 2 (1994-1999) Establish the European Monetary Institute to 
strengthen central bank co-operation and prepare for the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB). Plan the transition to the Euro. Define the future 
governance of the Euro area (the Stability and Growth Pact). Achieve 
economic convergence between member states. 
- Stage 3 (1999 onwards) Fix final exchange rates and transition to the Euro. 
Establish the ECB and ESCB with independent monetary policy-making. 
Implement binding budgetary rules in member states.” 
The establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) in Frankfurt on 1 January 
1994 showed the commencing of the second phase of the EMU. The EMI began to coordinate 
monetary policy among the national central banks, based on the Maastricht Treaty, which had 
been signed in 1992, required to be independent, as well as working on the details of the 
single currency.  The Committee of Governors ceased to exist but was effectively 
reconstituted as the Council (governing body) of the EMI.
211
 The two main tasks of the EMI 
are to strengthen central bank cooperation and monetary policy co-ordination, and to make the 
arrangements required for establishing the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), for the 
conduct of the single monetary policy and for the design of a single currency in the third 
stage. The EU countries then at that time were preparing for the transition from their national 
currencies to the Euro. 
1.2.1 The European System Central Bank (ESCB) and The European Central Bank (ECB) 
The third stage can be indicated as the completion of all community currencies in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and for its achievement, it is essential to revise 
the Rome Treaty in order to set up the future European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB). The ESCB would take up all its responsibility as foreseen in the Treaty, 
including the formulation and implementation of the monetary policy in the 
Community. Hence, it can be concluded that the central bankers who until then had 
been conducting monetary policies, had set forth these monetary judgments to 
restructure policy-making, and transfer them to a new European institution, the 
European Central Bank (ECB). This was becoming the starting point of the 
establishment of the ECB.    
As mentioned above, the structure of the ECB was outlined in the Maastricht Treaty 
as part of the program to create Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  The Treaty 
set up the ESCB and a European Monetary Institute (EMI). The primary objective of 
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The ESCB has no legal personality and no capacity to act and no decision-making 
bodies of its own. Its composition comprises of the ECB and the NCBs of all EU 
member states.
213
 Hence, the ESCB as an institutional framework, which establishes 
an ‘organic link’ between the ECB and the NCBs’, ensures that i) decision-making is 
centralized, and ii) the tasks that the EC Treaty has assigned to the ESCB are 
performed jointly and consistently in line with the allocation of powers and the 
objectives of the system.
214
 
1.2.2 The Commencement of the European Central Bank (the ECB) 
With the establishment of the ECB on 1 June 1998 and the commencement of its 
operation on 1 July 1998, the EMI had ended its tasks. In accordance with Article 
123 paragraph 2 (ex-Article 109l) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU), the Treaties establishing the European Community 
(TEC) and certain related acts
215
, the EMI shall go into liquidation upon the 
establishment of the ECB. All the preparatory work entrusted to the EMI was 
concluded in good time and the rest of 1998 was devoted by the ECB to the final 
testing of the systems and procedures.
216
 The establishment of the ECB was one of 
the objectives of the TEU set in the preamble and the TEC set in Article 2. The 
principle provisions of the ECB are comprised in Articles 8, 105 to 124 TEC.   
Besides The Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice
217
 also instituted the 
amendments and the renumbering of the TEU and TEC. Hence, these became the 
consolidated versions of the TEU and the TEC incorporating the changes made under 
the Treaty on the European Union, 2006.
218
 
Compliant with Article 105(2) TEC, the ESCB has the basic tasks to carry out as 
follows: 
“ - to define and implement the monetary policy of the Community;  
- to conduct foreign exchange operations consistent with the provisions of 
Article 111 of the EC Treaty;  
- to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the member states; 
and  
- to promote the smooth operation of a payment system.”  
From this article, the author argues that the establishment and operation of the ECB 
is one of the most important steps in the whole process of  the European integration 
to back up the tasks of the ESCB. Why? Because the monetary policy and the 
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payment system integration are important key roles in carrying out the EU economy. 
The EU needs an institution, which could manage the economy and monetary aspects 
within the EU member states under one roof and this is not an easy task for the ECB. 
On 1 January 1999, the third and final stage of the EMU, it commenced with the 
irrevocable fixing of the exchange rates of the currencies. Eleven member states
219
 
were initially participating in the Monetary Union and conducted a single monetary 
policy under the responsibility of the ECB. The ECB is embedded in the specific 
legal and institutional framework of the European Community. What distinguishes 
ECB and NCB is the ECB’s supranational status within a community of sovereign 
states.  With regard to the ECB’s independence, Jakob de Haan states that the 
Maastricht Treaty made the European Central Bank (ECB) politically independent.
220
 
The Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
221
 and the Statute of the 
ESCB provide an independent status for the ECB and the NCB of the EU member 
states. Renè Smits simply divides the independent status of the ECB into four 
elements: institutional independence, functional independence, financial 
independence and personal independence.
222
  
Institutional independence of the ECB is based on Article 108 of the EC Treaty (was 
amended by Article 130 TFEU). It states as follow: 
“when exercising their powers and carrying out their tasks and duties, 
either the ECB nor an NCB nor any member of their decision-making 
bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or 
bodies, from any government of a member state or from any other body.” 
This article means that the ECB, as a legal autonomy of the monetary authority, has 
its own institution separate from the other bodies of the government and it is not 
allowed to seek or take any instructions from any other body or even from any 
government.  
Carol affirms that this Treaty grants the ECB full constitutional independence.
223
  
She also states that it explicitly explains that neither the ECB nor any member of its 
decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from the European 
Commission, from any government of any member states, or from any other 
organization or institution. 
                                                 
219
The eleven members are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portuguese, and Spain. 
220
Jakob de Haan, et al., “The European Central Bank : Credibility, Transparency, and Centralization”, Opcit., 
pp.9. 
221
The EC Treaty was amended by the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. 
222
Renè Smits, “The European Central Bank: Institutional aspects”, The Hague, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International,  1997, pp. 155-157. 
223Carol C. Bertaut, “The European Central Bank and the Euro-system”, New England Economic Review, Second 
Quarter 2002, pp. 26. 
   
67 
 
With regard to its the functional independence, the ECB has the objectives to 
conduct the monetary policy and to pursue the price stability.  In performing the 
tasks and objectives, the ECB and the NCB’s could not be influenced by the 
Community institutions or by bodies from any government of a member states.
224
 
Hence, the ECB has the sole right to carry out its function as a monetary authority for 
the EU without any interference from other parties. 
The financial independence means that the ECB manages its own budget, which is 
separated from the EC’s budget.225 Its budget is not even subject to approval by the 
minister of finance. Moreover, Article 26(2) of the ESCB Statute states that: 
“the annual accounts of the ECB shall be drawn up by the Executive 
Board, in accordance with the principles established by the Governing 
Council. The accounts shall be approved by the Governing Council and 
shall thereafter be published.” 
The capital of the ECB for its establishment shall be 5.000 million Euro.
226
  The ECB 
shall also take responsibility for the allocation of the monetary income of the national 
central banks and of the net profits and losses of the ECB respectively.
227
 
Regarding personal independence, the ECB has such privileges and immunities for 
the performance of its tasks, by having its own decision-making bodies, staff, salaries 
and other benefits.
228
 The dismissal of the officer could not be done by the reasons 
interrelated to the government/parliament decision but it is only possible if there are 
serious matters unrelated to the policy of the ECB. 
In terms of independence, the author agrees that this is also one of the most 
important issues for managing a region’s monetary policy, because without 
independence, the government or other parties will be able to intervene.  The central 
bank should be independent of political and economic influence from the 
government and other parties. This privileged independence is supported by the EU 
legislation according to Article 282(3) (TFEU). 
The ECB has also the law-making powers to carry out its tasks, such as making 
regulations, decisions, recommendations, guidelines as well as fines and penalty 
payments.
229
 The law making powers shall be binding and directly applicable in all 
member states. These status and powers demonstrate that the ECB can be named as a 
supranational body/institution. The ECB shall also enjoy in each of the member 
states the most extensive legal capacity and can even undertake actions in the private 
law area, for instance, making contracts, acquire or dispose of movable and 
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immovable property, and be a party to legal proceedings.
230
 So, the ECB could make 
agreements with the other party for the purpose of its tasks. 
Unlike the ESCB, the ECB has a legal personality and has the capacity to act but that 
should be in line with its objectives, the rules of the Treaty, and the Statute, as well 
as with the decision-making bodies of the ECB.
231
 The ECB also has a right to 
resolve international arrangement with the IMF, the BIS and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
The ECB could perform as a policy function, although it is not a public institution 
like the European Parliament, the Council, the European Commission, the Court of 
Justice, and the Court of Auditors.
232
 These institutions are assigned with the broad 
mandate of performing the tasks of the Community within the limits of the powers 
deliberated to them by the Treaty.  The ECB has a specific status within the whole 
framework of the European Community and carries out its activities with a well-
defined peculiar task.  The ECB has not received its delegated power from the 
Community institutions, and this distinguishes the ECB from other decentralized 
agencies such as the European Environment Agency and the Office for 
Harmonization in the Internal Market, whose competences are delegated by the 
Community institutions. 
The ECB has three-structural bodies. These bodies are the Governing Council, the 
Executive Board, and the General Council.  The Governing Council is the main 
decision making body of the ECB and, according to Article 10 of the Statute of the 
ESCB, is managed by six members of the executive board, consisting of the 
president, vice-president and four members nominated by the Eurozone countries, 
plus the governors of the national central banks of the 17 Euro area countries.
233
 Its 
main role is to adopt the guidelines and take decisions necessary to ensure 
performance of the tasks entrusted to the Euro-system and to formulate monetary 
policy for the Euro area. This includes decisions relating to monetary objectives, key 
interest rates, the supply of reserves in the Euro-system, and the establishment of 
guidelines for the implementation of those decisions.
234
 Jakob de Haan and his 
colleagues have their opinion related to the independency of the Governing Council:  
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“However, when taking monetary decisions, the members of the 
Governing Council of the ECB are not expected to act as national 
representatives but rather in a fully independent personal capacity.
235
 
The second of decision-making body is the Executive Board. In accordance with 
Article 11 the Statute of the ESCB, the Executive Board consists of the President, the 
Vice-President and four other members who are appointed by the European Council, 
through a qualified majority.
236
 Its main role is to implement monetary policy for the 
Euro area in accordance with the guidelines specified and the decisions taken by the 
Governing Council; to prepare Governing Council meetings; to manage the day-to-
day business of the ECB; and to exercise certain powers delegated to it by the 
Governing Council. These include some of a regulatory nature.
237
 
With regard to the Executive Board body, Daniel Gros and Niels Thygesen compared 
it to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve in USA. 
The FOMC meets every five to six weeks, and has its functions analogous to those 
envisaged for the ECB Governing Council in setting monetary objectives and in 
formulating guidelines for the main policy instrument, open-market operations, to be 
undertaken through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
238
  Their comparison 
reached a conclusion that the ECB Executive Board is likely to have a relatively 
weaker position with respect to both decision-making and policy implementation 
than the Federal Reserve.  They furthermore revealed that The Board will be 
squeezed from one side by the Governing Council, the repository of all major policy-
making authority, and from the other side by the participating NCBs, anxious to 
preserve as many operational tasks as possible, partly to retain influence for 
themselves partly to defend the perceived interests of their employees.
239
  The author 
has a different opinion. The ECB has three bodies and the Executive Board is a kind 
of extension of the Governing Council, whose tasks are to assist and to smoothing 
the Governing Council’s policies. On the other hand, the Executive Board has certain 
powers and authorities to run day-to-day business. Thus, this co-ordination will 
mutually strengthen and support each other. 
The last body of the ECB is the General Council, which comprises of the President 
of the ECB; the Vice-President of the ECB; and the governors of the national central 
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banks (NCBs) of the 28 EU member states. In other words, the General Council 
consist of representatives of the 19 euro area countries and the 9 non-euro area 
countries..
240
 The General Council
241
 has the main tasks of being the ECB's advisory 
functions, collecting statistical information, preparing the ECB's annual report, 
setting up the necessary rules for standardizing the accounting and reporting of 
operations undertaken by the NCBs, taking measures relating to the establishment of 
the key for the ECB's capital subscription other than those laid down in the Treaty, 
laying down the conditions of employment of the members of staff of the ECB and 
taking necessary preparations for irrevocably fixing the exchange rates of the 
currencies of the "EU member states with a derogation" against the Euro.
242
    
By these decision-making bodies under Article 8 of the Statute of the ESCB, the 
ECB has the instruments to efficiently work to handle their respective tasks. 
Furthermore, the ECB has also the authority to make regulations, carry out 
supervisions and even impose sanctions.
243
 By this authority the ECB is entitled to 
impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply with 
its regulations and decisions. It ensures uniform and effective imposition of sanctions 
through full collaboration with the ECB by the national central banks of the euro 
area.
244
. All measures taken by the ECB have a legal binding effect but are open for 
review or interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
245
  
The author sees that this authority gives the ECB, as an institutional body for the EU 
member states, the power to make regulations, which will automatically be accepted 
in all the member states’ jurisdictions and is directly applicable and have been 
adopted by the members of the Euro-system. The regulations made by the ECB, 
already provides a certainty of law regarding the enforceability to all the EU member 
states. However, when conflict of laws arises among the parties, they can find justice 
at the ECJ.  
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The ECB clearly holds an important role for the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Before a member state joins the Eurozone, it must prove that it has fulfilled some 
requirements/criteria over a long-term period, known as the economic convergence. 
This convergence is a method to assure equal treatment of member countries in the 
Euro area, especially when new member countries want to join the EU.
246
 The ECB 
has to examine each member state who would like to join the Eurozone. The 
requirements for the adoption of the single currency are: a high degree of sustainable 
convergence (economic convergence) and compatibility of the national legislation 




“-   the achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will be 
apparent from a rate of inflation which is close to that of, at most, the 
three best performing member states in terms of price stability, 
- the sustainability of the government financial position; this will be 
apparent from having achieved a government budgetary position 
without a deficit that is excessive as determined in accordance with 
Article 104(6), 
- the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at 
least two years, without devaluing against the currency of any other 
member state, 
- the durability of convergence achieved by the member state and of its 
participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European 
Monetary System being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels.” 
These four criteria should be independently assessed by the ECB and the European 
Commission both for economic and legal convergence, then they should report to the 
EU Council (meeting in both the ECOFIN composition and the composition of the 
Heads of State or Government).   
For legal convergence, the ECB will examine:
248
 
“-  the independence of the NCB (legal, institutional and functional 
independence and security of tenure of the members of the decision-
making bodies); 
- the legal integration of the NCB into the ESCB (including statutory 
objectives, tasks, instruments, organization and financial 
provisions); 
- other legislation which has a bearing on the full participation of the 
member state in Stage Three of EMU (including provisions on the 
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issue of banknotes and coins, holding and management of foreign 
reserves and exchange rate policy).” 
One thing that the author notes is that the national legislation of all member states, 
including the statutes of their NCBs, must be compatible with the Treaty and the 
Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, based on Article 131 (TFEU), in order to be 
integrated. These mean that the NCB of every member state should adopt the 
regulations and statutes related to the ECB’s regulations and by means of these 
adoptions, the NCB member states must comply with the ECB’s regulations or 
policies. 
To distinguish between the NCBs Eurozone and non-Eurozone, Scheller also 
describes the term of ‘Euro-system’, which has been adopted by the Governing 
Council of the ECB in November 1998 to refer to the composition of the ECB and 
the NCBs of the Member Countries who have adopted the Euro.
249
 There are three 
reasons why the term Euro-system was established to carry out central bank 
functions for the Euro, and not a single central bank:
250
 
“1. The establishment of a single central bank for the whole Euro area 
(possibly concentrating central bank business in one single place) 
would not have been acceptable on political grounds. 
2. The Euro-system approach builds on the experience of the NCBs, 
preserves their institutional set-up, infrastructure and operational 
capabilities and expertise; moreover, NCBs continue to perform some 
non-Euro-system-related tasks. 
3. Given the large geographic area of the Euro area, it was deemed 
appropriate to give credit institutions an access point to central 
banking in each participating member state. Given the large number of 
nations and cultures in the Euro area, domestic institutions (rather 
than a supranational one) were considered best placed to serve as 
points of access to the Euro-system”. 
To perform its tasks on monetary policy the ECB, like other central banks, is using a 
basic instrument namely the interest rate, by using an intervention tool called open 
market operations.
251
 The author is going to discuss the other instruments that may 
support the monetary policy, which are also very important to support the monetary 
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To support an effective monetary policy, the efficient and safety payment and 
settlement systems are one of the crucial instruments.  Based on Article 3.1 the 
ESCB statute, one of the basic tasks of the ESCB is to promote the smooth operation 
of payment systems. There was a fundamental need to build up a payment service to 
serve the needs of what would be a single monetary policy.  The legal basis for the 
Euro-system’s capability in the area of payment and settlement systems is also 
contained in Article 127(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). To promote the smooth operation of payment systems, the Euro-system 
actively cooperates with other bodies and institutions. First is the cooperation with 
the EU Commission, which strives for further harmonization of the laws within the 
Union by issuing a directive to be implemented in the national law of the member 
states.  Second is to cooperate with the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS) of the G-10 central banks, coordinated by the BIS.  
In accordance with Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank, it is clearly stated as follows:
253
  
“the ECB and the national central banks may provide facilities, and the 
ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and 
payment systems within the Community and with other countries.”  
The task of making regulations on payment system within the Union and with other 
countries becomes the legal basis of the ECB to regulate the NCBs of member states. 
As with the regulations adopted by the legislative bodies of the European 
Community, the ECB regulations have general application, and are binding in their 
entirety. They are also directly applicable in all Euro area countries.
254
 Scheller 
explains that general application means that they are applicable to an unlimited 
number of entities and cases. Directly applicable means that, ECB Regulations 
become part of the national law without intervention of Parliament.
255
 As binding 
legal acts, they impose direct obligations on third parties. Such regulations take 
effect as soon as they are published by the European Commission. 
Accordingly, the ECB has been established by the EC Treaty, as a specialized, 
independent organization for conducting monetary policy and performing related 
functions, such as, in this discussion, as an operator of the TARGET system for 
payment system cross-border transaction.  
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In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty was signed. It made big changes on the ECB. In 
accordance with Article 13 TEU of the Lisbon Treaty and Part IX, Title 1, Chapter 1 
and Section 6, the ECB becomes one of the European official institutions such as the 
European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European 
Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditor.   
On the one hand, the ECB changes into an institutional framework under the EU 
constitutional order. The ECB becomes part of the core institution of the EU.  On the 
other hand, the independency of the ECB will be questioned. As we can see, Article 
108 TEC states that: 
“When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties 
conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither 
the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-
making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions 
or bodies, from any government of a member state or from any other 
body. The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the 
member states undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to 
influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the 
national central banks in the performance of their tasks.” 
Compare this to Article 282(3) of the Lisbon Treaty, which states that: 
“The European Central Bank shall have legal personality. It alone may 
authorize the issue of the Euro. It shall be independent in the exercise of 
its powers and in the management of its finances. Union institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies and the governments of the member states 
shall respect that independence.” 
The author sees that those two articles above imply a concept of independence.  But 
in the new clause of the Lisbon Treaty, the author sees that the ECB’s independence 
is not literary stated to not be influenced by the other parties as stated in the article on 
TEC.  Some academics and practitioners have different opinions on that issue. The 
Executive Board of the ECB, Dr. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi states that the independence 
of the central bank needs to be continuously protected and maintained over time, and 
this is the responsibility of the political institutions.
 256
 Nevertheless, the Lisbon 
Treaty has strengthened the ECB’s independence by explicitly introducing its 
financial independence in primary law.
257
 
In addition, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU provides that the EU shall have exclusive 
competence in the monetary policy of  the member states whose currency is the Euro. 
Consequently, only the ECB has the power to legislate and legally adopt acts relating 
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to EMU. The term Euro-system was introduced in this treaty. By these regulations, 
the ECB has the power to smooth the payment system by regulating and operating 
the TARGET system, which supports the monetary policy in the EU. The creation of 
the Euro area and a new supranational institution, the ECB, was a milestone in the 
long and complex process of European integration.
258
  
1.2.3 The Role of the National Central Bank’s (NCB) in the EU 
Like the ECB, the NCBs of the Euro-system also have a legal personality within the 
national law of the respective country.  However, all NCBs in the Euro area are 
integral parts of the Euro-system by virtue of Article 105 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB.
259
 In Article 14.3 of the Statute it is clearly 
stated that “the national central banks … shall act in accordance with the guidelines 
and instructions of the ECB”, so it means that the Statute mandates the NCBs to 
comply with the ECB’s policy.   
The EU has NCBs as a part of the Euro-system and NCBs of the non-EU member 
states. As part of the Euro-system, the NCBs and their management should also be 
independent, like the ECB. This independence has been protected in both the EC 
Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. The government may not interfere with the tasks 
and objectives of the NCB and the governor of the Central Bank in line with the 
functioning of the Euro-system.   
The NCBs of the non-EU member states are also members of the ESCB but have a 
different status. They are responsible for their respective national monetary policies 
and are therefore excluded from taking part in the main activities of the Euro-system. 
Their governors are not members of the ECB’s Governing Council and do not take 
part in the decision-making process for the Euro-system’s duties. The non-EU NCBs 
are, however, obliged to comply with the principles of price stability-oriented 
monetary policy. Moreover, being members of the ESCB implies that they need to 
work thoroughly with the Euro-system in several subjects, such as supporting the 
ECB in the collection of statistics.
260
 In addition, the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II (ERM II) provides a framework for monetary and exchange rate 
policy cooperation with the Euro-system.
261
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Nout Wellink, the former President of De Nederlandsche Bank and the former 
Director of the Bank for International Settlement, made a statement in the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank Conference ‘Competition of Regions and Integration 
in EMU’, at Vienna, 13-14 June 2002, as follows:262 
“The national central bank in Europe is of a peculiar sort and has a 
double identity. On the one hand, it is deeply rooted in national tradition 
and sovereignty, which reflects specific national tasks and 
responsibilities. On the other hand, it is part of a system of central banks 
responsible for a fully supra nationalized monetary policy and related, 
common tasks.” 
It can be said that the responsibilities of the NCB, in terms of its domestic tasks, 
basically have clear links and synergies with the tasks of the ESCB, both of which 
should be carried out for the interests of its country and its part towards EU 
integration. For example, the tasks of financial stability in the EU, is also important 
for the NCB to carry out. But Wellink affirmed that the financial stability task is 
more appropriately located at the national level, although communication and co-
ordination across borders are increasingly important. He also stated that this 
involvement in the financial stability is a natural reflection of other tasks, including 
monetary policy and payment system. The conclusion is that despite the fact that the 
NCBs have to execute tasks on national level, they are also responsible for carrying 
out tasks that are related to the country’s role as an EU member states. Hence, the 
NCBs must also comply with the policy of the ESCB, set forth in the Treaty on the 
EU, in order to ensure smooth coordination among the NCBs of all member states.  
The NCBs play double roles, given by their national law and by its  community law. 
2. The Background, Development and Legal Framework of the Trans-European 
Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) 
The ECB states in the ECB Monthly Bulletin April 2004 the following:
263
 
“The existence of efficient and robust large-value payment systems is of key 
importance for the smooth functioning of the economy. A large-value payment 
system should be efficient in order to ensure the uniform distribution of liquidity 
and a homogeneous level of short-term interest rates across a monetary area. 
This is a prerequisite for the efficient conduct of monetary policy operations. A 
large-value payment system should also be robust in order to cushion systemic 
risk and to contribute to financial stability. If a payment system for large-value 
transfers lacks robustness, not only could it cause disruptions in the financial 
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sector, but it could also allow these to spread from one market participant to 
another… With regard to the operational of large value payment systems, the 
Euro-system (the ECB) manages the TARGET system.” 
As the author pointed out previously, according to Article 127(2) of the TFEU and 
Article 3.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, one of the basic tasks of the ECB is to promote the 
smooth operation of payment systems. In order to promote the smooth operation of a payment 
system, Article 22 of the Statute states that the ECB and the NCBs are entitled to provide 
facilities to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Community 
and other countries. The essence of these articles was commonly already contained in the 
statutes of each NCB prior to their integration into the Euro-system, so after joining the Euro-
system, these functions became the shared competence of the ECB and the NCBs. Article 
34.1 of the Statute of the ESCB also authorizes the ECB to make regulations and 
recommendations, take decisions and deliver opinions in the area of clearing and payment 
systems, which are binding on the participants.  Such ECB regulations and decisions are 
directly applicable in the member states, which have adopted the Euro. It could also be 
concluded that the NCBs which have adopted the Euro must comply with the ECB regulations 
and decisions as provided by the Treaty and the Statute in their function as the legal basis for 
the engagement of the Euro-system in clearing and payment systems. 
These legal provisions in the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB are of particular 
importance with regard to payment and settlement systems. One of the payment systems, 
which play a very important role within the EU for cross-border transaction, is the RTGS, 
which is linked to TARGET.  Basically, the Euro area monetary markets are worked by two 
core payment systems, TARGET and EURO1. TARGET is owned and operated by the ECB, 
and EURO1 is owned by the European Banking Association, providing settlement services on 
a net basis.  In this dissertation, the author focuses on the TARGET system, which has made 
contribution to the fast-moving integration of the Euro market. 
Prior to the introduction of the Euro and the launch of a single monetary policy in 
1999, payments between the EU countries mainly relied on correspondent banking.
264
 But the 
correspondent banks were no longer considered appropriate and the establishment of an 
efficient and robust payment system for the Euro area as a whole was required.
265
    TARGET 
was created against this background. The main objectives of TARGET are to contribute to the 
singleness of the Euro money market in order to serve the needs of the single monetary policy 
implemented by the Euro-system, and to the soundness and efficiency of payment transfers in 
the Euro area.
266
 The impact of monetary policy operations is currently transferred to the 
money market via interbank funds transfer systems, which settle in the accounts of the central 
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bank. Related to the start of stage three of EMU, there will be a single monetary policy and an 
integrated money market where the interest rate may vary from one country to another.  So it 
is needed to apply one  standard in the EU. Moreover, there will be a need for a payment 
arrangement amongst them and finally the EU central banks agreed to establish the TARGET 
system. 
From the description above, the author may define that TARGET is created to support 
the objective of the EU to create a single market. It is a system composed of a real time gross 
settlement system in each of the EU countries,  which is managed by the Eurosystem, which 
are interlinking with the ECB payment mechanism (EPM), which provides intraday, finality, 
and settlement in the central bank money. Each NCB should have an interface between its 
RTGS and the interlinking system. TARGET is designed in such a way that the system will be 
able to process cross-border payments in one currency (Euro) at low cost with more safety 
and real time settlement. the RTGS of the non-Euro countries may also be connected, 
provided that they are also able to process the Euro currency along with their national 
currency. Security and business continuity have always been one of its key features.
267
 
TARGET is used to settle payments between participants located in the same country 
(domestic) or in two different countries of the EU (cross-border).
268
   
Fortunately, before the need for a single currency, the majority of the EU members 
already had their own RTGS system, but that system was only for the settlement of 
transactions in their domestic currencies. Hence, in March 1995, the EMI decided that all 
current EU NCBs should be ready to connect to TARGET by 1999.
269
  This development of 
TARGET was supported by the EU central banks’ collective decision, taken in November 
1993, to implement real-time gross settlement systems in all EU countries.
270
 
Why had the EMI chosen the RTGS for interlinking to TARGET? Because the RTGS 
ensures that every single transaction will occur in real time and will be final. TARGET was 
developed to meet three main objectives:
271
  
“First and foremost, to facilitate the integration of the Euro money market in order to 
allow for the smooth implementation of the single monetary policy; second, to improve 
the soundness and efficiency of payments in Euros; and third, to provide a safe and 
reliable mechanism for the settlement of payments on an RTGS basis, thus 
contributing to a minimization of risks in making payments.” 
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In order to achieve these objectives, TARGET offers the possibility of transferring the 
central bank money on a cross-border basis as smoothly as in the domestic market, making it 
possible to reuse these funds several times a day.
272
  
From the experience of TARGET until present day, the author concludes that it has 
been proven that RTGS provides more safety and efficiency for cross-border transactions than 
the other payment systems, such as the netting system transactions.   
Nakajima states that the RTGS system achieves finality earlier, which reduces the 
credit and liquidity risk, compare to the DTNS system.
273
 According to the “Outcome of the 
Global Payment System Survey 2010” conducted by the World Bank, 116 out of 139 
countries (or 83%) were using the RTGS system.
274
 This also confirms that RTGS has 
become one of the most important payment systems used, not only in the EU but also ASEAN 
and worldwide.   
But at that time, there was no sufficient time to build a completely new system in time 
for the introduction of the Euro in all the EU countries. The most practical and immediate 
solution was to link the existing RTGS systems and define a minimum set of harmonized 
features for sending and receiving payments across national borders (i.e. inter-member state 
payment).
275
 Then, at the national level, central banks continued to function as they did for the 
settlement of payments within their banking community (i.e. intra-member state payments).
276
 
The TARGET system was built by linking together the different RTGS structures, which 
existed at the national level. TARGET, the first-generation RTGS system for the Euro, 
commenced operation on 4 January 1999, following the launch of the Euro.
277
   
After the commencement of its operations, the national money markets were 
integrated effectively. The use and acceptance of a payment system largely depends on its 
safety and reliability. The ECB’s bulletin in April 2004 shows that in 2003, in spite of the 
decentralized structure of TARGET, the level of availability stood at 99.79%
278
. In this 
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respect, TARGET has proven to be robust and resilient. The temporary service interruptions 
in TARGET were bridged by special contingency arrangements aimed at ensuring the smooth 
and timely processing of specific payments, whose delayed processing could have potentially 
triggered a systemic risk.  Almost 96%
279
 of the inter-member state traffic was being 
processed in less than 5 minutes. Due to exceptional service disruptions, the processing time 
exceeded 30 minutes for 0.28%
280
 of inter-member state payments in TARGET. This report 
shows that the TARGET system has undoubtedly met its purposes i.e. to reduce systemic risk 
and enhance financial stability, and thus turn into the preferred system for cross-border 
transactions in Euro.   
Nevertheless, during its journey, there have been also some demands in terms of 
technology and business practice regarding TARGET to keep its speed. For example, the 
needs for foreign exchange transactions, triggered the ECB to develop a new system, namely 
the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) which becomes part of the development of 
TARGET in order to provide this system for settling the foreign exchange transactions. 
According to the needs and demands of the market, the EU needs a more sophisticated 
version of TARGET, to accommodate the strong demand from TARGET users for a more 
harmonized service at the European level.  
The ECB and the NCBs quickly moved to the next generation TARGET system. The 
main objectives that have been defined by the Euro-system for the second generation of 
TARGET, as stated in the IMF Country report in October 2001, were as follows:
281
 
“- to better meet customers’ needs, in terms of availability, intraday information, and 
liquidity management; 
- to provide a more harmonized service in order to ensure a level playing field for 
banks accessing TARGET via different RTGS systems; 
- to ensure cost efficiency; and 
- to be prepared for rapid adaptation to future developments, including, inter alia, 
technological progress and the likely enlargement of the Euro-system.”  
Based on the IMF country report, on 24 October 2002, the Governing Council of the 
ECB continued its work by defining the strategic direction for the next generation of 
TARGET, with the aim of overcoming the shortcomings of the current system, which could 
render it incapable of meeting future challenges.  Furthermore, the Governing Council has 
decided three main objectives for the TARGET2, and these are:
282
 






Based on IMF Report on Observance of Standards and Codes on the Euro area. See at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr01195.pdf, last accessed on January 19, 2015. 
282
See ECB website “Overview of TARGET”, pp.17., at https://www.ecb.Europa.eu/paym/pdf/target/current/ 
target overview.pdf, last accessed on January 19, 2015. 
   
81 
 
“ -   TARGET2 should provide a harmonized level of service on the basis of a common 
technical platform; 
- It should follow the principle of cost recovery and have a single price structure that 
is applicable for both inter-member state and intra-member state payments; 
- It should meet new user demands including those form the ten new member states 
that joined the EU on 1 May 2004.” 
In December 2004, the Governing Council granted the evolution of TARGET by 
designing a single technical platform, known as the Single Shared Platform (SSP) for 
TARGET2, which is based on the joint agreement prepared by three NCBs of the Euro-
system, namely the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Banca d’Italia, and the Banque de France. This 
evolution was designed to meet the participants’ requirements for more harmonized level of 
service and to increase cost-efficiency due to the decentralized structure, which multiplied the 
local technical components and, therefore, increased the maintenance and the running costs. 
Furthermore, the participants need a single price policy across the EU, which applies both to 
domestic and cross-border transactions, and also require flexible liquidity management 
facilities, high level of business continuity and effective contingency measures. 
The ECB and the NCBs were eventually successful in transforming TARGET into 
TARGET2.  It was launched on November 19, 2007.
283
 TARGET2 replaced the decentralized 
technical structure with the SSP. By using the SSP, each NCB will no longer be compulsory 
to maintain a payment processing platform of its own, but the settlement account relationship 
and the intraday credit extension still belong to the business relationship between each central 
bank and its national bank industry. This development will reduce the costs per transaction 
and will provide harmonized level of service in order to maintain a level playing field 
amongst the TARGET users. 
Participants may use TARGET not only to make large-value transactions, but also to 
facilitate settlements in other interbank funds transfer system, such as CLS and to resolve 
money market, foreign exchange and securities transactions. It can also be used for small-
value transactions. 
2.1 The Structure and the Objectives of TARGET 
TARGET at first had a decentralized structure, which was composed of each RTGS 
system of the NCBs Euro area, on the one hand, and the ECB payment mechanism, on the 
other hand, and has been replaced by TARGET2 in 2007 with the characterized structure, the 
SSP. The NCBs, which are not in Euro area, like Denmark, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and the 
United Kingdom, are also able to connect to TARGET, subject to certain additional 
                                                 
283
See ECB website “TARGET 2 Successfully Launched”, at http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/press/pr/date/2007/ 
html/pr071119_1.en.html, last accessed on January 19, 2015. 





  This interlinking will provide a uniform platform which will 
acknowledge payment orders to move from one RTGS system to another within the member 
states. By using TARGET, the payment settlement in the central bank money is immediately 
irrevocable and final. This eliminates both the settlement risk and the credit risk and 
substantially reduces the systemic risks. The ECB in particular, requires the payments, related 
to monetary policy operations involving the Euro-system or to the final settlement of 
systemically important payment and settlement systems, to be made via TARGET.  This 
categorizes the TARGET system as a systemically important payment system (SIPS) and 
should comply with the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems 
(CPSIPS). 
With regard to CPSIPS, TARGET provides a guarantee to eliminate service 




“i)  a very high operating level in terms of TARGET availability, and short 
processing times (as measured by the business performance indicator, for 
example); 
ii)  the secure processing of payments in TARGET (including protection 
against any type of threat); and 
iii)  compliance with the internationally agreed Core Principles for 
Systemically Important Payment Systems.” 
Having the new SSP structure of TARGET2, the ECB may achieve its objectives and 
support its goal to strengthen the economic integration process.  In 2006, before being 
replaced by TARGET2, it had processed more than 83 million national and cross-border 
payments with a value of almost €534 trillion.286 TARGET has an 89%287 share of the total 
value processed by all large-value Euro payment systems. The daily average number of 
payments processed in TARGET as a whole, i.e. domestic and cross-border payments taken 
together, amounted to 326,196 payments
288, with an average daily value of €2,092 billion.289  
The availability of the system was 99.87%
290
.  In 2008, after being replaced by TARGET2, it 
processed a daily average of 369,966 payments,
291
 representing a daily average value of 
€2,667 billion.292 TARGET’s share of total large-value payment system traffic in Euro was 
                                                 
284See “Conditions for the participation of non-Euro area EU NCBs and credit institutions in TARGET, at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/1998/html/pr980708_3.en.html, last accessed on January 19, 2015. 
285European Central Bank, “TARGET Annual Report 2007“, ECB, April 2008, pp. 20. 
286
See the ECB, “TARGET Annual Report 2006”, ECB, 2006, pp.5.  See further at 









291ECB, “TARGET Annual Report 2008”, ECB, 2008, Opcit., pp.15.    
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90% in value terms and 59% in volume terms.
293
 The availability of the system was 99.98% 
and 99.91% of TARGET payments were processed in less than five minutes.
294
 On 22 
December 2008 TARGET2 reached a peak of 576,324 transactions, which represents an all-
time high for the system (including the original TARGET) since its launch in January 1999.
295
 
From these explanations above, it shows that after re-designing into SSP, TARGET has 
become a better system and we can say that TARGET is one of the largest payment systems 
in the world. 
By moving from a decentralized multi-platform into a centralized platform structure, 
TARGET2 aims to fulfil the harmonized services at EU level, guaranteeing the same level 
playing field for the banks within the EU. According to TARGET Annual Report 2011 
published by ECB, during its years of progression, it effectively met the goals, especially in 
implementing single monetary policy, it contributed to reducing systemic risk and it helped 
banks to manage their Euro liquidity at national and cross-border level.
296
 Furthermore, 
TARGET2 provides ancillary systems with a harmonized set of cash settlement services and 
supports its users with enhanced liquidity management tools.
297
 The new generation of 
TARGET also provides a better integration of Euro liquidity management by making it 
possible for multi-country banks to further consolidate their internal processes for their 
treasury activities for Euro. 
TARGET2 has the same operating dates and times as the first-generation TARGET 
system.  TARGET2 is also open from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. CET or ECB time on each of its 
working days, with a cut-off time of 5 p.m. CET for customer payments.  However, the 
operational day of TARGET2 will be longer than the previous one, starting the new business 
day on the evening of the previous day.
298
 
The Euro-system released the “Information Guide for TARGET2 Users”299 which 
aims to provide a standard set of information in order to give their operators a better 
understanding of the overall functioning of the system and to enable them to make use of it as 
efficiently as possible. Furthermore, the information guide gives users a clear understanding 
of the features that are common and/or specific for each country and provides information and 
measures for abnormal and contingency situations. The Euro-system also released the 













The night-time window is available from 7.30 p.m. to 6.45 a.m. CET the next day, with a technical 
maintenance period of three hours between 10 p.m. and 1 a.m. CET.  The author does not elaborate on this 
technical operation in the current dissertation. 
299
See the ECB, “Information Guide for TARGET2 Users”, ECB, 2012.  See further at 
http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/ paym/t2/shared/pdf/professionals/nov_2011/infoguide_V5_1.pdf, last accessed on 
January 19, 2015. 
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“Information guide for TARGET2 pricing” to give a comprehensive overview of the pricing 
schemes related to TARGET2 operations.
300
 
2.2 The Minimum Common Features of TARGET   
As mentioned above, TARGET ensures the smooth implementation of the single 
monetary policy, facilitates the efficient functioning of the money market and improves the 
soundness and efficiency of the large value cross-border transaction in the EU member states.  
In order to carry out the services in 1996, the EMI defined the features of TARGET: to 
harmonize the features of the national RTGS and to smooth its tasks.  At the beginning, three 
features were required by the EMI,
301
 i.e. (1) the provisions of intraday liquidity; (2) operating 
hours; and (3) pricing policies. 
For intraday liquidity
302
, which is already implemented in each NCB’s RTGS, this 
feature is provided by the NCBs of the Euro area with two facilities: fully collateralized 
intraday overdrafts, and intraday repurchase agreements.   
Concerning the operating time, TARGET is open from 7 a.m. until 6 p.m. CET or 
ECB time. The local RTGS systems may open at an earlier time for processing domestic 
payments first. This policy to allow the overlap time between TARGET and other payment 
systems in other regions such as America and the Far East will encourage the business 
transactions made by credit institutions and central banks worldwide to limit the cross-
currency settlement risk. Regarding the relations with other transfer systems, in this case the 
net settlement systems, they are required to settle in central bank money. The settlement 
procedures of the net settlement system for cross-border transactions can be done via normal 
TARGET transfers between the ordinary (RTGS) account of the participating credit 
institutions or via a special account for the net settlement system within the ESCB. With 
regard to the TARGET pricing policy, it will be based on the cost recovery principle. It 
should uphold a level playing field between participants and it should reduce risk policies in 
payment systems. In the end, it will avoid competitive distortions within Euro area member 
states. 
In 1997, the EMI developed the features in more detail.  With regard to the pricing 
policy, it was decided that the price of domestic and cross-border transfers in Euro should be 
                                                 
300
These information guides are available and may be seen at the ECB’s and the respective NCB’s website. 
301European Monetary Institute, “The Single Monetary Policy in Stage Three: Specification of the Operational 
Framework”,  European Monetary Institute, January 1997, pp. 37-40. 
302
Intraday Liquidity can be defined as an extended credit facility provided by central bank to participants during 
the day and reimbursed before the end of the day.  Intraday credit to participants needs to be fully collateralized 
with adequate collateral. 
   
85 
 
broadly similar, based on volume predicted.  The role of the ECB will also be added to 
perform the following functions:
 303
  
“• provide end-of-day and possibly other control procedures for the TARGET system;  
• provide settlement services to cross-border large-value net settlement systems;  
• process payments for its own account; and  
• maintain accounts on behalf of its institutional customers (excluding credit institutions).” 
For the provision of settlement services to Euro net settlement systems, it was agreed 
to use a method for the settlement of the European Banking Association (EBA) clearing 
system, by opening a central settlement account at the ECB.                                                                                         
In June 2002, the ECB released TARGET’s minimum common performance features of the 
RTGS within TARGET. The ECB defined more detailed features for the TARGET’s 
participants. Some additional features such as accounting functions, communication 
functions, end-of-day procedures, currency conversion and audit trail should abide by the 
NCBs.  Furthermore, at the same time, the ECB also published TARGET Interlinking 
Specifications and TARGET Interlinking User Requirements for the NCBs.
304
  
With regard to accounting functions, the settlements at the NCBs take place in real 
time. No new cash management facility is offered to credit institutions with several accounts 
in the RTGS systems, which means that there is no consolidation of accounts for credit 
institutions. Regarding communication functions, all RTGS systems transmit settlement and 
business information in real time, so the transmission structure should be uniform.
305
 
However, for domestic communication, they can retain or improve their own configuration. 
For end-of-day feature, there are three procedures that have to be complied with, 
namely the end-of-day procedures during a normal business day, during abnormal situations, 
and during a “disaster” business day.306 Compliant with currency conversion, the RTGS 
systems in each NCB must be able to provide the interlinking with payment denominated in 
Euro, besides their own currency. In the audit trail area, RTGS systems should be able to 
provide security-relevant chronological documentation so it can be reviewed or the 
supervisors can access the transaction activities. These features will be updated continuously, 
depending on the condition and the development of technology and economy in the EU. 
Furthermore, the ECB also releases a guideline on TARGET, which has to be 
complied with those participants who join TARGET. The guideline is published in the 
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The ECB, TARGET Annual Report 2008, Opcit.. 
304
These publications are more technical requirements and the NCBs should also comply with these 
requirements. 
305
Under normal conditions, the transmission time for the Interlinking network will be less than ten seconds for 
99% of the traffic, and less than 15 minutes for the remainder. 
306
Further explanation of this feature can be seen at the ECB website on TARGET minimum common 
performance features of RTGS within TARGET. 
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Official Journal of the European Union and it becomes legally binding to all participants. The 








 Access Criteria. 309 
This is related to the parties that are entitled to become participants.  There 
are direct participants and indirect participants.
310
 The direct participants 
eligible for the TARGET system are credit institutions established in the 
EEA and outside the EEA, with some requirements set out in the Guideline. 
 Currency Unit 
All cross-border payments should be in the Euro currency. 
 Pricing Rules 
There will be single pricing rules, which have been determined by the 
Governing Council of the ECB with the reference of cost recovery, 
transparency, and non-discrimination. The domestic payment should also 
respect the policy on pricing, set out in the Guideline. 
 Time of Operation 
This feature is related to the operating days and the hours of operation.
311
 
 Payment Rules 
All the payments should be in connection with the monetary policy 
operations, the settlement of the Euro leg of foreign exchange operations 
involving the Euro-system, and the settlement of cross-border large-value 
netting system handling Euro transfers. The rule is called “No funds, No 
game”. The payments should become irrevocable by the time the sender 
account is debited to the receiving account. 
 Intraday Credit 
This is related to the “No funds, No game” rule, whereby each NCB should 
provide intraday credit to the supervised credit institutions referred to the 
Guideline. 
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Article 3 ECB/2005/16, Official Journal L 18, 23.1.2006. 
308See further on “Minimum Common Performance Feature of RTGS Systems within TARGET”, at 
https://www.ecb.Europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/target01annex4en.pdf, last accessed on January 19, 2015. 
309
Article 4 Annex II ECB/2007/2, Official Journal L 237, 08.09.2007. 
310
Indirect participant is an institution without its own RTGS account which is nevertheless recognized by a 
national RTGS system and subject to its RTGS rules and which can be directly addressed in TARGET.  All 
transactions of an indirect participant are settled on the account of a direct participant. 
311
Previously, the author has already discussed this operation time. See sub chapter 2.2. 
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2.3 The Oversight of TARGET 
The Euro-system has the following tasks:
312
 
“•  providing payment and securities settlement facilities (TARGET2) and 
also a mechanism for the cross-border use of collateral (the 
correspondent central banking model (CCBM)); 
•  overseeing the Euro payment and settlement systems; 
•  setting standards for securities clearing and settlement systems; 
•  ensuring an integrated regulatory and oversight framework for securities 
settlement systems; 
•  acting as a catalyst for change (i.e. promoting the SEPA initiative).” 
 
As part of their payment system function, central banks monitor developments in the 
field of payment and settlement systems in order to assess the nature and scale of the risks 
inherent in these, and to ensure the transparency of the arrangements concerning payment 
instruments and services.
313
 As we can see, one of the tasks of the Euro-system is overseeing 
the Euro payment and settlement systems and TARGET is one of the objects to be overseen 
according to Article 105(2) of the Treaty and Articles 3 and 22 of the Statute of the ESCB. In 
January 2001, the Governing Council of the ECB adopted also the G10 report on Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems as one of the standards, which the 
Euro-system must apply when performing its oversight role.
314
 
Why is the oversight of payment system, in this case, the oversight of TARGET 
important? It is because the payment systems (the TARGET or other SIPS) are major parts of 
a country’s economic and infrastructure contributing to the economic activity and also the 
control of monetary systems.  Payment systems which facilitate the flow of funds within the 
EU region, also has some potential risks, such as credit risk, operational risk and settlement 
risk, when transaction failures occur.  Such risks may upturn into a systemic risk, which the 
risk that the inability of one participant to meet its obligations, will cause other participants to 
be unable meet their obligations. This will potentially threaten the stability of the financial 
system.
315
 The DNB, for example, has two goals related to oversight.
316
 The first one is 
preventing a systemic risk to the extent that it may arise from the payment and settlement 
systems. The second one is promoting the smooth operation of the payment and settlement 
systems.  
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The ECB, TARGET Annual Report 2011, Opcit. 
313CPSS, “Payment Systems in the Euro Area”, Opcit., pp. 79. 
314
Ibid, pp. 81. 
315
The ECB Annual Report 2011, pp.227 
316De Nederlandsche Bank, “Oversight”, De Nederlansche Bank, August 2011, pp. 5. See also at 
http://www.dnb.nl/payments/oversight, last accessed on January 19, 2015. 
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As per above explanation, we can see why oversight is important to be implemented 
for efficiency and safety and for the smooth functioning payment system. Oversight is also 
important to aim at safeguarding the transmission channel for monetary policy. 




“•  Formulation of the policy stance: setting the general framework, criteria 
and standards;  
•   Evaluation of compliance with the policy stance: collection and analysis 
of information on the overseen entity and implementation actions;  
•  Enforcement of the policy stance: inducing the system to take steps to 
fulfil the criteria and standards. This could be done by using formal 
regulatory powers or alternatively by moral suasion.”  
Oversight responsibilities within the Euro-system are generally entrusted to the 
national central bank of the country where the system is legally incorporated, so there has 
been a shared responsibility between the ECB and the NCBs.  The ECB is the overseer of 
European wide large-value payment systems (including TARGET) whereas the NCBs oversee 
the respective domestic systems. 
The previous chapter has already explained the role of the Core Principles 
Systemically Important Payment System (CPSIPS) and the Principles for Financial Market 
Infrastructure (PFMI), set out by the BIS.  These two principles, have already offered a useful 
guideline for the central bank’s oversight in improving safe and efficient management of 
payment systems. Based on Ben Norman and his colleagues, the oversight of payment system 
does not quantify the risks, because the risks in payment systems can never be precisely 
quantified.
318
 With regard to the oversight of TARGET and other payment systems, the author 
may argue that the risk-based assessment is more required than system-based inspection. The 
examination of the bank is quite different from the examination of the payment system. The 
oversight of payment system is a combination between the moral suasion, the assessment and 
the regulatory acts, because the main purpose of oversight is to protect the functioning of the 
payment systems. The oversight of payment system is therefore different from banking 
supervision. Banking supervision involves monitoring individual banks or financial 
institutions with a view of ensuring their financial stability and, primarily to protect the 
customers. 
The author tries to define that the risk-based assessment for payment systems 
oversight is by monitoring, identifying, determining the risk, which may affect the system; 
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The ECB, “Payments Oversight”, at http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/paym/pol/payover/html/index.en.html, last 
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Ben Norman, et al., “A risk-based methodology for payment systems oversight”,  Bank of England, Financial 
Stability Paper No.6, August 2009, pp.3.  see further at https://www.academia.edu/4941525/A_risk-
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estimating the impact of the risks itself and mitigating the risks. The BIS already set up the 
principles for assessing the payment system to ease and encourage the design and operation of 
safer and more efficient systemically important payment systems worldwide. Besides these 
two principles, every central bank may define its own oversight method to promote the safety 
and efficiency of its payment systems.  
2.4 Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and/or Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) of 
TARGET 
In any activities in an industry or within an organization, there might be an incident, a 
disruption or even a threat which can be either from internal or external, such as 
malfunctioning software caused by a computer virus, a strike, a power outage, a storm or even 
a terrorist attacks. With regard to the payment systems industry, this clearly shows that it is 
critically reliant on a resilient payment system infrastructure. It provides an effective 
prevention and recovery for continuing the business of the organization or the industry. To 
overcome the problem, it needs what we call a “business continuity plan” and/or “disaster 
recovery plan”.319   
In addition, the BCP/DRP needs some arrangements to make it effective.
320
 First, it 
should have scenarios for handling the disruptions. All types of hazards should be carefully 
anticipated and identified. The dependencies and interdependencies should be cautiously 
analysed.  The role of related parties is also essential for the success of the scenario. 
Moreover, these scenarios should be well documented. The second BCP arrangement should 
have, at a minimum, a secondary site, which should not be located close to the primary site. 
This secondary site should be able to access the current data, which is a critical component of 
the BCP. Data mirroring or back-up data, is important to be accessible to ensure the business 
can recommence promptly.   
The next arrangement is to identify the staff critical for the running of the BCP. The 
system operators should minimize the risk by ensuring that all staff members are 
simultaneously present at the same site. If not, it would be good to have the secondary site 
located in geographical areas that have a different risk profile operated by different staff. The 
fourth arrangement is the dependence on third party providers.  The system operators should 
be aware not to depend on a single supplier, for example, merely depend on a single of the 
operational reliability of telecommunication provider.  This is generally critical for payment 
systems.  The Service Level Agreement will be needed to ensure the availability and 
capability of the service providers’ facilities and resources, especially in the event of a 
disaster. Therefore, it is recommended to have tests and simulations be organized with the 
involvement of the recovery service providers. 
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Business continuity and/or disaster recovery plan can be defined as some processes that help organizations or 
industry prepare for disruptive events. 
320
The author summarizes  from the ECB’s Developing BCP. 
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The last arrangement is the role of the participants. The technical failure of critical 
participants in the system may induce a systemic risk. It is recommended that participants 
should have a secondary processing site and this should be part of the technical requirement to 
access the system. 
The ECB, with regard to this issue has prepared a business continuity plan for 
TARGET. The ECB has learnt from a series of major incidents (e.g. terrorist attack of 911 
disaster and other disruptions such as power outages, etc.), to work together to develop 
implementation guidelines which are applicable to all SIPS and which define the required 




The steps above are similar to the element framework of the ECB and also to other 
companies that have already prepared the BCP/DRP for their organizations.
322
 These 
preventions are applicable to all SIPS operating in the Euro area.  The Euro-system already 
has a set of business continuity expectations with regard to the CPSS Core Principle VII, to be 
integrated into its oversight policy framework.
323
 
Another important component that should be implemented for the effectiveness of the 
BCP is to update it continually at certain periods or at any time where there is a major 
alteration on infrastructure or business procedures, which concern the critical functions of the 
system. This updating should also be audited by an independent party to make sure that the 
modifications are already appropriate. 
2.5 The Legal Framework of TARGET 
As it has been described in the previous sub chapter, since 1 January 1999, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) has been responsible for conducting monetary policy for the 
Euro area. The ECB and the NCBs are also entrusted by the Treaty establishing the European 
Community and by the Statute of the ESCB with the task to facilitate the efficient functioning 
of money market and to improve the soundness and efficiency of large value cross-border 
transaction in the EU member states.  They designed one of the most efficient and safe 
payment system known as TARGET and then transformed into TARGET2, which was 
developed by the Euro-system, the central banking system of the Euro area. There are three 
Euro-system operators running TARGET i.e. the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Banca d’Italia, 
and the Banque de France, who jointly provide the SSP for TARGET2 and operate it on 
behalf of the Euro-system. 
                                                 
321
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TARGET has a powerful legal basis supporting its tasks. TARGET is designed by the 
ECB and the NCBs entrusted by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB is one of 
the major supranational institutions of the EU with legal authority on monetary policy and 
also on the payment system policy. The ECB can make legally binding regulations and 
decisions. The NCBs shall act in accordance with the regulations and instructions issued by 
the ECB.  
To provide legal certainty, the Euro-system also arranged some regulations governing 
TARGET and its functions which are laid down in the TARGET Guideline. The TARGET 
Guideline applies to both the ECB and the NCB participants in the Euro area. It comprises 
provisions with a number of minimum common features to which all national RTGS system 
participants or connected to TARGET must comply, arrangements for inter-member State 
payments through the interlinking system, and the management of TARGET. In 2007, the 
Euro-system completed the public TARGET2 Guideline. The new Guideline is the basis for 
the NCBs to establish their TARGET2 component systems, governed by their national 
legislation.
324
 The TARGET2 Guideline contains the main legal elements of TARGET2 as 
well as governance arrangements, and audit rules. It includes the harmonized conditions for 
participation in TARGET2 to ensure the maximum legal harmonization of the rules relevant 
to TARGET2 participants in all jurisdictions concerned. The NCBs of the non-Euro area are 
allowed to connect to TARGET on a condition that they must obey to the rules and 
procedures referred to above and implement the modifications and specifications appropriate 
for the non-Euro area NCBs. TARGET Guideline provides a separate agreement for the non-
Euro area NCBs.  
Compliant with the CPSIPS, with regard to transparency, the ECB published the 
TARGET Guideline on its website and on the NCBs website.
325
 Since the commencement of 
the TARGET system in 1999, the TARGET Guideline has been amended and adjusted a 
number of times.
326
 It shows that the alterations of the guideline reflect the growing business 
and legal developments in the EU.   
Besides the TARGET Guideline, the Euro-system also provides a set of rule and 
procedures in national regulations and/or contractual provisions (national RTGS rules) 
applicable to each of the national RTGS systems and the ECB Payment Mechanism (EPM).
327
 
Some of the rules are the legal basis for irrevocable and final settlements vis-à-vis the 
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 EPM is an integral part of TARGET, which is operated by the ECB and connected to the 15 national systems 
in exactly the same way as they are connected to one another. See further the ECB website, at 
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92 
 
participants, provided by national law. In addition, the accountabilities of all parties involved, 
whether as participants or as service providers related to the system, must be obviously 
defined and set by contract and should be in line with the Guideline.   
Besides the TARGET Guideline, there are also the Payment System Directive (PSD) 
and Settlement Finality Directive (SFD), which make the legal framework for payment 
services in the EU harmonized. The aim of PSD is to guarantee that cashless payments, 
including the TARGET system, are as smooth, efficient and also safe and sound as the 
domestic payments. The PSD consists of authorization requirements, transparency 
requirements, and rights and obligations. The SFD provides the certainty of protections 
against the insolvency of a participant in the system, in order to make sure that transactions, 
which have already been settled in the system, are final and irrevocable, and also to ensure the 
enforceability of collateral security.
328
 This Directive purposes to diminish the systemic risk 
inherent in payment and securities settlement systems and to decrease the disruption caused 
by the insolvency of a participant in such a system.
329
 These two directives provide 
standardization for the construction of an integrated payment throughout the EU. They ought 
to be transposed into the national law of the EU member states. 
Furthermore, the new TARGET2 Guideline also provides the basis on which the 
NCBs of the eurozone create and design their own TARGET2 participation, in conjunction 
with their national legislation.
330
 This new guideline provides harmonize conditions for all 
participations. These TARGET2 conditions allow the NCBs to implement them in an identical 




From the above description, the author observes that the EU and the ECB (the Euro-
system) are already successful in harmonizing the operational legal framework of TARGET 
to be implemented by all the NCBs of Eurozone. The NCBs must adopt the guideline and 
other related rules and agreements as the basis for their respective national legislation.   
The Treaty and the Statute also provide a legal harmonization clause, which makes 
TARGET efficient and easy to implement.  Article 105 (4) of the EC Treaty (was amended by 
Article 127(4) (TFEU)) and Article 4 of the Statute state that the ECB shall be consulted on 
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See the ECB website, “Legal Basis”, at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2/legal/html/index.en.html, last 
accessed on January 20, 2015. 
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any provision and draft regulation in its field of competence; this also includes national rules 
and regulations in the field of payment systems.
332
   
Before the TARGET Guideline is published, all the Governors of the NCBs of the 
Eurozone must give their approval. Before their approval is granted, the working groups i.e. 
The Payment and Settlement Systems Committee (PSSC) and the Legal Committee (LEGCO) 
whose members are the legal experts from the respective NCBs of the Eurozone, give advises 
on general payment systems policy including the draft of Guideline.  It can be concluded that 
there is a harmonized co-ordination at the Euro-system level by way of appropriate 
committees and working groups. 
The author also finds that this mechanism and type of legal framework will make it 
efficient and convenient for the participants involved, especially if conflicts may arise.  The 
standardized and harmonized regulations will ensure certainty of law and enforceability of 
judgment among the participants.  The system and the regulation are made from, by and for 
themselves.  
2.5.1 Dispute Resolution Framework and Applicable Law 
Legal risk may also arise in TARGET due to conflict of laws. It may be between the 
ECB and the NCB and among the NCBs as well.  As described above, the systems 
and the regulations are made by, from, and for the EU member states of the 
Eurozone; thus, in this regard, the ECB has already anticipated the rule of resolving a 
dispute, which may arise between the parties. 
Article 12 of ECB/2007/2 dated 26 April 2007 states as follow
333
: 
“1.  In the event of a dispute between Euro-system CBs in relation to 
this Guideline, the affected parties shall seek to settle the dispute in 
accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on an 
Intra-ESCB Dispute Settlement Procedure. 
2. By derogation from paragraph 1, if a dispute relating to the division 
of the tasks between Level 2 and Level 3 cannot be settled by 
agreement between the affected parties, the Governing Council 
shall resolve the dispute. 
3. In the event of a dispute of the type referred to in paragraph 1, the 
parties’ respective rights and obligations shall primarily be 
determined by the rules and procedures laid down in this Guideline. 
In disputes concerning payments between TARGET2 component 
systems, the law of the member State where the seat of the Euro-
                                                 
332ECB, “Role of the Euro-system In the field of Payment System Oversight”, ECB, June, 2000, pp.3. See further 
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system CB of the payee is located shall apply in a supplementary 
manner, provided that it does not conflict with this Guideline.” 
It is clearly stated that if there is any dispute between NCBs, the MoU is used as a 
reference to settle the dispute. In case it cannot be settled in accordance with the 
MoU and/or by the agreement made by them, the Governing Council of the ECB 
shall resolve the dispute.  
There is another measure for resolving the dispute concerning the payments between 
the TARGET2 component systems. If there is a dispute among them, then the law of 
the member State where the seat of the Euro-system CB of the payee is located shall 
apply, but it should not conflict with the guideline. As with any dispute regarding 
contractual obligations between parties residing in different EU member states, the 
Rome I regulation (Regulation (EC) 593/2008) determines the law that governs the 
dispute. Article 25(3) ECB/2012/27 stipulates that the law of the EU member state, 
where the payee resides, is applicable in a supplementary manner. This means that 
the payee’s law is only applicable to the extent that it does not conflict with the 
applicable law according to Rome I.  
The author observes that in the RTGS system, known as the fund transfer system, the 
applicable law based on the payee’s law makes sense, since the payee is the 
beneficiary of the transaction and is regarded as the ‘weaker’ party, because he/she is 
the party who will incur the damage/loss if the transaction cannot be settled or is 
delayed. Therefore, the payee should receive some additional comfort. Moreover, the 
execution usually will be carried out in the place of the person sustaining damage. 
The description of harmed/loss party will be analysed further in chapter 4. 
The author finds that the TARGET operation has a very systematic and harmonized 
legal framework and structure. First, once again, it is regulated by the Treaty – the 
highest and the most powerful legislation – agreed by all the Head of Governments 
of the EU member states. Then, the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB also play an 
important role for smoothing the TARGET operations. Furthermore, the Governing 
Council, which consists of all the Governors of the Central Banks of the EU member 
state of the Eurozone, has the most important role. It provides the guideline to ensure 
smooth and efficient operations of TARGET. By this legal framework, the legal 
authority of the ECB in the field of payment system, especially in TARGET has a 
legal power to all the NCBs of the Eurozone. The ECB also has the power over the 
NCBs, which did not join the Eurozone. When they want to join TARGET, they 
should comply with the guideline as well.  
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In making the provisions or regulations, the Treaty and the Statute already govern the 
mechanism for the ECB by consulting with the experts in its field of competence.
334
 
In the ESCB, committees were established by the Governing Council
335
 to assist the 
work of the ECB’s decision-making bodies. The committees consist of experts in 
their fields. The ESCB committees for the payment system policy are the PSCC and 
the LEGCO whose members are usually restricted to the staff members of the Euro-
system central banks. They are working together and have quite a long discussion 
before submitting the draft to the Governing Council to be adopted. The committees 
try to render the guideline and other related regulations in line with the requirements 
of the national law as much as possible.
336
 If TARGET stipulates a regulation related 
to the monetary policy, then the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) will also be 
involved in this working group in order to be in line with the ECB’s monetary policy 
as well. We can say that in making the regulations of TARGET, all the member 
states of the Eurozone are at all time involved in the discussion and in the negotiating 
process, thus the unified and harmonized legal condition can be implemented 
successfully. 
2.5.2 The Contractual Agreement Related to TARGET 
The ECB guidelines also have been designed to allow the NCBs and their 
counterparties and between the NCBs, to have other legal arrangement between 
them.  This can be governed either by contracts concluded between the NCBs and 
their counterparties or by regulatory acts addressed to the counterparties. The 
arrangements may vary from country to country. 
They also have a contractual agreement between the Eurozone TARGET operators – 
which are represented by the Deutsche Bundesbank – and the NCBs.  They call it 
Service Level Agreement (SLA). SLA will typically have a technical definition, 
specifying the levels of accessibility, performance, operation, or other attributes of 
the service. If the dispute arises in relation to the SLA, there is a clause regarding the 
choice of forum and choice of law, which has been determined, i.e. by going to 
arbitration applying German Law, the law where the Deutsche Bundesbank and the 
Headquarters of the ECB is located.
337
  
Article 35.4 of the ESCB Statute states: 
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“The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to 
any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of 
the ECB, whether that contract be governed by public or private law.” 
The same commitment was reaffirmed in Rome I.
338
 Article 4 (1(b)) Rome I clearly 
states as follows: 
“A contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the 
country where the service provider has his habitual residence.” 
In case the parties of the contracts have not chosen the applicable law, Rome I 
already determined that the law of the country where the service provider has his 
habitual residence is applicable. Furthermore, the application of the lex domicilii 
principle also simplifies the execution of the damage. The ECB/the Eurozone has 
already prepared the clause of dispute of the SLA in line with the Rome I Regulation.  
There is also a contractual arrangement between the respective NCBs and their 
participants of their own TARGET2 component system.  The DNB, for example, has 
a provision known as Conditions for TARGET2-NL, which has already prescribed 
the governing law and the jurisdiction with regard to its relationship with the 
participants. When a dispute arises among them, the competent court is the court of 
Amsterdam and shall be governed by Dutch Law, in accordance with Article 48 of 
Conditions for TARGET2-NL:  
“1.  The bilateral relationship between the DNB and participants in 
TARGET2-NL shall be governed by Dutch Law. 
2. Without prejudice to the competence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, any dispute arising from a matter relating to the 
relationship referred to in Paragraph 1 falls under the exclusive 
competence of the competent courts of Amsterdam 
3. The place of performance concerning the legal relationship between 
DNB and the participants shall be Amsterdam.” 
In this situation, when a case comes before a court and the main components of the 
case are local, the prevailing national law will decide the case and usually they use 
the law of the place of performance.  
From the above analysis, the author finds that the ECB and the NCBs in preparing 
the set of rules and regulations on TARGET have demonstrated that the legal 
framework for TARGET system was well prepared.  It also seems to the author that 
they also have a good and systematic cooperation by sharing their common desire for 
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harmonized legal conditions.  Accordingly, they try to harmonize and unify the 
regulations without hampering the national law of the member states.  
3. Summary 
This chapter describes the background of the ECB and TARGET. The author 
concludes that the EU has done a tremendous effort in establishing its region and in 
developing its payment systems project. The EU leaders were strongly committed to achieve 
their objectives by initiating and establishing the EMU, the EMI, the ECB, and TARGET. 
The EU had former high-level officers/politicians who also played a big role in providing a 
proposal or input, such as Mr. Nout Wellink and Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher, or who became 
team leaders or committee leaders, such as Mr. Pierre Werner and Mr. Jacques Delors.  
Moreover, the EU is also very concerned about having a set of rules (legal basis), and 
structured bodies to implement its projects. It has implemented treaties such as the Rome 
Treaty, the Maastricht Treaty (EC Treaty), and the Lisbon Treaty (TEU and TFEU) as legal 
umbrellas supported by directives and related regulations to be transposed into national laws. 
The ECB was established by EC Treaty (was amended by TFEU) and has decision-making 
bodies which played  important roles.   
In relation to the payment systems, the EU first created TARGET, which was then 
followed by the retail payment systems (creating the SEPA initiative a decade later). 
TARGET also has a sound legal basis with provisions on applicable law for disputes; a well-
structured body, and clear rules and procedures for its implementation. It also complies with 









THE HISTORY OF ASEAN AND THE AEC 
 
1. The History of ASEAN 
1.1 Introduction 
ASEAN, a regional organization whose members have mainland of approximately 
3,055,000 square kilometres and a total population in 2013 of about 620 million people
339
, is 
one of the biggest associations and the most reputable organisation in the Asian region and 
even in the world, and has played an important economic and political role worldwide, 
especially for its members. The background of ASEAN started alongside the Cold War and in 
the turmoil transition to independence taking place in many Southeast Asian states. Before the 
establishment of ASEAN, Southeast Asia had the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), 
formed in 1961 by Thailand, the Philippines and the Federation of Malaya under the initiative 
of the Prime Minister Rahman of Malaya
340
. The war in Vietnam also encouraged the 
Association to more actively form a new regional body encircling Indonesia and Singapore. 
In the early 1980s, the ASEAN integration resembled that of the EU more than that of 
any integrated group of economics. However, the inter-country differences within ASEAN are 
far wider than those found within the EU-15.
341
 As written above, according to KOF 
Globalization Index, the level of diversity within ASEAN is considerable.  
In the late 1980s, Southeast Asia had changed vastly since its commencement in 1967 
and it was indicated that it had regained its regional stability and made remarkable economic 
development. The change was maintained with the ending of the communist insurgency as 
well as the pulling out of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, followed by the signing of 
the Cambodian peace pact. With regional stability, prominent economic growth, and intra-
region cooperation, ASEAN continued to promote active diplomatic initiatives such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and it also promoted 
intra-region cooperation as set in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) agreement. Situated in 
the middle of regional stability and prosperity, Vietnam ended its previous confrontation and 
joined ASEAN as its seventh member on July 28, 1995.  
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1.2 Scope of ASEAN 
As mentioned above, The Association of South East Asian Nations or namely ASEAN 
was created on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok, by five original Member Countries, i.e. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, 
followed by Vietnam in 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar (Burma) in 1997 and last but not least, 
Cambodia joined in 1999. 
It is clear that the ASEAN alliance membership is open for all states in the Southeast 
Asian region with the same aims, principles and purposes. The ASEAN membership is 
voluntary in nature. The association embodies the communal will of the nations in Southeast 
Asia to bond together in friendship and cooperation, and through joint efforts and sacrifices, 
in the name of peace, freedom, prosperity and future generation. 
1.3 The Fundamental Principles of ASEAN 
The ASEAN Member Countries have adopted the pursuing fundamental principles in 
their dealings with one another, as contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia (TAC), signed on February 24, 1976
342
: 
“a.   mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, 
and national identity of all nations; 
b. the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion; 
c. non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
d. settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 
e. renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
f. effective cooperation among themselves.”  
From the principles above, the author will observe only two principles which will be 
discussed in the next sub chapter i.e. the Principle of Non-Intervention and Settlement of 
Differences or Disputes by Peaceful Manner. 
1.3.1 The ASEAN Principle of Non-Intervention 
This principle seems to be a source of misperception for some intellectuals.  Jürgen 
Rüland debates that “ASEAN’s collective identity crystallized in the revered 
principle of non-intervention”.343 He also thought that non-intervention was little 
more than a pious myth. He refers to the example of: (1) Malaysian and Indonesian 
protests against Myanmar’s expulsion of the Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh; (2) 
the critical remarks of Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew during a visit to 
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the Philippines, linking the country’s unruly democratic system to economic 
stagnation, the provision of sanctuary to Muslim rebels in the Philippines by Sabah’s 
chief minister Tun Mustapha; and (3) Indonesian pressure on the Philippines to 
cancel an NGO conference on East Timor.
344
 Increasingly, ASEAN is a vehicle for 
Southeast Asian nations to resolve problems through the “ASEAN Way” of informal 
consensus-based and confidence-building efforts rather than through binding 
commitments or agreements.
345
   
It is the underlying cultural-based beliefs governing the ASEAN actions, which make 
up the real “ASEAN Way”.346 In traditional terms, the manner of politics found in 
Southeast Asia can, to a large extent, be considered as personal, informal and non-
contractual.
347
 It can be interpreted that the “ASEAN Way” is more indirect than 
straight regarding the issues and applies non-confrontational approach by seeking 
support from other nations. One of the examples is when Thailand’s foreign minister, 
Siddhi Savetsila, the ASEAN standing committee chairman, visited Washington D.C 
to get support for a proposition.
348
   
Essentially, it is not difficult to understand why this principle was used by ASEAN in 
1967. The member countries are divided by historical, religious, cultural, political 
and economic differences. There are some obvious ethno-religious divisions, such as 
Islam (Indonesia/Malaysia), Buddhist (Thailand, Singapore), and Christian 
(Philippines). At that time, the political situation was unsteady and the economy was 
fragile. Under such circumstances, ASEAN could never have survived if the 
members had failed to adhere to the non-intervention principle with a rational degree 
of consistency. As Holsti observes, if non-intervention, sovereignty, and the legal 
equality of states “were not observed with reasonable consistency, the structure of 
the system and the nature of interstate relations would change radically”.349 
1.3.2 The ASEAN Principle of Settlement of Differences in Peaceful Manner 
As we know, ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization, where the policy makers 
are indeed the heads of states and governments of the member states.  The ten 
members have an equal vote in making decisions. However, decision-making was 
strictly by consensus. To settle dissimilarities among members, ASEAN relied on 
close personal ties at official, ministerial and heads of government levels at post 
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meeting entertainment sessions, than on formal institutions and treaties.
350
 This 
enabled the resolution of differences among the elite, lessening the need to resort to 
various forms of burden for achieving national goals and stability. The Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord (1976)
 351
 clearly states that: 
“The stability of each member state and that of the ASEAN region is an 
essential contribution to international peace and security… member 
states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful 
processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences.” 
In addition, the mediation measures have often sought to solve the conflicts between 
neighbouring members. In late 1986, the Indonesian Leader, Soeharto, organized an 
official visit to Malaysia for the southern capital Johor Baru, then crossed the 
causeway to Singapore, in a gesture designed to ease conflict between these two 
countries after they had fallen out over the visit to Singapore by the Israeli 
President.
352
 In February the same year, five foreign ministers called for a ‘peaceful 
resolution’ to the conflict with increasing concern over the trend of events following 
the presidential election in the Philippines, noting:
353
  
“A critical situation has emerged which portends bloodshed and civil 
war. The crisis can be resolved without widespread carnage and political 
turmoil. We call on all parties to restore national unity and solidarity so 
as to maintain national resilience. There is still time to act with restraint 
and bring about peaceful resolution. We hope that all Filipino leaders 
will join efforts to pave the way for a peaceful solution to the crisis.” 
In Chapter III of the Treaty (TAC), it was also mentioned that the Association’s 
Leaders agreed to strengthen economic development and mutual assistance.
354
 Based 
on this Treaty, the members shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic 
development to intensify economic cooperation. A number of economic reasons can 
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“(1)  The existing trade and production patterns of ASEAN have allowed 
only limited absorptive capacity for each other’s major exports like 
rubber, tin,…. 
(2)  The ASEAN economies have almost exhausted all their commercial 
capacities in responding to the large and growing export market of 
developed countries during the past two decades. 
(3)  The import-substitution policies together with the balance of 
payments difficulties among some ASEAN countries have resulted in 
certain policies which are inherently biased against regional trade: 
for example, high priority is given to imports of capital and 
intermediate goods which are usually supplied by the developed 
countries. 
(4)  Past foreign aid and loans from developed countries have often been 
tied to imports from donor countries.” 
Ultimately, significant growth of intra-regional trade depends on the appropriate 
restructuring of the existing trade policies, currently pursued by the individual 
members, such as liberalizing the present intra-regional trade arrangements, for 
which the leaders agreed to make a treaty in February 1976. 
The author thinks that the Treaty became the foundation and a turning point for the 
economic integration regulation for ASEAN. The Treaty also became a binding rule 
for the ASEAN member states for achieving economic development in the future. 
1.4 The Objectives and Purposes of ASEAN 
ASEAN’s objective stated in the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok was as follows:356  
“1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality 
and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and 
peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations; 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice 
and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and 
adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of 
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research 
facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative 
spheres; 
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5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture 
and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the 
problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their 
transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living 
standards of their peoples; 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and 
regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all 
avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.” 
These objectives and purposes have been drafted based on the existence of mutual 
interests and common problems between member countries, and the need to further strengthen 
the bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation. To achieve these objectives and purposes, a 
standing committee is needed as well as Ad-Hoc and Permanent Committees of specialists 
and officials on specific subjects. To support the work of ASEAN, the Permanent Secretariat 
was established in February 1976 due to the increasing demands of the ASEAN members for 




The Joint Communique Meeting in 1976 and1977 also emphasized on the desire of the 
ASEAN countries to develop and promote peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with all 
countries in the region, including Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam,
358
 and also welcomed 
and recommended the decision of the UN related to the admission of Vietnam as a member of 
the organization.
359
 One issue to be underlined from the results of this meeting is the 
recognition of the private sectors, which could play a major role in supplementing the efforts 
of the ASEAN Governments towards achieving greater regional cooperation.
360
 This 
recognition shows that the private sectors have a key role to support the realization of the 
ASEAN projects, and therefore, ASEAN encouraged the active participation of non-
governmental organizations in ASEAN activities. 
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The involvement of the private sector was once again stated in the Manila Declaration 
on December 15, 1987 as an element which was playing an increasing role in the economic 
development and in the intra-ASEAN cooperation.
361
 For economic development, non-state 
actors are more needed since they are the players in the industries who know their respective 
fields better than the states. The heads of the ASEAN government realize the need to involve 
the private sectors, known also as non-state actors, and make them become a part of the 
economic development in the region. The influence of non-state actors in the post–cold war 
era has been one of the leading factors in international politics, not only in ASEAN, but also 
in the EU and other region states. The role of non-state actors is one of the important parts of 
this dissertation but it will not be discussed in this section in order to avoid repetition. 
In the late 1980’s, the original ASEAN members like Thailand, Singapore and 
Malaysia wanted to deepen the ASEAN economic integration.  It was a former Thai Prime 
Minister Anand Panyarachun who formally proposed in 1991, with the encouragement and 
support of Singapore’s and Malaysia’s prime minister, that ASEAN enter into a free trade 
area, thus initiating the current stage of regional economic integration.
362
 From that moment 
and onward, Singapore seems to have taken the lead initiative of the ASEAN Economic 
Community integration and keeps stressing and reminding members, especially the new ones, 
of the commitment on regional economic integration, by suggesting the proposal called the 
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in 2000, while Indonesia, to balance off Singapore, 
leads with its idea of an ASEAN Security Community.
363
 Nevertheless, according to 
Severino, Indonesia seems to be the best member as a leadership in the escort heading 
towards an ASEAN economic integration, because Indonesia’s leadership cannot be said to be 
self-serving.
364
 However, Indonesia does not seem to be confident of its ability to be 
competitive even within ASEAN – whether for investments or for markets.365 
The ASEAN Vision 2020 was firstly adopted on 15 December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur 
by the leaders at the 30
th
 Anniversary of ASEAN.
366
 This is the ASEAN Vision on the region 
as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward-looking, living in peace, striving for stability 
and prosperity, bonded together in partnership, in dynamic development, and in a community 
of caring societies.
367
 In this summit, the Treaty Amity became fully functioning as a binding 
                                                 
361
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code of conduct for the governments and peoples, to which other states with interests in the 
region adhere.
368
 After The ASEAN 2020, known as the ASEAN Community, had been 
declared, and to welcome the ASEAN vision 2020, in 2003 the ASEAN leaders committed to 
what was known as Bali Concord II.
369
 It established three pillars to realize the ASEAN 
Vision 2020. In this summit, the term of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was for 
the first time announced, and in addition to the AEC, the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) 
and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) were the other two integral pillars of the 
envisaged the ASEAN Community.
370
 This summit was also a big step towards 
transformation and integration of the economy, socio-culture and security among the member 
states. Successively, the summit was followed by the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting 
(AEM) in August 2006, which developed a single and coherent blueprint for advancing the 
AEC by classifying the characteristics and elements of the AEC by 2015 in line with the Bali 
Concord II.  
At the 12
th
 ASEAN Summit, when the Cebu Declaration 2007 was signed, the 
ASEAN Heads of State and/or Government Member Countries affirmed to accelerate the 
establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015.
371
 The AEC as a second pillar of ASEAN 
Community shall be the ultimate goal of regional economic integration schemes. Its goal is to 
create a stable, prosperous, and highly competitive ASEAN economic region, in which there 
is free flow of goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and a freer flow of capital, 
equitable economic development, and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities by the 
year of 2020.
372
 The topic of the AEC will be discussed in the following part of this chapter. 
Some efforts related to economic cooperation had been prepared before the setting up 
of the AEC, such as implementation of Hanoi Plan of Action whose main purposes were 
consolidating and strengthening the economic fundamentals of the Member Countries.  
These are ten elements that are to be fulfilled in order to achieve the specific targets.  
They are recapitulated as follows:
373
 
1. Strengthen Macroeconomic and Financial Cooperation 
Some measures that are to be noted by the author are the strengthening of the 
financial systems by adopting and implementing sound international financial 
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practices and standards and the developing of the ASEAN capital markets. One of 
these programs is to facilitate clearing and settlement systems within ASEAN.
374
 
2. Enhance Greater Economic Integration 
Some points to be underlined are the need to accelerate the implementation of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), inter alia, by creating trade liberalization and 
customs harmonization. The Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment 
Area (AIA) is implemented to enhance the competitiveness of the region and to 
attract higher and sustainable levels of direct investment flows into and within 
ASEAN. The program has its objectives of Narrowing the Development Gap 
(NDG) and accelerating economic integration of the newer members of ASEAN 
(Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam, known as CLMV).
375
 It aims also 
to realize a free and open investment regime through cooperation and facilitation, 
promotion and awareness.
376
 One more important issue that should be observed 
from this aspect is the encouragement of electronic commerce i.e. first, the 
creation of  policy and legislative environment to facilitate cross-border electronic 
commerce, to ensure the coordination and adoption of a framework and standards 
for cross-border electronic commerce in line with the international standards and 
practices. Secondly, to encourage technical cooperation and technology transfer 
among member states in the development of electronic commerce infrastructure, 
applications and services.
377
 This point becomes a basic foundation for the author 
to discuss further on the issues of the payment system integration. 
3. Promote Science and Technology Development and Develop Information 
Technology Infrastructure 
There are two points that should come first to empower and protect the ASEAN’s 
innovation of technology. First, is the establishment of the ASEAN Information 
Infrastructure (AII) by making an agreement on the design, standardization, inter-
connection, and inter-operability of Information Technology system. Secondly, is 




4. Promote Social Development and Address the Social Impact of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis 
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The inspiring programs shall use the ASEAN foundation: (1) to support activities 
and social development programs aimed at addressing issues of unequal economic 
development, poverty and socio-economic disparity; and (2) to strengthen the 
ASEAN collaboration in combating trafficking of and crimes against women and 
children; and (3) also to protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 
peoples in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 




5. Promote Human Resource Development 
The interesting programs in this element are the implementation of the ASEAN 
Work Program on Informal Sector Development which provide opportunities for 
self-employment and entrepreneurship and the program for out of school youth 
such as skill training and education for employment. 
6. Protect the Environment and Promote Sustainable Development 
The programs aim: (1) to establish the ASEAN Regional Research Centre and 
Training Centre for Land and Forest Fire Management; (2) to implement the 
ASEAN regional water conservation program; and (3) to protect the ASEAN 
Heritage Parks and Reserves; and lastly (4) to enhance regional efforts in 
addressing climate change. 
7. Strengthen Regional Peace and Security 
The formulation of rules and procedures for the operations of the High Council as 
envisioned in the TAC and promoting efforts to establish a regional code of 
conduct in the South China Sea among the parties directly concerned
380
 are 
programs which the author finds interesting as they can be used as an example for 
the formulation of the procedures of implementing the payment system 
integration.  
8. Enhance ASEAN’s Role as an Effective Force for Peace, Justice, and Moderation 
in the Asia-Pacific and in the World 
Maintaining ASEAN’s chairmanship in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)381 
process and enhancing consultation and coordination of the ASEAN positions at 
the United Nations (UN) and other international fora are programs that should be 
conserved in order to be able to continue to interact with the outside world of the 
ASEAN region to bring peace. In an attempt to bring sustainable peace to the 
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world, ASEAN and the United Nations (UN) are scheduled to meet to discuss, 
among other issues, conflict resolution.
382
 
9. Promote ASEAN Awareness and its Standing in the International Community 
One of the programs that need continuity to raise awareness among the ASEAN 
member states is developing linkages with the mass media networks and websites 
on key areas of the ASEAN cooperation in order to disseminate regular and timely 
information on ASEAN. One of the implementation methods for spreading 
awareness among the ASEAN community was initiated by Indonesia’s foreign 
ministry by setting up an online blog for raising public awareness on the issues of 
the ASEAN Community 2015.
383
  
10. Improve ASEAN’s Structures and Mechanisms 
Two programs related to this dissertation to be further discussed are reviewing 
ASEAN’s overall organizational structure in order to further improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness, taking into account the expansion of the ASEAN 
activities; the enlargement of the ASEAN membership; and the regional situation 
as well as reviewing the role, functions and capacity of the ASEAN secretariat to 
meet the increasing demands of ASEAN and support the implementation of the 
Hanoi Plan of Action. These programs also meet the AEC agenda, which needs an 
organizational structure and mechanism to fulfil the ASEAN’s programs in the 
future. Since the payment system integration is also part of this Action Plan and 
has its own characteristic and infrastructure, the possibility of reviewing the 
ASEAN’s structures and mechanisms related to payment systems is open for 
discussion by these programs. The characteristics, structure and mechanism of 
payment system will be discussed in another chapter.  
Setting these 10 (ten) programs of the Hanoi plan of action was the first stage in a 
series of actions to help ASEAN reach its goals. This plan of action will also become the 
foundation of economic cooperation and integration within the ASEAN member states. The 
author honours the idea of the ASEAN leaders who have a sense of willingness and concern 
to always be open to reforms by setting up this action plan. 
1.5 External Relations of ASEAN 
In order to strengthen the region and to secure the recognition and the respect for 
ASEAN, the member countries need to broaden the areas of cooperation with other countries. 
In this regard, the ASEAN leaders developed a close partnership with the countries and 
                                                 
382
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organizations with an interest in Southeast Asia as part of ASEAN’s strategy to remain in the 
driver’s seat in the regional developments and in the creation of a network of economic 
agreements in the region. 
These are the following countries/fora of cooperation with ASEAN: 
1.5.1 Fukuda (Japan) Relation 
The first partnership of ASEAN started with Japan in 1973. In 1977, the Prime 
Minister Takeo Fukuda, with his famous doctrine called “Fukuda Doctrine” 
reassured Japan’s policy to support the national development in the ASEAN 
countries. Three principles were announced in Manila:
384
 
“ -   Japan rejects the role of a military power; 
- Japan will do its best to consolidate the relationship of mutual 
confidence and trust based on "heart-to-heart" understanding; and 
- Japan will an equal partner of ASEAN, while attempting to foster 
mutual understanding with Indochina.” 
1.5.2 The Republic of Korea 
The Republic of Korea
385
 is ASEAN’s second dialogue partnership. It was firstly 
cooperated in 1989, covering the trade, investment and tourism area.  Subsequently, 
they upgraded to a full dialogue partners in 1991 on the 24
th
 ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur. 
1.5.3 China 
The relationship with China
386
 started in 1991 on the 24
th
 AMM when the host 
invited China as a guest, and upon identifying mutual interest, China became a full 
dialogue partner at the 29
th
 AMM in Jakarta on 20-21 July 1996. 
1.5.4 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
APEC is a forum of 21 member economies
387
 that seeks to promote free trade and 
economic cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN collaborated with 
Australia in establishing APEC in 1989 in response to the growing interdependence 
                                                 
384Sueo Sudõ, “The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy”, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1992, pp. 4.  
385
See ASEAN website, “ASEAN-Republic of Korea Dialogue Relations”, see at http://www.asean.org/asean/ 
external - relations/rok/item/asean-republic-of-korea-dialogue-relations, last accessed on January 20, 2015. 
386See ASEAN website, “ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations”, see at http://www.asean.org/asean/external-
relations/china/item/asean-china-dialogue-relations, last accessed on January 20, 2015. 
387
APEC consists of 21 member economies: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Chinese 
Taipei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam. 
   
110 
 
of the Asia-Pacific economies and the arrival of regional economic blocs in other 
parts of the world such as the European Union. The APEC Secretariat is located in 
Singapore, to prove that ASEAN fully and actively supports the APEC 
establishment. APEC is the premier forum for facilitating economic growth and 
cooperation as well as trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region.
388
 
1.5.5 ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) 
At the 2
nd
 ASEAN Summit in 1992, the ASEAN leaders recommended the idea of 
AFTA
389
 by signing the Framework Agreement on Enhancing the ASEAN Economic 
Cooperation. This is a wide-ranging program of tariff reduction in the region to 
attract foreign direct investment to ASEAN. The AFTA is formed to increase the 
ASEAN region’s competitive advantages as a production base geared for the world 
market. Such creation is also to compete with the existing regional bloc such as the 
EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)). This is a common 
reaction since globalization also influences the Southeast Asian region. AFTA has 
the mechanism to achieve its goals by a so-called The Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT), which only applies to goods originating within ASEAN. 
1.5.6 The European Union (EU) 
The ASEAN-European Union (EU)
390
 dialogue relations were officially held on the 
10
th
 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) in July 1977. They agreed on 
ASEAN’s formal cooperation and relationship with the European Economic 
Community (EEC), which included the Council of Ministers of the EEC, the 
Permanent Representative of the EEC countries and the EEC Commission.  
1.6 The ASEAN Charter 
The “ASEAN Way” is the traditional principle of non-interference, meaning that 
governments can endeavour to influence each other’s conduct by creating diplomatic channels 
or informal consultation. Globalization in the region, plus the economic crisis in the late 
1990’s, has devastated most of the ASEAN members’ economy. This is well known as “the 
ASEAN Financial Crisis 1997”. The Asian financial crisis started with the devaluation of 
Thailand’s Bath, which took place on July 2, 1997, and followed by other regional members, 
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like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and, to a lesser extent, Singapore.
391
 These 
challenges urged ASEAN to revitalize itself. The entry of Cambodia, Vietnam, Lao PDR and 
Myanmar as new members also created an imbalance of economies between the members.
392
 
The Economic gap development has changed dramatically and need more efficient and 
structured mechanism to resolve. To answer the imbalance of economies between the 
members, the Leaders agreed to launch the IAI program, which provides guidance to sharpen 
the focus of collective efforts in ASEAN to narrow the development gap between ASEAN's 
older and newer members (CLMV). These issues should have been a critical moment for the 
ASEAN members to take a closer look again at the Association’s structure that needs to be 
adjusted. The widening tasks and the growing complexity of economic issues would make 
more policy coordination and harmonization an inevitable consequence. 
There are differences among the members, which require more attention, as they may 
not have a common political conception of the ASEAN Way since the crisis struck the 
ASEAN region, such as Myanmar and Lao PDR which still emphasize the traditional non-
interference principle.
393
 Conversely, the other members such as Vietnam and Malaysia have 
started to focus on methods of work, developing mechanism of coordination and 
strengthening of the consolidation and cooperation among the members for the future in order 
to resolve outstanding issues.
394
 On the other side, the members states administrations are 
totally different as well, for instance, Indonesia and the Philippines are a republic, Malaysia is 
a constitutional monarchy while Vietnam and Lao PDR are communist states. The members 
also have a wide gap of economics. According to World Bank data in 2013, Singapore for 




These differences within the ASEAN member states show that ASEAN needs a reform 
to fulfil the needs of improvement in the future. Globalization requires ASEAN to be more 
flexible and forward thinking to meet the challenges.  The author realizes that it is not an easy 
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task for the ASEAN member states to amend the principles, since these principles represent 
its character and identity; in the meantime, globalization indeed needs such movements. The 
ASEAN community integration would entail a modification at the “ASEAN Way”, since the 
global economic powers would continue to supersede the conventional approach. 
Despite these vast differences and massive economic and politic transformation 
occurring in the ASEAN region at that time, the ASEAN leaders continued to search the way 
to anticipate forthcoming issues. Four decades later since the establishment of ASEAN, in 
November 2007, the ASEAN leaders decided to determine a charter known as the ASEAN 
Charter.
396
 This Charter was a breakthrough constitutional manuscript for ASEAN. Its 
purpose was to strengthen democracy, develop good governance, and foster the rule of law 
and human rights. Jasudasen says that the Charter provides ASEAN with a clear legal 
framework after more than forty years of gradual and comfortable institutionalization.
397
 He 
also states that the Charter also codifies ASEAN’s well-established norms for inter-state 
conduct and also formally accords ASEAN a legal personality, which establishes its capacity 
to join other international organizations and gatherings on its own behalf and gives the right to 
sue and be sued 
The announcement of the ASEAN charter also attracted a lot of attention on the 
regionalism in Southeast Asia not only among many scholars and analysts, but also among 
civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 
breakthrough from the ASEAN officials was the involvement of CSOs in the drafting of the 
Charter. A series of consultative meetings was done among them. The involvement of non-
state actors was an inevitable part in supporting the governments to create and develop 
ASEAN to achieve its objectives. 
The ASEAN Secretariat noted that: “For the first time after 40 years of regional 
organization, the ASEAN member states have codified organic Southeast Asian diplomacy 
and listed key principles and purposes of ASEAN.”398  This Charter has fundamentally set up 
the legal and institutional framework of ASEAN. In addition, the ASEAN Secretary-General, 
Mr. Ong Keng Yong affirmed that the Charter would serve the organization as follows:
399
 
“(1) Formally accord ASEAN Legal personality, 
(2) Establish greater institutional accountability and compliance system, and 
(3) Reinforce the perception of ASEAN as a serious regional player in the future 
of the Asia-Pacific region.” 
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With the Charter underlying its functioning, ASEAN has a legal personality,
400
 
therefore is able to represent its member states to play officially in international forums. 
Moreover, the charter also makes the organization more useful by providing a legal 
framework for incorporating the ASEAN decrees, and treaties into the national legislation of 
member states. By virtue of this declaration, ASEAN is now governed by a rule-based regime 
for effective implementation of the various economic commitments.
401
 
Furthermore, the Charter also outlined the institutional structure of the association and 
created new structures.
402
 Besides having an ASEAN Human Rights Body,
403
 the Charter has 
also formed the relationship between each of the institutions and explained their decision-
making processes. The Human Rights Body is a promising body, but it did not go far enough 
in its operation, due to the absence of provisions and sanctions of penalizing mechanism on 
the infringement of norms. This is because of the decision-making process which takes place 
by consultation and consensus,
404
 is working on the lowest common denominator while the 
non-interference principles remain unchanged. The Charter still purely contains divergent 
views of the conceptions.  The older member states saw that the “ASEAN Way” needs to be 
reformed to facilitate cooperation, while the new members still regard it as a norm of non-
interference. 
Indeed, the Charter preserves the existing infrastructure for economic integration by 
having the ASEAN Economic Community Council
405
 and the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism.
406
 Despite its limitations, the Charter can be utilized by the ASEAN members 
and still provide the opportunities for a change.
407
  
2. The Role of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
Today, ASEAN tends to be seen very much through the lens of economics — 
measuring its potential to provide a common or single market for its ten countries. This is 
similar to the events in Europe in the process of formation of the European Union.
408
 The 
outcome demonstrates that ASEAN tends to strengthen the economy. ASEAN as an 
organization has become more and more focused on economics and specifically on trade 
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  This sub chapter will describe the background of the establishment of the AEC, its 
objectives and challenges. 
2.1 The Declaration of the AEC 
The AEC is a concept proposed in the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (The 
Bali Concord II) in Bali, Indonesia, which took place in October 2003. This concept became 
one of the pillars of the ASEAN vision. The Deputy Secretary General for the ASEAN 
Economic Community, Pushpanathan, says that the readiness of ASEAN for community 
building was clearly reflected by the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and later by its 
ratification in 2008.
410
 At the 11
th
 ASEAN Summit in December 2005, the ASEAN Leaders 
discussed the acceleration of the AEC implementation from 2020 to 2015 and requested the 
respective ministers and senior officials to study all relevant possibilities. Subsequently, the 
9
th
 High Level Task Force (HLTF) Meeting on the  ASEAN Economic Integration in 
Singapore discussed and recommended it to the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM).
411
 Thus 
the ASEAN Secretariat was tasked to develop a single and coherent blueprint for advancing 
the AEC by identifying the characteristics and elements of the AEC by 2015 consistent with 
the Bali concord II, with clear targets and timelines for implementing various measures and 
pre-agreed flexibilities for the interests of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam and other 
concerned member countries.
412
 The Leaders, who were behind the idea of economic 
community, proposed a deeper economic integration. This idea was reinforced by the plan of 
the ASEAN Economic Community which is to establish ASEAN as a single market and 
production base, turning the diversity of characteristics in the region into opportunities for 




The reasons behind the decision to create the AEC are as follows:
414
 
 “a.  The desire to create a comprehensive post-AFTA agenda; 
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b. The perceived need to deepen economic integration within ASEAN given the 
new international commercial environment, especially the dominance of free-
trade areas (FTAs); 
c. Given this environment, the possibility that bilateral FTAs could actually 
jeopardize ASEAN integration, as all members were free to pursue their own 
commercial policy agenda; and 
d. The recognition since the 1997 Asian financial crisis that cooperation in both 
real and financial sectors must be extended concomitantly, and that free 
flows of skilled labour would be required to do this.” 
In a sense, the ASEAN process towards realizing the AEC is more like the European 
Union’s (EU). The stark and important difference, however, is that the EU’s integration 
process is driven by its strong regional institutions, which ASEAN still needs to build.
415
 The 
AEC is the main objective of economic integration.
416
  
The AEC Blueprint was adopted in 2007 and it serves as a comprehensive and 
coherent master plan for building the economic community.
417
 The Implementation Plan 2015 
seeks to achieve the goals of the AEC Blueprint 2015 by offering a comprehensive set of 
strategic initiatives and by formulating specific implementation actions and objectives.
418
 In 




“1.  To focus on full harmonization of domestic laws, regulations and 
operations in order to facilitate cross-border access based primarily on 
International principles, standards and best practices. This is supported by 
mutual recognition in any sectors that are not subject to harmonization and 
by liberalization measures that that will ensure an absence of national 
restrictions on access. This is broadly the approach taken in the European 
Union.  
2. Another approach is to create enabling conditions for access with broad 
harmonization, and supported by mutual recognition and a greater freedom 




Sjamsul Arifin, Rizal Djaafara, Aida S. Budiman, “Masyarakat Ekonomi Asean (MEA) 2015, Memperkuat 




See ASEAN Capital Markets Forum (ACMF), The Implementation Plan, at 
http://www.theacmf.org/ACMF/report/ImplementationPlan.pdf, last accessed on January 20, 2015. Further, The 
initiatives cover three broad themes : Creating an enabling environment for regional integration, creating the 
market infrastructure and regionally focused products and intermediaries, and strengthening the implementation 
process. Thus, The AEC blueprint 2015 pertaining to capital markets seeks to achieve significant progress in 
building a regionally integrated market, where within the region : 1) Capital can move freely; 2) issuers are free 
to raise capital anywhere; and 3) investors can invest anywhere. In such a market anyone would be able to trade 
in ASEAN capital market products freely in any ASEAN market at a competitive fee from a single access point, 
with capital market intermediaries being able to provide services throught ASEAN based on home country 
approval. 
419
Sjamsul Arifin, et al., Opcit., pp.2 
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for capital movements. This is the vision and the approach that is implicit 
in the AEC Blueprint 2015.” 
These two approaches are complementary rather than alternative because an effective 
implementation of a mutually recognised regime requires adequate progress in the 
strengthening and harmonization of key laws and practices in order to increase, inverstors 
protection, market integrity and systematic stability.
420
 The objective of regional capital 
market integration, regardless of the approach taken, should be to help build the efficiency, 
capacity, and liquidity needed to compete effectively amidst global markets and players. 
Thus, implementing regional integration should not exclude non-regional participants, but 
should focus on enhancing the capacity to compete both regionally and globally.
421
 
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 is also a commitment of the 
ASEAN member states to make their nations borderless. The free flow of investments, goods, 
services, capital, and skilled labour should no longer become an obstacle among the ASEAN 
countries. People shall have no restrictions to make transactions among the ASEAN 
counterparts. The single market as the vision of the AEC 2015, is one of the big issues in the 
ASEAN region. This acceleration goes along with financial integration that consists of 
harmonized regulatory framework and a payment and settlement system. Furthermore, the 
financial integration of the payment systems is one of the tools the ASEAN members needs to 
implement in the single market.  
There are crucial differences amongst the ASEAN member states from an economic 
point of view especially in terms of the flow of investments, goods and services.  
Furthermore, the member states are not familiar with each other laws , regulations and 
policies. This creates the possibility of conflicts. With regard to payment system, it involves 
and uses political, legal, economic, business practices and arrangements within the global 
market economy businesses in order to determine and exchange values or ownership of goods 
and services. Properly functioning payment systems enhance the stability of the entire 
financial system, reduce the transaction costs in the economy, promote the efficient use of 




The ASEAN member countries have to progress towards realizing the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. In order to monitor the timely implementation of the 
AEC Blueprint, an AEC Scorecard was developed which serves as a tool to keep track of 
member states’ progress in implementing the commitments they have made.423 The Scorecard 
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has two major goals: 1) to provide qualitative and quantitative indications of the ratifications, 
adoption and transposition into the domestic laws, regulations and administrative procedures 
of the agreed obligations and commitments within the prescribed timeframes as specified in 
the AEC Blueprint; and 2) to track implementation of agreements and achievements of the 
goals in the AEC Strategic Schedule.
424
 
2.2 The Significant Objectives and Characteristics of the AEC425 
2.2.1 The Objectives of AEC 
The objective of AEC is to transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of 
goods, services, investment, skilled labour and freer flow of capital.
426
 Fostering 
economic development throughout ASEAN is also an important objective of the 
AEC, especially to enable the new ASEAN members to accelerate the pace of 
economic growth by designing the AIA, in order to enable them to participate on a 
similar level with the first six members.
427
  
2.2.2 The Characteristics of The AEC 
Through the AEC 2015, ASEAN will become known as a single market with a vision 
to get more competitive with new processes to strengthen the existing economic 
condition, and to facilitate movement of businesses. It also strengthen the ASEAN’s 
mechanism itself. Hence, the AEC integrates many policies for anticipating and 
eliminating the obstacles such as the non-tariff barriers, then builds the commitments 
to strengthening the measures for trade facilitation, and creates  harmonization laws 
and regulations to broaden and deepen the economic integration.
428
 In the beginning, 
to realize the AEC, ASEAN has been implementing the recommendations of the 
High Level Task Force (HLTF) on the ASEAN Economic Integration contained in 
the Bali Concord II.
429
  
The author summarizes the characteristics of the AEC, as follows:
430
 
 A Single Market and Production Base 




The description of the objectives and characteristics of the AEC in this section is merely to give information of 
the framework of the AEC, and not intend to discuss further detail on these matters, except matters that related to 
the payment systems.  
426
Centre for International Law, NUS, “An Introduction to ASEAN”, National University of Singapore at 




Mia Mikic, “ASEAN and Trade Integration”, Staff Working Paper 01/09, ASEAN and Trade Integration, 
Bangkok, 8 April 2009, pp.14. at https://www.academia.edu/875837/ASEAN_and_trade_integration, last 
accessed on January 21, 2015. 
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Ibid, p.7, the author summarizes the AEC’s characteristics with additional opinion and explanation. 
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The ASEAN Single Market and Production Base has five components. 
These are free flow of goods, free flow of services, free flow of 
investment, freer flow of capital and free flow of skilled labour. The free 
flow of goods in ASEAN has achieved a substantial progress in the 
removal of tariffs, and the deletion of non-tariff barriers. In addition, 
another major elements that would facilitate free flow of goods are trade 
facilitation measures such as integrating customs procedures by creating 
the ASEAN Single Window (ASW), continuously enhancing the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT), Rules of Origin 




Moreover, with regard to the free flow of services, there will be 
substantially no restriction to ASEAN services suppliers in providing 
services and in establishing companies across national borders within the 
region, subject to domestic regulations.
432




“1.  Remove substantially all restrictions on trade in services 
for 4 priority services sectors, air transport, e-ASEAN, 
healthcare and tourism, by 2010 and the fifth priority 
services sector, logistics services, by 2013; 
2. Remove substantially all restrictions on trade in services 
for all other services sectors by 2015; 
3. Undertake liberalization through consecutive rounds of 
every two years until 2015; 
4. Target to schedule minimum numbers of new sub-sectors 
for each round: 7 sub-sectors in 2015;
434
 
5. Schedule packages of commitments for every round.”435 
                                                 
431
See further comment by Edmund W Sim, “Introduction to the ASEAN Economic Community”, April 11, 
2008, at http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=8b8a24ce-5f76-4c90-bb9f-83a2a7 
5e2f91, last accessed on January 20, 2015. He also stated that “unlike the European Union, The ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) does not apply a common external tariff on Imported goods. For Goods originating within 
ASEAN, members must apply a tariff rate of between 0% and 5%, although the most recent members such as 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam, have been given additional time to implement the reduced tariff 
rates. This is known as the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) Scheme. Members have agreed to 
enact zero tariff rates on virtually all imports by 2010 for the original signatories and 2015 for the four recent 
members. Furthermore, The CEPT applies only to goods originating within ASEAN. The general rule is that 
local ASEAN content must constitute at least 40% of the free on board value of goods. The local ASEAN 
content can be cumulative, that is the value of material, labour and processing inputs from various ASEAN 
members can be combined to meet the 40% requirements.” 
432




Based on GATS W/120 Universe of Classification. 
435
This action has also been dealt with the financial sector parameter that all measures for the financial services 
sector will be subject to prudential measures and balance of payment safeguards as provided for under the WTO 
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Ahead, a free flow investment is a free and open investment regime to 
increase ASEAN’s competitiveness in promoting and ensuring the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This free flow of investment should 
protect all investors and should be covered by the comprehensive 
agreement, binding regulations, strengthen investor dispute settlement 
mechanism, and policies, so that these will provide legal certainty, will 
integrate the investment sector and at the end, will attract foreign 
investors.   
In terms of the progressing of liberalization, various committees are 
working towards the vision of the ASEAN financial integration by 
addressing issues such as financial service liberalization, capital-account 
liberalization and payment systems integration.
436
 The purpose of this is 
to set free the flow of goods, services, labour and investment within the 
ASEAN region in the light of AEC 2015, while expecting in the same 
time to lower investment obstacles.  While a single ASEAN currency is 
not included yet in the frame, one of the AEC 2015 financial policies is 
to encourage the local currencies among the ASEAN countries. 
Presently, cross-border trade is mostly paid in US dollars but the 




In the areas of offering rules for debt securities, disclosure requirements 




“the freer flow of capital as the fourth characteristics are to 
achieve greater harmonization in capital market standards 
in ASEAN rules; to facilitate mutual recognition 
arrangement or agreement for the cross recognition of 
qualification and education and experience of market 
professionals; to achieve greater flexibility in language and 
governing law requirements for securities issuance; to 
enhance withholding tax structure and promote the 
                                                                                                                                                        
General Agreement on Trade in services. These liberalisation measures of the financial services sector should 
allow members to ensure orderly financial sector development and maintenance of financial and socio-economic 
stability.  
436
Achara Deboonme, “BOT Prepares for ASEAN Integrations”, at http://www.nationmultimedia.com 
/2011/07/11/business/BOT-prepares-for-ASEAN-integration-30159944.html, last accessed on January 21, 2015. 
437
Ibid. The ASEAN+3 Research Study is still researching the question if this will be different if local currency 
is used. See further, the ASEAN Secretariat, “Ways to Promote Trade Settlement Denominated in Local 
Currencies in East Asia: Case Studies of Thailand, Singapore, EU and NAFTA”,  ASEAN+3 Study Research 
Group, 2010.   
438
See further, on the AEC Blueprint, at http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf, last accessed on January 21, 
2015. 
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broadening of investor base in ASEAN debt issuance; and to 
facilitate market driven efforts to establish exchange and 
debt market linkage including cross-border capital raising 
activities. Thus the fifth character, free flow of skilled labour 
in order to facilitate for the movement of natural persons 
engaged in trade in goods, services and investments 
according to the prevailing regulations of the receiving 
countries.” 
 Competitive Economic Region 
With respect to creating a Competitive Economic Region, six core 
elements are included, namely: Competition Policy, Consumer 
Protection, Intellectual Property Rights, Infrastructure Development, 
Taxation, and E-Commerce. Furthermore, the key issues of achieving a 
competitive economic region are:
439
 
“(a) The development of regional guidelines on competition 
policy; 
(b) The need to conduct a comprehensive review of existing 
ASEAN Actions Plans (e.g., Intellectual Property Rights, 
Transport, Energy, among others) and to streamline 
them according to the Strategic Schedule of the AEC 
Blueprint; and 
(c) The creation of a Regional Infrastructure Development 
Fund with the participation of other ASEAN plus Three 
(APT) or East Asia Summit (EAS) partners.” 
 Equitable Economic Development  
Two core elements are included in the Equitable Economic Development 
objective, namely Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
440
 Development 
and Initiative for the ASEAN Integration. With regards to the objective 
of achieving equitable economic development, key issues include:
441
 
                                                 
439Hadi Soesastro, “Implementing the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint”, in Soesastro, H. (ed.), 
“Deepening Economic Integration-The ASEAN Economic Community and Beyond”, ERIA Research Project 
Report 2007-1-2, Chiba: IDE-JETRO, 2008, pp.47-59. See also, at http://eria.org/research/images/pdf/ 
PDF%20No.1-2/No.1-2-part2-3.pdf, last accessed on January 21, 2015. 
440
SMEs stands for Small and Medium Enterprises, a business that maintains revenues or a number of employees 
below a certain standard. Every country has its own definition of what is considered a small and medium-sized 
enterprise. SMEs play an important role in ASEAN economic integration because between 95-99 percent of the 
firms in ASEAN Member States (AMS) are SMEs and contribute 23-58% to the GDP and 10-30% in total 
export, .see further:  “ASEAN SME Policy Index 2014:Towards Competitive and Innovative Asean SMEs”, Eria 
Research Project Report, No. 8, 2012. (Ed), by Eria SME Research Working Group, March 2014. 
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“(a) The need to undertake a full review of the ASEAN Policy 
Blueprint for SME development to identify real 
promising actions; 
(b) Serious efforts to translate the concept of “ASEAN 
(regional) public goods” into practice; 
(c) Development of mechanisms to deliver real and 
sustained technical assistance to the CLMV countries; 
and, 
(d) Establishment of an ASEAN Development Fund (ADF).” 
With regard to the objective of full integration into the global economy, 
the main challenges are:
442
 
“(a) Development of approaches and mechanisms to 
strengthen ASEAN’s role as a “hub” in the East Asian 
integration; and 
(b) Development of an effective and open regionalism 
cooperation schemes with other parts of the world (e.g., 
North America, Europe and Latin America).” 
The assessment also emphasized on the following challenges and issues 
that ASEAN needs to address in achieving the AEC:
443
  
“(a) Deal with the barriers to trade; 
(b) Expediting investment and services trade liberalization; 
(c) Strengthening the ASEAN Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (DSM); 
(d) Deal with the proliferation of FTAs; and 
(e) Narrow down the development gap among ASEAN 
Member Countries.” 
 Region Fully Integrated into the Global Economy 
Finally, in creating a Region Fully Integrated into the Global Economy, 
ASEAN is aware that it needs to take into account external rules and 
regulations. In this regard, the two elements included in reaching these 
objectives are developing a coherent approach towards external 
economic relations and enhancing participation in global supply 
networks. 
ASEAN never saw its future in building a fortress like a regional block. 
One of the unique features of ASEAN as a regional integrated entity is 
that trade as well as financial and business links with the rest of the world 
have not been weakened, while the intra-regional linkages have 










 In fact, the AEC not only involves the economic 
integration of the ASEAN countries but also covers the harmonization of 
the economic policies among the ASEAN countries.
445
 The AEC being 
one component of the three pillars of the ASEAN community, will one 
day help achieve the grand vision of an integrated and united ASEAN 
community, like the European Union.
446
 The recognition of the 
importance of the partnership with other economies resulted in the 
inclusion of measures and actions related to deepening the integration of 
ASEAN into the global economy as part of the blueprint. To remain well 
integrated into and relevant for the rest of the world, it is not sufficient to 
rely on market forces, which have so far treated the ASEAN region as a 
favourable location for investment and production.
447
 Thus, the effort for 
deeper integration must include comprehensive and coherent technical 
assistance frameworks to assist weaker countries within ASEAN and 




2.3 The Challenges and Implications of the AEC 
As mentioned above, the goal of the AEC as a single market is to achieve freedom of 
internal trade and free mobility of capital and labour as well as harmonization (of laws and 
regulations). But in fact, at that time the ASEAN governments are not prepared to create a 
customs union where trade barriers among member states have to be removed. There was 
recently a feasibility study from ISEAS regarding the possibility of creating an ASEAN 
Customs Union. This study supports the implementation of the single market by declining 
into zero common external tariffs or using a partial custom union.
 449
 This study would be an 
option of ASEAN to create a custom union within the member states.  
                                                 
444
Mia Mikic, Opcit., pp.25. 
445
SCB Economic Intelligence Center, “Insight Moving Forward With the AEC”, February 2011 at 
http://www.scb.co.th/eic/doc/en/insight/SCB%20Insight%20Feb%202011%20Eng_AEC.pdf, last accessed on 








The study has two options for ASEAN in moving towards a CU: either all its members will need to decline to 
a zero Common External Tariff (CET) like Singapore, or they will have to form a CU with a positive CET minus 
Singapore. This study also has several scenarios and internal challenges to implement it. See further: Sanchita 
Basu Das, et al., “AEC Vision Post-2015: Is an ASEAN Customs Union Feasible?”, ISEAS Economics Working 
Paper No.2015-1, February 2015, at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/ISEAS/upload/files/ EWP20151.pdf, last accessed 
March 22, 2015.  
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The author summarizes the importance of how integration is carried out based on 
Petri’s observation, as follows:450  
1. The single market that ASEAN builds has to be the “right” market. That means 
that the single market should reflect the characteristics and regulatory standards of 
the ASEAN member states. It will not always be possible to harmonize all 
standards within the region’s most advanced markets. This standard should be 
shifted into a regional level so that it is closer to those within ASEAN itself;  
2. The production systems that ASEAN develops will need to be closely linked to 
their foreign counterparts. In this case, ASEAN should improve its scheme of 
policies and regulations, especially the environment of doing business and 
investing capital in order to get more attraction from its foreign counterparts.   
3. ASEAN will need to market its market. This means that ASEAN should have an 
ASEAN brand, which represents a wide range of characteristics pertaining to 
those markets. Again, it needs real schemes to adopt standards and to have 
certifications. A strong ASEAN brand will not possibly be promoted adequately 
by individual members, but it should be done together.    
The challenges which ASEAN face in achieving the AEC, as Pushpanathan Sundram 
mentioned, are as follows:
451
 
“The key challenge for ASEAN is to stay the course in community building as a 
whole. While readiness is important, it is not sufficient to deliver the AEC by 
2015. The building of the AEC will need strong leadership, vision, political 
                                                 
450
Petri, Peter A. "Competitiveness and Leverage", In Ed. Michael Plummer and Chia Siow Yue (ed)  “Realizing 
the ASEAN Economic Community: A Comprehensive Assessment.”. Singapore: ISEAS Press, 2009.  See at 
http://www.learningace.com/doc/328544/bf6282156fec393140691cd5da1244c5/competitiveness-and-leverage-
jul08, last accessed on January 22, 2015. 
451
Pushpanathan Sundram, Opcit., last accessed on October 25, 2011. See further, The several challenges facing 
ASEAN in achieving AEC 2015. Firstly, ASEAN has to manage the integration process and achieve the targets 
within the timeframes that have already been agreed. Secondly, the ASEAN countries should actively address 
the non-implementation of regional commitments, which should include capacity building to tackle any 
inadequacies in implementing commitments; peer reviews for sharing and learning of best practices as well as 
transparency and confidence-building; and utilizing the dispute settlement mechanisms already in place to 
resolve issues in a rules-based manner. There could also be specific target-setting to encourage ASEAN to 
achieve more. For example, there could be specific targets for bringing down the costs of doing business in 
ASEAN. Thirdly, a robust regional surveillance mechanism is necessary to track emerging risks in the AEC and 
to deal with them in a timely manner. In this regard, the ASEAN Secretariat will soon be establishing a 
Macroeconomic and Finance Surveillance Office which will undertake surveillance on economic and financial 
integration issues. Fourthly, financing the development of an ASEAN single market and production base will 
continue to be a challenge. In this regard, ASEAN countries should look at innovative and creative ways to 
augment the funds being provided by dialogue partners and donors to support ASEAN economic integration. 
Fifthly, the development within ASEAN certainly deserves more attention to realize the AEC by 2015. Sixthly, 
the private sector of ASEAN must be better engaged in building the AEC as they are the principal driver of 
regional economic integration. There should be regular sector-specific dialogue with the business community so 
that ASEAN can address their concerns and create a more facilitating environment for doing business in the 
region.  
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will as well as strong mechanisms and institutions to support coordination and 
implementation, both at the national and regional levels. ASEAN must 
continue to stay open and engage its partners to maximize the gains from the 
AEC given our outward-looking economic orientation. A transformation of 
mind-set from “national interest to regional action” to “regional interest to 
national action” is also necessary for community-building as a whole.” 
Since the date set for the AEC is approaching, so it needs to be recognised that the 
growth process of regional integration has to speed up. Thus, in this area, there is a need to 
focus on strength and to build cross trading of financial instruments in various markets and 
facilitate intraregional payments and settlement.
452
 
An integrated payment system cannot be created from scratch, but it has to be pushed 
by economic needs and/or be pulled by political will.
453
 The performance of the ASEAN 
regional economic cooperation is fundamentally based on two conditions, namely government 
and markets,
454
 and this time the condition of the ASEAN member states have a deeply rooted 
concept of sovereignty, so that it is highly unlikely to strengthen cooperation through large 
scale sovereignty transfer. Further regional economic cooperation is difficult because of 
limited market scale of internal regional market, competition among member countries as well 
as dependence on the external market.
455
 In order to have a good performance within the 
region members, these must be transformed considerably. 
The author argues that the implication of the AEC is a need for acceleration of 
financial regional integration to develop a single market in ASEAN. They need a connection 
among the member states through technology in order to have an efficient and effective free 
movement of products and services. The author argues that an integrated payment system is 
one of the effective and efficient service instruments that may support the acceleration of 
financial regional integration. Furthermore, to achieve a financial integration,  strong 
commitments are needed from leaders who have a great vision and strong political will, as 
well as well-built mechanisms and institutions to back up the achievement of the AEC. 
                                                 
452
This target expected is in line with the function of an Independent Asian Financial Institute (AFI), as proposed 
by Eichengreen, in Ramkishen S. Rajan, “ASIAN Economic Cooperation and Integration : Sequencing of 
Financial, Trade and Monetary Regionalism”, July 2004 at http://ramkishenrajan.gmu.edu/ 
pdfs/publications/Published_Academic_Papers/2005/sianregmem.pdf, last accessed on January 22, 2015. The 
tasks of AFI would assigned the following tasks: strengthening prudential supervision and regulation, running 
training and capacity building programs for bank supervisors, securities and exchange commissioners and 
accountants, helping design region wide financial standards and regulations and provision of liquidity to 
countries that find it hard to adjust to the standards, and facilitating regional clearing and payments settlements 
among central banks in the region. 
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2.4 The Benefits and Contributions of the AEC 
The positive effect of building a strong and highly competitive common market will 
allow the ASEAN economies to gain more benefits from the world markets. It will at the 
same time provide a better bargaining position for the individual member states with regard to 
the trade in the product exported in international market.
456
 It will also be a good step for the 
ASEAN members to assure open access to whole markets around the world which will raise 
the ASEAN members’ capacity to attain good market access. 
The ASEAN Economic Integration brings the following benefits to the economic 
development of the region:
457
 
“First, it creates a peaceful, cooperative and coordinative macro environment, 
which is absolutely necessary for economic development. ASEAN countries are 
beware of its importance increasingly. Second, it reinforces external 
development strategies of member countries and has impact on internal 
economic development model. Regional economy has become an integral part 
in external development strategies of member countries.” 
Peter Robson
 458
 describes that: 
“Experience of many countries in the world (including tiny countries) proves 
that although membership in an economic community is not a necessary 
premise for economic success, it does not exclude the possibility that those 
who have been successful without participation in integration are likely to be 
more successful if they become a member of a suitable community.” 




“Development regionalism refers to concerted efforts from a group of 
countries within a geographical region to increase the complementarity and 
capacity of the total regional economy as well as finding the right balance 
between function and territory.”  
 
Based on the development regionalism conditions, Hettne, et al. argue that, from the 
point of view on indirect and broader economic returns, regionalization (for example, in 
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See http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20141003172848.pdf, last accessed on January 22, 2015 
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LU Guangsheng, Opcit., pp.63-64. 
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Peter Robson, “The Economics of International Integration”, (translated by Dai Bingran, etc), Shanghai Yiwen 
Press, 2001. 
459
Bjorn Hettne, Andraas Inotai and OsvaldoSunkel, “Comparing Regionalism: Implications for Global 
Development”,  New York: PALGRAVE, 2001, pp.14. 
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Additionally, Guangsheng emphasizes the following:
 461
 
“in the view of development regionalism, the benefits of regionalization in 
Southeast Asia are: to bring political stability and developmental 
authoritarianism of Southeast Asia and make it locked in and consolidated in 
the system; to cut down military expenditure; to strengthen dynamic economic 
links through several ways, like regionalized network production, trade, 
investment and allocation, three growth engines and policy coordination in 
accepting foreign capital; to enhance collective bargain capability in foreign 
affairs; to improve status in global politics and economy; to build resource 
management mechanism (for example, establishment of dispute settlement 
mechanism of resource management).”  
The AEC itself is concerned with regional financial integration, which focused on the 
process of financial liberalization. Williamson and Mahar identified six dimensions of 
financial liberalization that can be summarized as:
462
 
“ (i)  Elimination of credit controls; 
(ii) Deregulation of interest rates; 
(iii) Free entry into financial services industry; 
(iv) Bank autonomy 
(v) Private ownership of banks; 
(vi) Liberalization of internal capital flows.” 
With regard to financial integration, ASEAN has implemented ASEAN Single 
Window (ASW), as one of good examples, to ensure a rapid and accurate payment to 
governmental authorities and agencies for required duties and any other charges.
463
 The 
implementation of a single window can be highly beneficial for both governments and trading 
communities. For Governments it can bring better risk management, improved levels of 
security and increased revenue yields with enhanced trader compliance. For trading 
communities will benefit from transparent and predictable interpretation and application of 
rules, and better deployment of human and financial resources, resulting in appreciable gains 
in productivity and competitiveness. In addition, a single window can simplify and facilitate 
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the process of providing and sharing the necessary information to fulfil trade-related 
regulatory requirements for both traders and authorities to a considerable extent. Furthermore, 
the use of such a system might result in improved efficiency and effectiveness of official 
controls and in reduction of costs for both traders and governments due to better use of 
resources.
464
 The benefits of the single window concept encompass the implementation of a 
better risk management, the improvement of security levels and increased revenue yields with 
enhanced trader compliance, the transparent and predictable interpretation and application of 
rules, the better deployment of human and financial resources as well as the achievement of 
gains in productivity and competitiveness.
465
 
In the future, the AEC will reduce the development gaps among its member states and 
raise regional economic prosperity and stability. Apparently, once economically integrated, 
the AEC could improve efficiency, enhance effectiveness, and also may strengthen the 
economic fundamentals within the region.
466
 However, it needs a strong efforts from the 
member countries to integrate their economic in the same speed, due to the difference of 
economy level among the member states. The governments should synchronize and 
implement coherence and commit policies which are written in the AEC Blueprint.
467
 The 
formation of an AEC will also benefit to play a more effective part in determining a financial 
system that more responsive to its needs.
468
  
It is clear that at the ASEAN level, the diversities in the levels of economic 
development and capabilities are quite wide, thus, it offers more extensive and mutually 
beneficial linkage. The diversity in economic structure gives its own indigenous capacity and 
markets for dynamic industrial restructuring within the region on the basis of ‘flying geese’ 
patterns.
469
 The Asian region encompasses some of the fastest growing economies in the 
world, forming an enormous market that is growing faster than any other region in the 
world.
470
 The development of an AEC will assist the member states in the region to 
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participate and play a more effective role in determining a world trading and financial system 
that is more responsive and reactive to its needs.  
According to Petri, et al., the AEC would yield benefits similar to those of the 
European Union regarding the financial integration. This is remarkable since the ASEAN 
economies are less closely integrated and are arguably less complementary than those of the 
European Union (EU) were at the outset of the EU initiative.
471
 However, given the relatively 
early stage of development of some ASEAN members, existing barriers to trade are greater 
and their elimination could yield larger productivity gains in relation to current trade.
472
 
Although difficult to comprehend for the author, according to Petri, these benefits show to 
compensate the result of less integration. As ASEAN economies continue to mature and work 
more closely together, the benefits of the AEC should grow, and with rising incomes and 
trade, ASEAN is also likely to develop the horizontal, inter-industry linkages that have come 
to characterize the later stages of the European single market effort.
473
  
2.5 The Implementation of the AEC from Legal and Political Overview 
In order to achieve the goals of the AEC, Rolf Weber states that there are factors and 
elements to be taken into consideration.
474
 These factors and elements are as follows:
475
 
- Political will: Both government and business should be interested to implement a 
project. They should make the necessary resources available and agree on the proper 
dissemination of clear and impartial information.  It is obvious that the role and the 
involvement of the government and related industries are needed in this matter. 
- Partnership between government and trade: The successful implementation of a 
project makes it necessary that all relevant public and private agencies and 
organizations participate in the development of the system and are involved in its 
processes. It requires a harmonized cooperation between government and industries. 
- Definition of clear project objectives: The implementation of a project must be based 
on a careful analysis of the needs, aspirations and resources of the key stakeholders, 
in particular in respect of the given infrastructure. The parties should have a clear 
objective in order to implement the single window. 
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- User friendliness and accessibility: A project should encompass the requirements of 
adequate operating guidelines, support services. The standard and procedure must be 
clearly known and understandable by parties involved. 
- Strong lead agency: The implementation of a project is more likely if a strong, 
resourceful and empowered lead organization is driving the project.   
- Financial model, promotion and communication: Clear guidelines as to the financing 
of a single model are needed.  In addition, establishing a proper mechanism for 
keeping all stakeholders informed on project goals, objectives, targets, progress and 
difficulties of a concept creates trust and avoids misunderstandings. The standard and 
procedure should be clear and transparent to parties involved. 
- Payment possibility: The inclusion of possible payment mechanisms makes a project 
more attractive. There should be options of payment mechanisms that could be more 
attractive for industries. 
- Legally enabling environment: As mentioned, legal issues and restrictions are to be 
identified and carefully analysed; a clear and predictable legal environment leads to 
trust of the involved stakeholders. This point refers to providing a legal certainty for 
parties involved. 
Overall, the success of the future development efforts in ASEAN will greatly depend on 
the political will to implement development plans, that the main thrust of the strategy for the 
region’s development in the future must be integrative in nature or at least, policy-wise, 
multidimensional. Furthermore, the role of the government in the future requires an effective 




Moreover, John H. Jackson mentioned:
477
 
“….international trade relations in the world today…  is a very complex mix 
of economic and governmental policies, political constraints, and above all an 
intricate set of constraints imposed by a variety of rules or legal norm.” 
The above statement of John H. Jackson indicates that it is applicable to the whole 
international economic activities, which involves legal aspect as well as politic factor. Related 
to the legal issues of the single window concept, Rolf Weber and Schermer explained some 
issues, which need to be addressed that should be taken into consideration.
478
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From the description above, the author comes to the conclusion that some 
requirements should be taken into consideration in order to create and implement a new 
policy, project, program, or initiative, like the single window, as follows: 
 There is a necessity of political will, both from the government and related business 
industries. Moreover, other elements such as legislative and judicial bodies should 
support this project, especially related to the legal aspects. 
 There are needs for legal basis and well-structured organization in implementing 
the program/initiative. The legal basis itself comprises of rules and procedures 
related to the program to provide a legal certainty and safeguard the parties 
involved in such program. 
 There are also needs for a well-managed dissemination and education to public in 
order to provide awareness and readiness of the society regarding to the program. 
2.6 The AEC’s Dispute Settlement  
The development of the AEC is in its early stages and many of the key foundations of 
an integrated market, such as predictability, transparency and the right to seek dispute 
resolution, are not as well-grounded as in national states or other regional economic blocs, 
such as the European Union.
479
 The AEC dispute settlement mechanism for economic 
agreements also demonstrates an effort to construct economic integration the ASEAN Way.
480
 
Regarding dispute resolution mechanism, the member states avoided a processed dispute 
resolution mechanism for over a decade.
481
 Demonstrating their gradual acceptance of rules 
based economic integration, the members crafted a Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 2004, 
but it nevertheless remains an option rather than a mandate and permits a member state at any 
time to engage in conciliation or mediation.
482
 Moreover, the whole procedure is managed by 
a group of political representatives from each member state, which would make decisions by 
consensus, and as a fact, no dispute has yet been processed through the dispute settlement 
mechanism (DSM), and member states simply resolve some agreements when they are unable 
or unwilling to implement earlier ones.
483
 This ASEAN way of thinking in building consensus 
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According to R. Aldaba and Yap, ASEAN has three interrelated dispute resolution 
mechanisms that address the implementation of obligations under the ASEAN agreements: 
the ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues (ACT), the ASEAN 
Compliance Body (ACB), and the Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM).
485
 The 
ACB is advisory in nature while the DSM is binding.
486
 Moreover, ASEAN has developed 
three key mechanisms for dispute settlement: the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC); the 1996 Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism and subsequently the 2004 
Protocol for Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM) for disputes relating to 
ASEAN economic agreements; and the provisions of the 2007 ASEAN Charter that serve as 
an overarching framework for dispute settlement in ASEAN. Unfortunately, to date, neither 
the High Council of the TAC nor the EDSM have been utilized by member states.
487
The 
Protocol on the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (the ASEAN DSM), that to a substantial 
extent is similar to the dispute settlement mechanism in the GATT era and the ASEAN 
EDSM resembles the WTO DSM.
488
   
The ASEAN Economic Ministers’ High Level Task Force (HLTF) on Economic 
Integration had unveiled a slew of economic initiatives with clear deadlines to expedite the 
economic integration process to realize the AEC.
489
 One of the most important 
recommendations by the HLTF was the creation of a more effective Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (DSM) with powers to make legally binding decisions in resolving trade disputes 
among member states.
490
 This process is as end-goal for AEC in moving towards improving 
the existing ASEAN DSM, in order to ensure and provide legally binding resolution of any 
economic disputes.  Since the number of trade disputes will likely rise significantly as the 
region moves towards a higher level of economic integration, a credible DSM would be 
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“- Establish a legal unit within the ASEAN Secretariat to provide legal advice 
on trade disputes; 
- Establish the ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues in 
order to provide quick resolution to operations problems (this would be 
similar to the EU mechanism); 
- Establish the ASEAN Compliance Body.” 
In 2010, the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
(ACDSM) was signed by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN in Ha Noi, Vietnam. This current 
protocol provides more extensive rules and processes for dispute settlements. The ACDSM 
will apply not only to the interpretation and application of the ASEAN Charter, but also to 
other ASEAN instruments. Moreover, the ACDSM creates a dispute settlement mechanism 
which allows the ASEAN Summit to approve a decision if consensus among the ASEAN 
members cannot be reached. The author observes that this current Protocol (ACDSM) 
provides arbitration mechanism as tools for resolving the disputes.
492
 This is a better step for 
ASEAN of having a better Dispute Settlement Mechanism which is expected to be used by 
the member states for the solutions of their disputes. 
2.7 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Integration: Seeking Values and 
Empowering the Organ(s) 
During the financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN countries became disunited in terms of its 
economic policy. Consequently, they became more focused on their internal interests. After 
the crisis, individual ASEAN members sought to secure its own economic interests outside 
the ASEAN framework. For example, Singapore was frustrated by the slow leap of 
integration after the crisis and responded by signing bilateral trade deals with the EU, 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, India, and the United 
States.
493
 The Philippines followed in 2002 by signing a bilateral FTA with Japan.
494
 Then 
                                                 
491
Ibid, See details in Recommendations of the High level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration at 
Annex 1 : Mechanism of The Dispute Settlement Mechanism, at http://www.asean.org/news/item/ 
recommendations-of-the-high-level-task-force-on-asean-economic-integration, last accessed on October 26, 
2011. 
492
See Article 8 of ACDSM. 
493Linda Low, “Singapore’s Bilateral Free Trade Agreements: Institutional and Architectural Issues”, Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council Trade Forum, April 2003, can be seen at http://www.pecc.org/resources/trade-
and-investment-1/154-singapores-bilateral-free-trade-agreements-institutional-and-architectural-issues-1, last 
accessed on January 22, 2015. 
494Maki Aoki, “New Issues in FTAs: The Case of Economic Partnership Agreements between Japan”, APEC 
Study Centers Consortium Meeting, May 2004, can be seen at http://www.pecc.org/resources/trade-and-
investment-1/106-new-issues-in-ftas-the-case-of-economic-partnership-agreements-between-japan, last accessed 
on January 22, 2015. 
   
133 
 
Malaysia followed the two previous members by subsequently expressing its interest in 
negotiating a FTA with Japan.
495
   
This phenomenon happened due to the lack of institutional mechanism and the 
inability of ASEAN to provide a better arrangement for the members to recover and develop 
their economies. Furthermore, since the crisis ruined the members, it demonstrated that the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs was a major obstruction that impeded the 
capability of ASEAN to rise again from the turmoil.  Nevertheless, it must be admitted that 
the norms of consensus and consultation (the ASEAN Way) have been effective in averting 
political and security conflicts within the ASEAN member states, especially the worries of the 
domino effect of Vietnam War and Cambodia and Myanmar’s conflicts. The political 
approach is more efficient in these matters at that time. Kraft points out that these norms also 
were acknowledged to be key factors in the economic development of a number of the 
ASEAN member states and, more importantly, in preventing the outbreak of wars between 
them.
496
  Nowadays, since the Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) became 
members of ASEAN, those risks have declined, but ASEAN still needs an approach, which 
can manage security and business shifting from conventional norms to forward-looking 
norms. 
The ASEAN Charter is one of the examples of the forward-looking capacity from the 
ASEAN Leaders and it is a stepping-stone for transition. It includes an ASEAN Protocol on 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which rules dispute resolution for AFTA and other 
arrangements of ASEAN. But then again, in practice, when the disputes arise, the disputes are 
resolved bilaterally through informal means. The mechanism dispute settlement which is 
stated in the Charter is never implemented.  This can also be annoying for corporations 
implicated by an ASEAN arrangement, such as the AFTA dispute, and they often try to find a 
dispute resolution in another forum such as the WTO or the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).
497
 Such developments which are far from the spirit of the ASEAN integration. 
However, Kraft is questioning the binding norms. He states that whatever the norms adopted 
by ASEAN, they must have binding authority – meaning that the Association must be able to 
enforce sanctions against non-compliance.
498
 Additionally, he also argues that norm building 
must be supported by proper institutions that will allow and facilitate the enforcement of these 
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norms. There is a need to increase the level of institutionalization of ASEAN even when there 
is an implied reticence to do so.
499
  
Hadi Soesastro also pointed out that there is no point in pursuing an advanced and 
demanding notion as an AEC without deeper and testable commitment of the member states 
and stronger institutions or a detailed treaty from the outset.
500
 He also stated that regional 
energies must also be invested in institutional development to effectively implement 
initiatives, actions, and programs to realizing the AEC. Additionally, there is a need for 
ASEAN to develop a new ASEAN way in achieving the goal of an AEC, which is part of the 
broader ideal of an ASEAN Community.
501
 Without endowed ASEAN institutions, without a 
treaty, without transfer of powers, and without any budget, one should not expect a credible 
ASEAN Economic Community to emerge.
502
 Moreover, Stubbs observes that economic 




From the above descriptions, the author argues that it seems that ASEAN is still 
reluctant to shift from the informal manner to ruling of law, and to transfer power from the 
member states to association.  Subsequently, in order to attain the AEC and to deepen the 
economic integration within the ASEAN member states, there are two important elements that 
should be considered.  These two elements are:  first, a legal certainty by developing binding 
arrangements, and second, the importance of deepening and empowering the regional 
institutions or bodies that could make regulations, decisions and supervisions for ASEAN. 
These two elements are a must-have for ASEAN in achieving the AEC. When we are talking 
about agreement related to financial concerns, unquestionably the parties need a binding 
arrangement to protect their interests.  A number of other ASEAN agreements as well as the 
ASEAN agreements with the dialogue partners (e.g. the free trade agreements) also contain 
specific clauses on dispute settlement.
504
 ASEAN need some instruments that can assure them 
with a certainty, such as legal certainty and legal enforcement. Furthermore, the regional 
economy needs a legal certainty to smooth the single market in ASEAN. They need an 
efficient decision-making mechanism rather than a political decision-making process from the 
Leaders of the member states meeting, which is too long and contains a lot of political 
interests. 
With regard to economic integration especially a financial market integration, it 
appears to the author that such integration needs a payment system instrument, which is 
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smooth, fast, efficient, safe and certain. Besides standardization of the payment systems, the 
legal harmonization is also necessary and important. To harmonize regulations, ASEAN 
should be given legal supremacy over national laws and it needs an institutional mechanism.  
Thus, for economic integration, the institutionalization, the supervision and the legal 
instruments, which are binding and enforceable to all the ASEAN member states, are needed.  
With regard to a legal certainty and effective decision-making mechanism, Pushpanathan 
stated in his keynote address at the FX Week Asia Conference 2009 in Singapore that the 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), which provides US$120 billion swap 
arrangements under the CMIM needs a legal agreement and an independent regional 
surveillance unit to support the decision-making process of the CMIM.
505
 Christopher Roberts 
also argues that by having the agreement of the CMIM, the ASEAN members were also 
willing to adopt a more flexible decision-making process in relation to their economic 
agreements.
506
 It seems to the author that ASEAN is no longer dealing only with cooperation 
but also with regional integration. Given the increasing demands of financial globalization, 
the ASEAN region must prepare the necessary policies and infrastructure to be in place in 
order to cope with the needs of financial integration.  
One of the most important matters for ASEAN in order to implement the AEC 
objectives effectively is to design an institution/body and to create the regulations that are 
applicable and binding for all member states.  This reasoning was also inspired by Roberts’ 
statement on the crisis effect that smashed the ASEAN’s economy. He argues that the 
devastating effects were also due to the lack of the institutional mechanisms and capacity, 
ASEAN necessary to provide tangible assistance for the purpose of either the recovery of its 
member economies or the prevention of political instability.
507
  
The ASEAN Charter has also provided the ASEAN Secretariat with some forms of 
functional capacity, but the influence of the Secretariat remained low. Dr. Munir Majid 
criticized the secretariat as "weak", saying that it is not given the authority to carry out its role 
effectively.
508
 He argues that it does not necessarily mean giving it more power or money, but 
giving it a stronger role.
509
   
The author agrees with Dr. Munir, but the Secretariat needs more than that.  As an 
institution that has authority, it needs more power to regulate, to decide, and to control. It also 
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needs credible and capable staff and adequate funds for achieving the AEC. These 
components were thought out by Surin Pitsuwan as a former Secretary General and chief 
administrative officer at the ASEAN Secretariat. He argued that the Secretary General and his 
office should be given sufficient trust and latitude to carry out their responsibilities.
510
 
Furthermore, he said that they also need sufficient financial support, personnel and 
infrastructure, including modern technology.
511
 He compares the ASEAN annual budget of 




Although such comparison, according to the author does not make sense, since the EU 
has different structural and responsibilities, he agrees that those components should be 
empowered, especially the delegated power to regulate, impose sanctions and doing 
supervision. They should also create bodies or committees with such power, especially to 
create a cross-border payment system.
513
 But it is acknowledged that this cannot be 
implemented in just “one night”.  It will need a certain period of time. 
2.8 ASEAN’s Dimension for the AEC: Intergovernmental vs. Supranational 
Institution – Learning from the EU Experience 
When we discuss creating and promoting regional integration, this process is mostly 
influenced by how the member countries in the specific region create, develop and integrate. 
It has been established that ASEAN has intergovernmental characteristics and the EU has 
supranational attributes. In this sub chapter, the author will explain the impact of globalization 
and integration to a region’s characteristics and how to learn from the EU perspective, which 
will finally give an idea to ASEAN of how to seek the values necessary for its 
economic/financial integration especially for attaining the AEC. 
It is acknowledged that the establishment of ASEAN was originally initiated for 
security reasons. Thus, the development of the ASEAN vision is greatly influenced by the 
leaders of the member states and they have played a central role in ASEAN since its 
establishment until the creation of the AEC. This intergovernmental character has led the 
association in dealing with the issues using a political instead of legal process.  
In the global and integration era, which involves and deals with many countries, the 
regional powers need to be taken into consideration for ruling the national level. In providing 
more power to the regional level, the sovereign power of each nation, in certain manner and to 
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a certain degree, should be shifted to the association. The region countries may establish an 
institution with supremacy power to manage their common interests (called supranational 
institution). By learning from the EU, supranational institutions may be established to 
facilitate domestic and regional interests which will benefit all member states. By having 
supranational institutions, every member has the same rights and obligations, because each 
member state delegates their power to the institution to manage and regulate them.  However, 
Guy Peters keeps reminding that governments remain significant actors in the EU context.
514
   
On the one hand, as Moravcsik
515
 argues, the European Community (EC) is the most 
successful example of an institutionalized international policy co-ordination in the modern 
world, and yet there is little agreement about the proper explanation for its evolution.
516
 He 
explains that the EC has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains 
since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1958 until the making of Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, each of which set the agenda for an overriding period of consolidation.
517
 Moreover, he 
also argues that the EC can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to 
manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination.
518
   
Another scholar, James Caporaso, states that the most important virtue of domestic 
politics is how a society constructs its institutions, and also the way these institutions are built 
is thought to affect political outcomes.
519




“Yet Moravcsik’s underlying model is one of societal pluralism, particularly 
economic pluralism.  Economic factors, particularly the distribution of commercial 
and productive interests, work their way up toward the national leaders, who in 
turn carry these preferences into international negotiations.  The results of the 
negotiations are then locked in by institutions.” 
On the other hand, Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz  have a shifting theory of 
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Scholarship Series, Paper 87, 1997, pp.304. also can be seen at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ 
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“The continuum measures the movement from intergovernmental to supranational 
governance in three interrelated dimensions: 
•  EC rules: the legal, and less formal, constraints on behaviour produced by 
interactions among political actors operating at the European level; 
• EC organizations: those governmental structures, operating at the European 
level, that produce, execute, and interpret EC rules; and 
• Transnational society: those non-governmental actors who engage in intra-
EC exchanges - social, economic, political - and thereby influence, directly 
or indirectly, policy-making processes and outcomes at the European level.” 
They are also inspired by the founders of the integration theory, Karl Deutsch and 
Ernst Haas, who declared later the theory of neo-functionalism in 1950´s.
522
  In their journal, 
they also state Deutsch’s emphasis on social exchange, communication and transactions, and 
Haas’ attention to the relationship between global interdependence, political choice, and the 
development of supranational institutions.
523
 From these opinions, Sweet and Sandholtz agree 
that social exchange across borders drives integration processes, and generates social 
demands for supranational rules, it also pushes the integration process towards higher levels 
of organizational capacity which can respond to further demands.  If this demand is not 
supplied, the development of higher levels of exchange will be stunted.
524
  
From the above description, the author is on the opinion that the path of the EU history 
to become one of the most respectable organizations in the world, initially started with an 
intergovernmental character, and then due to social exchanges between the member states, 
followed by communications and starting cross-border economic transactions, they became 
interdependent and needed integration by seeking political bargaining through negotiations 
between the leaders of member states to create a supranational institution as a final form of 
consolidation.  It is like Anneli Albi´s opinion in her book, which mentions that the EU is 
rather a novel and unique combination of supranational and intergovernmental structures to 




With regard to the ASEAN dimension, the author also sees that the need for 
transformation from intergovernmental  to supranational institution is essential for the 
deepening of the ASEAN’s economic integration. The key success for achieving the AEC 
objectives is the creation and/or empowering of the ASEAN institution(s) with the authority 
                                                 
522
Neo-functionalism describes and explains the process of regional integration with reference to how three 
causal factors interact with one another: (a) growing economic interdependence between nations, (b) 
organizational capacity to resolve disputes and build international legal regimes, and (c) supranational market 
rules that replace national regulatory regimes. See further at Ernst Haas "International Integration: The European 
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to make regulations, to make decisions, to carry out supervisions, and to impose sanctions. 
ASEAN does not have to leave the intergovernmental characteristics behind at once. There 
will be a gradual change and obviously a long-term development in nature. Although, the time 
line of ASEAN to face AEC is less than one year, the author is aware that ASEAN still needs 
more time to adjust that combination to its own unique and specific regional characteristics.   
2.9 A Glimpse of MERCOSUR: Learning from its Economic Integration Experience 
Besides learning from the EU, it might be wise and necessary for ASEAN to see and 
learn as well from the other region which has a similar motivation in integrating their 
economic region. One of such regions is Latin America with its MERCOSUR or the Mercado 
Comun del Sur, also known as the Common Market of the South. ASEAN, also sought 
political and economic relationships with this Latin America region.
526
 
MERCOSUR was established under the Asunción Treaty in 1991.
527
 It was set up with 
the ambitious goal of creating a common market between the participating countries. At first, 
it started with four member countries: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay while 
Venezuela joined six years later, and Bolivia became member of MERCOSUR in 2012.  Four 
instruments are needed to be applied in order to achieve a common market: trade 
liberalization, the creating of common external tariffs, the coordination of macroeconomic 
policy and the commitment of harmonizing their legislation.   
Since its establishment until 1997, MERCOSUR experienced a golden era, which 
attracted large amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the region. This was interrupted 
by the financial crisis in East Asia and Russia in late 1997.
528
 Argentina had a debt crisis in 
1998, while Brazil was impacted by a devaluation of its exchange rate. In the beginning of 
2003, the trade of MERCOSUR recovered and increased by negotiations with countries 




There are six organs of MERCOSUR i.e. the Common Market Council (CMC), the 
Common Market Group (CMG), the Trade Commission of MERCOSUR (CCM), the 
Parliament of MERCOSUR (PM), the Permanent Tribunal of Review (TPR), and the 
Secretariat of MERCOSUR.
530
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The Common Market Council (CMC) is the highest body of this organization, 
responsible for the political decisions and is composed of the ministers of foreign affairs and 
the presidents. It adopts measures, which are binding to all state parties.
532
 The CMG and the 
CMM are the executive organs, consisting of officials from ministries of foreign affairs and 
economics and also the representative of the central banks. The latter supports the CMC 
regarding trade and commercial issues. The Secretariat of MERCOSUR is an assisting body, 
providing technical and administrative support to all MERCOSUR organs. 
With regard to the power to regulate, the Parliament of MERCOSUR is a new organ 
replacing the Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC).
533
  It is expected to  balance the role of 
the presidential power. However, none of these functions was fully performed and it only had 
an advisory role and have no power to make laws.
534
 The Parliament of MERCOSUR has the 
role to work together with national parliaments with the aim of ensuring compliance with 
MERCOSUR rules. Thus, the decision-making body prior to adopting the secondary rules 
must consult with the Parliament of MERCOSUR. Furthermore, the Parliament of 
MERCOSUR has the right to propose draft rules to the CMC, in particular rules dealing with 
the harmonization or mutual recognition of the state parties’ national legislation.535 From this 
description, it seems to the author that the Parliament of MERCOSUR has no binding 
authority and it is contrary to the essence of the parliament body. In substance, the 
Parliament’s tasks of monitoring legislative power are very limited and do not change the 
intergovernmental character of MERCOSURE. Although the Parliament of MERCOSUR 
represents the people of MERCOSURE but it is only a label imbedded with no decision-
making authority. However, compared to ASEAN, the author notes that the creation of a 
Parliament like MERCOSUR has, but with more legislative powers, should be considered as a 
step forward in the development of the institutional structure of the organization. 
MERCOSURE has also established the Permanent Review Court/Permanent Tribunal 
Review (TPR) under the Protocol of Olivos in 2002, whose objectives were to interpret 
MERCOSURE regulations and settle trade disputes.  However, it seems to the author that 
MERCOSUR is just like ASEAN, which lacks institutional mechanisms and regulations to be 
transposed into national laws. Although MERCOSUR has a dispute-settlement mechanism, 
the author observes that it also lacks a clear binding endorsement mechanism. This can be 
seen in Article 7 of the Olivos Protocol as follows:
536
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533
See the Constitutive Protocol for the establishment of MERCOSUR Parliament, signed on December 9, 2005. 
534International Democracy Watch, “MERCOSUR Parliament”, IDW Centro Studi Sul Federalismo, see at 
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“1.  If the dispute was submitted to the Common Market Group of States parties to the 
dispute, it shall make recommendations, if possible, be explicit, detailed solution 
aimed at difference or.  
7. If the dispute is brought to the consideration of the Common Market Group at the 
request of a State not party to it, the Common Market Group may make comments 
or recommendations.” 
It seems to the author that the intervention of the CMG by issuing recommendations 
shows that the dispute mechanism is still influenced by its intergovernmental character. 
Furthermore, with regard to the role of TPR, Bartesaghi criticizes that to make a powerful 
TPR, the members must take a necessary step by changing its intergovernmental character to 
community law, a step that will create a full-fledged Permanent Court of Justice.
537
 
Nevertheless, the creation of Parliament MERCOSUR and TPR and inclusion of the 
possibility that this may solve consultative opinions, are efforts to endow the process with a 
certain degree of “supranationality”.538 
From the description above, the author concludes that there are similarities between 
ASEAN and MERCOSUR. Both have similar intergovernmental character, similar regulation 
on dispute settlement mechanisms and the same lack of effective mechanisms to deepen 
economic integration. There are also differences, in the author’s opinion, namely:  
 First, the establishment of ASEAN was initially based on security and political 
interest. A former Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, in his insightful 
book has a wise statement:
539
  
 “While ASEAN’s declared objectives were economic, social, and culture, 
all knew that progress in economic cooperation would be slow.  We were 
banding together more for political objectives, stability and security, but 
as expected, initially there was little tangible progress.” 
Another scholar, Stuart Harris, also formulated a good statement with regard to 
the background of the ASEAN’s objective.540   
“ASEAN’s objectives were never primarily economic, however, but 
involved security and then political influence. It was initially concerned 
with internal security objectives (to avoid existing territorial and border 
disputes or challenges to national legitimacies becoming military 
                                                 
537
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conflicts). Judged on its ostensible economic objectives, ASEAN’s 
achievements have been limited.” 
From the opinion of these two scholars, the author concludes that the main 
objectives of ASEAN are more related to security and political issues rather 
than economic and social issues.
541
 
Meanwhile, MERCOSUR’s establishment was based on economic interest and 
started with the Argentine – Brazilian integration, but both nations have the 
same initiative originating from the leader/policy maker. Furthermore, the two 
organizations have the same intergovernmental character, but pose a reluctance 
in transferring their sovereignty to their respective organizations.  
 Secondly, the willingness to reform the intergovernmental character in 
MERCOSUR is initiated by the weaker members, while in ASEAN it comes 
from some of the founding members.  This is exposed by Gabriel Gary who 
points out that the establishment of MERCOSUR was the result of bilateral 
negotiations between Argentina and Brazil initiated in the mid-1980s, which 
took on board Paraguay and Uruguay at the very last minute.
542
 The latecomers 
had little opportunity to exert any significant influence during the drafting 
process of the Treaty of Asuncion to ensure provisions are favourable to their 
national interests.
543
 Other scholars also see that the member states of 
MERCOSUR, particularly Argentina and Brazil, want the maximum of 
economic and politic benefits from integration, while foregoing as little 
sovereignty as possible.
544
   
What could be learnt from the MERCOSURs’ experience to further development of an 
ASEAN economic integration?  There are several points that can be taken into consideration. 
 The attempt to lessen regional asymmetry. MERCOSUR was focusing on 
technical and financial assistance for members with relatively lower or weak 
development.  In this case, ASEAN has already implemented it by designing 
the Narrowing Development Gap (NDG) project in July 2001 when ASEAN 
announced the Hanoi Declaration on Narrowing Development Gap for Closer 
ASEAN Integration. This was called the Initiative for ASEAN Integration 
(IAI) to narrow the development divide and enhance ASEAN’s 
competitiveness as a region to provide a framework for regional cooperation 
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through which the more developed ASEAN members could help those member 
countries that most need it.
545
 ASEAN also has a Roadmap for the AEC 2015 
which provides research and capacity building support to strengthen the 
research capabilities and human capital development of each ASEAN Member 
Country and to establish appropriate capacity building programs to assist newer 
member countries to enhance the development and regulatory frameworks of 
their financial markets.
546
   
 The role of NGO and/or Non State Actors in MERCOSUR is important for the 
resolution of the programs in the region.  For example, they helped 
MERCOSUR in the creation of the MERCOSUR Cultural Network, which 
includes more than 400 members, and also with the Coordination of Trade 
Union Centres of Cono Sur, which has a constant presence in the official 
meetings of MERCOSUR.
547
 ASEAN also has a partnership with the Civil 
Society Organization (CSO) and with the NGO, for certain projects such as 
ASEAN-ROK on home care for old people as well as with the CSO on the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.
548
 
 The transfer sovereignty of the government to a supranational body is one of 
the obstacles to achieve economic integration in MERCOSUR. ASEAN has the 
same problems.  The reluctance of leaving the comfort zone to some of the 
member states becomes a hindrance to deepen economic integration. 
The author also points out that these two organizations have similar problems, 
especially on the willingness to transfer sovereignty to international organization. However, 
ASEAN has made a significant achievement in its organization in the face of the ASEAN 
economic integration by having the ASEAN Charter. However, the Charter also needs to be 
reformed over time.    
Moreover, according to Guerrero, the establishment of AFTA in 1992 was the first 
significant move, to face the AEC 2015.
549
 Many agreements have already been made, 
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especially the economic agreements to face the AEC 2015. Many interactions have been made 
as well between the members, not only between states, but also between their residents.   
Furthermore, Luhulima also points out that by agreeing to enter into a regional 
association, the ASEAN member states should have implicitly or appropriately shared some 
of their sovereignty and thus consented to the diminishing role of the nation state. They have 
reordered sovereignty at the regional and national levels.
550
 Furthermore, he also states that: 
“With the proliferation of multilateral treaties regulating a growing number of 
issues and the rapid expansion of a body of international declarations, 
statements, resolutions and other instruments of what is now called “soft” law, 
more and more issues that were once considered domestic are now treated as 
legitimate international concerns: rule of law, good governance, the principles 
of democracy and constitutional government…”551 
In addition, Severino states that the recommendations of the High-Level Task Force on 
ASEAN Economic Integration on compliance bodies and procedures and on a dispute 
settlement system for the ASEAN economic agreements are unquestionably on the right 
track.
552
  He also points out that in order to promote the ASEAN economic integration and 
other forms of regional cooperation, the ASEAN Secretariat has to be empowered and 
fortified to take initiatives, for the approval of the member-states, on the basis of studies that 
it does or commissions.
553
 Besides, he also underlines that these can be overcome only with a 
stronger sense of region, as well as through bilateral efforts and financial support.
554
  The 
author agrees with his emphases. The author also argues that by committing to endorse their 
sovereignty, capacity and authority to some degree to the association or the Secretariat, 
ASEAN itself should considerably be aware of the needs for supervision and legal certainty of 
their activities with regard to the agreements that may cause conflict of law issues. It is not an 
easy task and is going to be a long-term effort for the ASEAN member states. However, it has 
to start soon. 
The author also concludes that from the EU and MERCOSURE perspective, there are 
lots of things that could be learnt from them, but one thing is for sure that ASEAN cannot be 
compared with the EU or MERCOSURE, because they are all different from one another. 
Severino has pointed out the difference between ASEAN and the EU as follows.
555
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“As I recalled earlier, the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN’s founding document, 
was a simple declaration of intent.  It was not couched in legal terms, set up no 
regional institutions, and was not binding in a legal sense.  In contrast, the 
Organization of American States and the African Union, like the European 
Union, are much more structured, with a Charter in the case of the OAS and a 
Constitutive Acts in the case of the AU and clear and elaborate rules of 
procedure in both cases.” 
The author concludes that ASEAN and the EU will never be able to compare the way 
they manage their regions because from the beginning of their establishment, they are both 
already different. ASEAN commenced from the members which had been under colonialism 
and was initiated by the elite powers based on security reasons with an informal approach, 
while the EU started from the Soviet Union’s threat and the willingness of making a 
cooperation with the United States (economics basis), not to mention that the EU began with a 
supranational authority with powerful supranational institutions such as the European Central 
Bank, European Parliament and a Court of Justice. They all have powerful authority to run the 
administration through treaties and statutes. 
So, it appears to the author that ASEAN could not use the EU model as a whole 
because ASEAN itself is unique to its region and has its regional identity. The author argues 
that ASEAN may learn from the EU, especially from its structural and legal perspective. 
Moreover, on top of that, one crucial point is that there should be a willingness and a full 
commitment of the ASEAN leaders and their administration, a sense of belonging , to 
implement together an economic integration with legal certainty and structured organs to face 
the AEC 2015. The author realizes that this is a very delicate issue and it is going to take a 
long time due to some reluctance at the beginning and the need for a huge reform and the 
same perspectives of the member states to do that. Nevertheless, this reformation should be 
taken into consideration by the member states. 
3. Summary 
This chapter describes the background of ASEAN and its development, which was 
initially from the security and political interest and then ASEAN tried to achieve its 
economics’ goals by creating the AEC. The author concludes that ASEAN’s economic recent 
goal was to increase its role in economic development and mutual assistance and the latest 
effort was to create the AEC in 2015. These goals were mostly created and initiated by means 
of a declaration by the leaders, like the Bangkok Declaration, the Manila Declaration, the 
Cebu Declaration, and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord or Bali Concord. The author sees 
that these declarations are not legally binding to the ASEAN member states. Since ASEAN 
uses a diplomatic strategy based on consultation and consensus, then the use of declarations 
fits to the ASEAN’s characteristic, but it should be reformed to provide more legal certainty. 
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ASEAN has also created a treaty, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), but 
since then there has not been any new treaty until now. 
During the ASEAN financial crisis in 1997, which caused disunity in the ASEAN 
economy, the principle of non-interference was not able to help ASEAN to bounce back from 
the turmoil. As of the beginning of the crisis, ASEAN has been willing to recover and develop 
its economy, by attaining the AEC 2015. Scholars and professional support for ASEAN’s 
interest, to transform from conventional arrangements to forward-thinking means. The 
economic integration and cross-border payment systems need a wide-range institutional 
mechanism, infrastructure, and mostly sound regulations which are applicable to all 
jurisdictions. These regulations should be legally binding and enforceable in order to provide 
legal certainty to all the ASEAN member states. 
Moreover, the regional power should be broadened to cover the national level as well. 
The author concludes that the ASEAN Charter is an example by providing a legal personality 
for the Association, but there is still a need for further reform, since the contents should 
provide a bigger role and power to the ASEAN Secretariat to represent all the ASEAN 
member states, by designing and empowering the institution and the infrastructure of ASEAN 
with the authority to make policies and regulations, to take decisions and to impose sanctions. 




A LEGAL BASIS AND KEY ISSUES FOR AN RTGS INTEGRATION 
INITIATIVE IN ASEAN 
1. The Possible Arrangement for an RTGS Integration in ASEAN 
1.1 Introduction 
As described in the beginning, globalization does not only impact the European and 
American continents but also the South East Asian region. The impact itself is not only in 
terms of political reforms, but also in economic, social and cultural reforms. The history of 
the establishment of the European Union and ASEAN has already been illustrated. From such 
description, it follows that the European Union has a supranational institution, known as the 
ECB, which has the power and authority for monetary policy and payment systems within the 
EU member states. It has been proven that the ECB is already successful in integrating cross-
border payments within the Euro member states by using TARGET.   
In this chapter, the author will make an analysis based on a legal normative approach 
as follows: would it be possible for ASEAN to follow the success of the EU in arranging an 
efficient and safe cross-border payment system within the region, not only from the legal 
perspective but also with regards to the requirements for making a unification of regulations 
by learning from the EU regarding the cross-border payment system.  It will also explains the 
challenges to create a unification of law on the RTGS integration within the ASEAN region. 
1.2 The AEC Blueprint and The Working Committee on Payment System and 
Settlement (the WC-PSS) 
In January 2007, there was a Declaration by the ASEAN Leaders of the member states 
affirming their commitment to the creation of the AEC by adopting the ASEAN Economic 
Community Blueprint, in Singapore.
556
  In 2009, there was the Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration 
on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009-2015) in Thailand, emphasizing on 
narrowing the development gap to ensure the benefits of ASEAN.
557
 Under the roadmap of 
the AEC, methods and milestones have been categorized in areas which are considered 
essential to economics and monetary integration, namely (a) capital market development; (b) 
capital account liberalization; (c) financial services liberalization; and (d) ASEAN Currency 
Cooperation.
558
  This commitment, according to the author, has consequences for the 
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economic integration of the ASEAN region, which needs more comprehensive cooperation 
amongst the national state to shift into a regional state. 
The different levels of development between the member states of ASEAN, which are 
economically, legally and technologically quite diverse, have been measured. Thus, for 
achieving the AEC by 2015, the respective member states realize that their high priority is to 
make preparations and to speed up the regional financial integration in achieving the 
standardized/common requirements within the ASEAN region. Therefore, they decided to 
carry out a financial outlook to identify the gap that impedes financial integration by making 
comprehensive timelines, schedules and stages to be implemented by the respective member 
states depending on their readiness in terms of the quality of their financial infrastructure.
559
   
1.2.1 The Roadmap for Financial Integration of ASEAN: An Economic Perspective 
As already described in the previous chapter, the financial crisis of 1997 was a 
shockwave as well as an initial step to get up and work together more intensively for 
ASEAN. The financial crisis shock and panic at that time in Thailand, due to Baht’s 
devaluation, affected other neighbour members, like Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines.
560
 From these domino effects of the crisis in 1998, the ASEAN member 
states, through the ASEAN Finance Ministers (AFM), agreed to work together side 
by side and they had a closer dialogue on economic and monetary policies, known as 
the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP).    
The ASP started in 1999 as a mechanism for peer review and exchange of views 
among the senior officials and Finance Ministers on recent economic developments 
and policy issues in ASEAN.
561
  
The objective of the ASP is to strengthen cooperation by:
562
 
“● exchanging information and discussing economic and financial 
development of member states in the region;  
 providing an early warning system and a peer review process to 
enhance macroeconomic stability and the financial system in the 
region;  
 highlighting possible policy options and encouraging early unilateral 
or collective actions to prevent a crisis; and  
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http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1998%20Terms%20of%20Understanding%20on%20the%20Establishment%20of%2
0the%20ASEAN%20Surveillance%20Process-pdf.pdf, last accessed on January 26, 2015. 
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 monitoring and discussing global economic and financial 
developments which could have implications on the region and 
propose possible regional and national level actions.” 
Since then, there has been an escalation of cooperation within the ASEAN member 
states with regard to the economic issues, in order to recover from the global crisis 
and to strengthen the economy at regional level. The author has observed that this 
achievement became one of the commitments to financial integration under the AEC 
blueprint in order to enhance financial resilience and competitiveness in the region 
by having greater integration of the financial market.  
The roadmap was defined and elaborated as follows:
563
     
1.2.1.1 Capital Market Development 
In this area, the ASM agreed to broaden and deepen the regional 
capital markets by building an integrated regional capital market to 
enhance market access, liquidity, and linkages. The measures to be 
undertaken are establishing the trading and settlement infrastructure, 
and also strengthening coordination and surveillance at both regional 
and domestic levels. 
1.2.1.2 Capital Account Liberalization 
The ASEAN member states have concluded their self-assessment and 
identification of rules appropriate for liberalization of regulation 
related to foreign direct investment (FDI). This reaffirmed their 
commitment to capital account liberalization. 
1.2.1.3 Financial Services Liberalization 
Realizing the dissimilar level of financial services development 
among the ASEAN member states, they agreed to undertake a study to 
identify the gaps and constraints that hamper financial integration. In 
2010, a new modality for financial services liberalization, based on 
pre-agreed flexibilities, was endorsed by the Finance Ministers.
564
 
1.2.1.4 ASEAN Currency Cooperation 
This cooperation will support and facilitate intra-regional trade, 
investment and economic integration through some currency 
arrangements. The efforts will be made toward maintaining 
                                                 
563
See “Regional Cooperation in Finance”, Opcit. 
564
Ibid. 
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1.2.2 The Establishment of the ASEAN Working Committee on Payment and Settlement 
System (WC-PSS) 
From the above description, there is nothing stated literally and specifically about the 
development of cross-border payment and settlement systems becoming part of the 
economic integration.
566
 The AFM meeting only provided the wide-range steps of 
implementation related to financial integration. Therefore, the ASEAN Central Bank 
Governors also had the same viewpoint at the ASEAN Central Bank Governors 
Meeting in Vietnam in supporting the AEC 2015. They discussed the implementation 
of the ASEAN Financial and Monetary Integration Roadmap, as well as cooperation 
between ASEAN and the three dialogue partners including China, Japan, and South 
Korea. Yan Meng reported that the governors made a statement and commitment to 
take actions to facilitate the ASEAN commercial transactions.
567
 The Governors 
therefore, came up with more comprehensive thoughts and more specific ideas. 
In April 2010, they decided to set up the ASEAN Central Banks’ Working 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (WC-PSS)
568
  aiming to identify 
areas of improvement requiring Payment and Settlement System (PSS) development 
among the ASEAN countries and to formulate recommendations for the member 
countries where relevant. This will support the integration of the members’ 
economies under the AEC 2015 Blueprint and beyond. 
In September 2010, the WC-PSS achieved its objective, which is to prepare the 
payment and settlement systems (PSS) of the ASEAN member countries in view of 
the AEC in 2015, by conducting studies and providing policy recommendations for 
the development of the PSS and the cooperation as well as the harmonization of the 
ASEAN PSS.
569
 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) in its study identified that the 
ASEAN Governors in the ASEAN Central Bank Governors’ meeting in April 2011 
had emphasized the necessity for financial integration to support the regional 




See Chapter 4 sub 1.2.1.  See further detail on the Roadmap of the AEC. 
567
Yan Meng, “Sixth ASEAN Central Bank Governors' Meeting opens in Vietnam”, source from Xinhua, at 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90856/6942953.html, last accessed on January 26, 2015. 
568See “Strategic Report to the ASEAN Central Bank Governors Meeting”, at http://www.aseanwcpss.org/ 
aseanwcpss/Documents/WCPSS%20Studies%20Executive%20 Summary.pdf, last accessed on January 26, 
2015.  
569
See ASEAN-WCPSS website, at http://www.aseanwcpss.org/aseanwcpss/Pages/About.aspx, last accessed on 
January 28, 2015. 
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economic integration to develop ASEAN into a leading growth region.
570
 The author 
argues that their decision is in accordance with the objectives of the ASEAN 
financial integration and supports the programs set forth in the AEC Blueprint.
571
  
Moreover, based on the ASEAN WC-PSS report in April 2011,
572
 the WC-PSS 
already identified five key elements to be examined i.e. policy, legal framework, 
instrument, institution, and infrastructure. The WC-PSS has also determined five 
areas for future enhancement, development and harmonization, namely cross-border 
trade settlement, cross-border money remittance, cross-border retail payment 
systems, cross-border capital market settlement and standardization.  They also laid 
out a roadmap for short term, medium-term and long-term recommendations (See 
Table 3). 
Table 3 
Roadmap of Cross-border Payment and Settlement System of ASEAN 
                                                                               
                Terms 
Area  
Development 
2012 – 2013 
(short- term) 
2014 – 2015 
(medium - term) 
Beyond 2015 
(long-term) 
Standardization Individual studies have 
identified many areas of PSS 
that require greater 
standardization, 
formalization and 
harmonization. There are 
international standards that 
exist for some areas, while 
in other areas it would fall 
upon members to identify 
best practices as a 
benchmark for services in 
the region. One key area 
under the ‘Standardization’ 
study is that ASEAN should 
look to adopt IS0 20022 for 
PSS for the financial 
services, which could, in the 
future, allow for more 
In the medium term, when 
ASEAN has achieved 
some degree of 
standardization in the 
respective areas, members 
could work towards further 
improvements to PSS and 
market practices, in 
alignment with members' 
needs based on the 
outcome of the needs 
analysis. Specific 
initiatives include moving 
towards T+1 receipt of 
funds and improving 
infrastructure by 
establishing or expanding 
links in existing payment 
systems (e.g. APN).  
In the longer term, the goal 
might be to achieve same 
day funds transfer within the 
region. This long-term goal 
would ultimately require 
linkages to be formed 
between the various 
payments systems be it for 
retail payments, trade 
settlement or money 
remittance. At this point, the 
region is expected to have 
enhanced or developed 
systems that are 
interoperable since they 
adopt similar standards. 
What remains is to 
determine the form of 
linkages within ASEAN for 
                                                 
570ADB, “The Road to ASEAN Financial Integration: A Combined Study on Assessing the Financial Landscape 
and Formulating Milestones for Monetary and Financial Integration in ASEAN”, Asian Development Bank, 
2013, pp.iv. 
571
These objectives are taking into consideration the different timelines and milestones for each AMS, and the 
readiness of each members’ financial infrastructure (especially for the BCMLV) to implement the programs/plan 
which drafted by the WC-PSS. 
572See further “Strategic Report to the ASEAN Central Bank Governors Meeting”, Opcit.  
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seamless integration.  each PSS area, which would 
constitute the long-term 
work goal of WCPSS. An 
example identified in the 
studies is the region’s 
eventual participation in 
Continuous Linked 
Settlement (CLS) that would 
reduce FX settlement risk. 
Other linkages could be 
between automated clearing 




The study proposed to create 
more transparency regarding 
the disclosure of bank 
charges (such as foreign 
exchange spread, handling 
fees) for cross-border 
banking.  
Greater disclosure of 
charges will reduce the cost 
of intra-ASEAN trade 
particularly when 
transacting in foreign 
exchange; The region would 
see benefits when local 
currency transaction costs 
are brought down due to 
greater information and 




For ASEAN to study 
possible mechanisms to 
achieve T+1 receipt of 
funds for cross-border 
payments. The study also 
recommended promoting 
local currency settlement 
of trade through bilateral 
linkages amongst ASEAN 
5 in line with member 
states’ relaxation of access 




In this study, proposals were 
for the adoption of policies 
to promote the use of 
formal/regulated channels, 
as well as greater 
transparency of remittance 
charges in enhancing 
consumer protection. Central 
banks could encourage the 
participation of regulated 
non-bank remittance service 
providers that could enter 
into rural unbanked areas.  
The study proposed 
exploring the feasibility of 
utilizing existing regional 
networks (APN) for 
money remittance and 
expanding its reach to 
other members. 
Retail Payment This study highlighted that 
central banks should 
promote the adoption of 
international/common 
standards in retail payment 
systems as the foundation 
for interoperability between 
existing retail payment 
systems in the region. 
Moreover, to increase 
efficiency and to widen the 
usage of payment 
WC-PSS should continue 
the initiative with 
facilitating the expansion 
of products, not only for 
ATM card, but also for 
debit card and credit card 
scheme, and services 
provided by the existing 
regional network, such as 
utilization for money 
remittance services.  
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instruments, central banks 
might facilitate the 
development of common 
used instruments under 
regional scheme for retail 
payment systems. In order to 
ensure the effectiveness of 
the initiative, joint research 
among central banks could 
be useful. 
Capital Market The study proposed the 
adoption of international 
standards for straight 
through processing in 
domestic and cross-border 
settlements, and introducing 
risk mitigating measures 
such as delivery vs. 
payments and payment vs. 
payments if they are absent 
in certain domestic markets.  
WC-PSS should work with 
the ASEAN Capital 
Market Forum (ACMF) 
and WC-Capital Market 
Development to assist in 
their respective 
implementation plans that 
might call upon WCPSS to 
help study various options 
for establishing regional 
infrastructure for capital 
market settlement.  
 
Source: the WC-PSS website, the author’s modification 
The author notices that the WC-PSS is already aware which of the different 
conditions in each of the member countries become the first priority tasks to 
consider. From the table above, the author has observed that the standardization and 
capacity building within the member states are important parts of the goals for 
narrowing the gap
573
 among the member states.
 
 They decided to adopt ISO 20022
574
 
as a standard system that will be applied for a payment system mechanism. 
1.2.3 Different Perspective between ASEAN and the EU on Payment Systems 
Development 
There is one thing that the author finds necessary to comment on, i.e. the types of 
area developments of the WC-PSS Roadmap. They have five areas of development. 
They decided to develop Trade Settlement, Money Remittance, Retail Payment 
                                                 
573
Narrowing the gap means to have a same level playing field on payment systems infrastructure in order to be 
able to communicate among national payment systems.  This can be seen that they decided to adopt IS0 20022 
for the standard of financial services of PSS. 
574
ISO 20022 is a multi-part International Standard for Financial Services Messaging, prepared by ISO Technical 
Committee TC68 Financial Services. It is a single standardization approach (methodology, process, repository) 
to be used by all financial standards initiatives. See further at http://www.iso20022.org/payments_ 
messages.page, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
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System, Capital Market Settlement, and Standardization to achieve the ASEAN 
Payment Vision which aims to foster integrated, safe and efficient payment 
settlement systems in the region that enable businesses and individuals to make or 
receive electronic payments with greater convenience.
575
 It is interesting to note that 
they have had a retail payment area for development but they did not explicitly 
mention a high value payment area (RTGS), which, from the author’s perspective, is 
also important as one of the areas for development. They did mention RTGS only as 
one of the options for supporting those five key areas of developments.
576
 
The author concludes that ASEAN has a different approach compared to the EU.  In 
the EU, they first had thoughts to establish both a high value payment and a retail 
payment area in order to integrate the financial market, but they created and 
developed a high value payment (TARGET) as a first priority to support the single 
market in the EU and to facilitate the ECB’s monetary policy transactions as well as 
support trading transaction for the EU members, then followed by designing 
TARGET2 and developing TARGET2-S (T2S) for securities settlement.
577
 
Simultaneously, they followed up to establish and develop a retail payment system, 
namely SEPA, to be integrated in entire Europe, which until now is still in the 
progress of development.
578
 In ASEAN, on the other hand, the WC-PSS has a key 
program to develop retail payment area but unfortunately not specifically as a 
program to develop a high value payment area, like the EU did.  It appears to the 
author that RTGS in ASEAN was not a priority area of development from the 
beginning, like retail payment area, but only as a supporting tool to support those 
five keys area of development. The author sees that to reach the financial market 
integration in ASEAN and to facilitate the trades and investments program, the 
development of the high value payment area is more feasible and beneficial, than the 
development of the retail payment area. 
Furthermore, the author also observes that the Trade and Capital Market area had 
already been explicitly stated and covered in the AEC Blueprint and repeated by the 
WC-PSS and it became an area of development, which, according to the author, 
should not be the main project areas for the WC-PSS to develop. Moreover, the 
author identifies that these two areas, especially Capital Market area, should be the 
main task of the Working Committee on the Capital Market Development (WC-
                                                 
575
See ASEAN WC-PSS website at: http://www.aseanwcpss.org/aseanwcpss/Documents/WCPSS%20Studies% 
20 Executive%20Summary.pdf, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
576
See Table 3 in chapter 4 sub chapter 1.2.2. 
577
See chapter 2 sub chapter 2.  See further also the overview of TARGET2-S (T2S) at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/about/about/html/index.en.html, last accessed on January 15, 2015.  The 
T2S project was launched in 2008 and the platform is scheduled to start operations in 2015.  T2S will not be 
discussed further. 
578
See further SEPA, at https://www.ecb.Europa.eu/paym/sepa/about/html/index.en.html, last accessed on 
January 28, 2015. 
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CMD) project. Additionally, the author thinks that a high value payment system area 
(RTGS) should become a primary priority project to establish and develop in order to 
support the Trade and Capital Market that have already been stated in the AEC 
Blueprint. 
The author is not in line with the WC-PSS’s policy, regarding the High Value 
payment system area. The author thinks that it should be taken into consideration the 
high value payment system as a priority project, because indirectly it will provide the 
infrastructure/instrument for regional settlement of trade, capital market and retail 
payments as well. They should be more concerned and focused on the development 
of payment system area instead of other areas. 
When looking at the EU’s experiences, from the beginning, the EU had already 
established TARGET (High Value Payment Mechanism/RTGS) in 1999 as a primary 
project to support the monetary policy to integrate the financial market within the EU 
members.
579
  Then, they consecutively followed up by developing retail payment 
(creating SEPA), which was enactment in 2008 and capital market settlement 
(creating TARGET2-Securities (T2S), which was enactment in 2014)
580
. With regard 
to TARGET, since the beginning of its operation in 1999, it has emerged as the 
major payment system instrument, settling on a yearly basis payment for more than 
10 times the total GDP or the EU countries.
581
  As mentioned earlier, TARGET itself 
was chosen not based on the market or business need, but it was based on the policy 
makers which is set forth in the Treaty. It can be seen in Table 4 that the volume of 
transactions varies among the EU members at that time.  Simonetta Rosati and 
Stefania Secola had analysed on Cross-Border TARGET flows in 2000, the first year 
after its commencement.
582
 (See table 4). 
 
                                                 
579
See chapter 2 sub chapter 2. 
580
These two instruments started few years after TARGET.  SEPA is a project to harmonize and to make and 
process retail payments in euro. The goal is to make payments in Euro and across Europe as fast, safe and 
efficient as national payments. There were two new SEPA instruments, introduced in 2008 (SEPA credit 
transfer) and 2009 (SEPA direct debit) and implemented in 2014. After 15 years of work (since 1999), the Single 
Euro Payments Area (SEPA) has been successfully implemented for credit transfers and direct debits in the Euro 
area. See further at http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/paym/ retpaym/paymint/html/index.en.html, and see the ECB 
Press Release related to SEPA at http://www.ecb.Europa. eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140801.en.html, last 
accessed on September 16, 2014. The T2S (TARGET2-Securities) is a new European securities settlement 
engine, developed by the ECB from TARGET and TARGET2, which aims to offer centralized Delivery-versus-
Payment (DvP) settlement in central bank funds across all European securities markets.  This platform is 
scheduled to start operations in 2015.  See further at https://www.ecb.Europa.eu/paym/pdf/Sibos_2013_T2S.pdf 
??ae8222de0aaac5f95d4631b6682aac39, last accessed on January 28, 2015. Both SEPA and T2S will not be 
elaborated in this dissertation because the focus of this dissertation is on a high value payment system settlement. 
581
Simonetta Rosati and Stefania Secola, “Explaining Cross-Border Large-Value Payment Flows – Evidence 
From TARGET and EURO 1 Data”, ECB, Working Paper Series No.443/February 2005, pp.5 and 10. 
582
Ibid, pp.10. 




EU Countries Key Figures 
Year : 2000 Cross-border TARGET flows 
Country EUR Billions Share in % EU  
Austria    2,594 2.4% 
Belgium    9,080 8.4% 
Germany 28,306 26.3% 
Denmark   1,432 1.3% 
Spain   4,096 3.8% 
Finland    1,533 1.4% 
France 15,352 14.3% 
UK 19,189  17.8% 
Greece      205      0.2% 
Ireland    1,406 1.3% 
Italy    9,308 8.6% 
Luxemburg    2,676 2.5% 
The Netherlands    9,859 9.2% 
Portugal        893 0.8% 
SE    1,718 1.6% 
total    107,647 100% 
Source: ECB- Simonetta Rosati and Stefania Secola – modified by author 
The table above shows that the cross-border payment flows vary for every member.  
It shows, for example, that Germany contributed the largest share i.e. 26,3% 
(€28,306 billions) followed by the UK and France i.e. 17.8% (€19,189 billions) and 
14.3% (€15,352 billions) respectively. The smallest shares belong to Greece, 
followed by Portugal and Ireland i.e. 0.2% (€205 billions), 0.8% (€893 billions), and 
1.3% (€1,406 billions) respectively.  In general, we can see that the leading 
economies (Germany, UK, and France) played an important role in term of financial 
markets. In particular, the UK shows an atypical condition, given the fact that it is a 
non-Euro area member state but could become a significant player at the EU level.  
In contrast, Italy, which is considered as one of the big EU countries, shows 
difference in condition, which is contradictive to its real economy, it has a share of 
8.6% (€9,308 billions), and is, thus, smaller than the Netherlands which has a share 
of 9.2% (€9,859 billions).  It can be concluded that at that time, TARGET was not 
created based on the demand of the market but because of the interest of the policy 
makers, to integrate the Euro market by creating a single market in the EU. 
On the other hand, in order to see and compare the trade flows in ASEAN, the author 
also provides the below table, which depicts the export import flow transactions of 
Indonesia compared to other ASEAN countries as an example.  
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Table 5  
Export Import Indonesia with other ASEAN Countries 
Jan Feb Mar Apr Mei Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
ASEAN 3.320.922   3.123.135   3.514.377   3.048.981   3.407.997   3.287.786   3.269.976   3.043.672   3.174.386   3.281.083   3.217.676   3.647.725   
Brunei Darussalam 4.632            6.038            11.067         6.791            8.488            5.638            6.041            5.543            6.500            12.014         7.293            8.460            
Filipina 319.980       278.739       346.155       281.008       310.134       299.292       352.475       307.672       308.777       347.335       332.267       310.698       
Kamboja 30.744         25.111         21.105         24.013         26.766         25.465         22.730         26.748         33.480         28.344         30.075         22.505         
Laos 169               347               526               446               469               668               729               283               406               430               223               391               
Malaysia 944.861       855.190       839.719       807.128       877.100       874.492       857.286       908.201       881.213       950.659       834.101       821.737       
Myanmar 100.750       43.251         31.675         33.909         62.643         42.629         32.883         36.547         46.196         42.774         28.765         74.475         
Singapura 1.239.344   1.236.120   1.533.776   1.079.894   1.237.080   1.369.660   1.231.262   1.165.675   1.123.519   1.205.896   1.299.349   1.716.482   
Thailand 520.717       520.576       533.387       561.500       523.735       517.992       558.701       437.344       562.236       476.421       435.778       459.058       
Vietnam 159.727       157.764       196.966       254.292       361.583       151.949       207.869       155.660       212.058       217.210       249.826       233.917       
Jan Feb Mar Apr Mei Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
ASEAN 4.837.388   4.685.934   4.286.837   4.625.287   4.945.752   4.491.503   5.819.856   4.250.771   4.672.565   4.220.780   4.428.987   4.438.098   
Brunei Darussalam 149.730       1.350            116               135.173       90                  19                  54                  68.389         130.640       119.322       866               3                    
Filipina 72.336         72.227         71.461         60.562         64.461         59.556         65.647         72.148         61.230         69.607         53.549         52.571         
Kamboja 304               732               973               2.090            730               1.207            3.764            601               2.250            1.730            1.222            2.148            
Laos 781               1.075            19                  1.175            24                  1.548            1                    513               507               625               1.267            7                    
Malaysia 982.889       1.060.199   1.007.699   1.151.842   1.253.997   1.169.700   1.817.072   1.110.407   1.096.762   882.279       1.218.865   1.267.752   
Myanmar 1.662            3.777            5.434            13.803         10.616         6.510            10.375         6.799            2.690            2.776            953               7.603            
Singapura 2.603.734   2.350.381   1.996.696   2.023.143   2.285.264   2.144.691   2.631.403   2.091.770   2.241.324   2.035.500   2.138.156   2.252.726   
Thailand 835.318       983.678       968.519       1.024.241   1.118.324   893.828       1.016.441   750.885       848.399       875.610       742.800       665.334       
Vietnam 190.634       212.516       235.921       213.258       212.246       214.444       275.099       149.259       288.762       233.332       271.309       189.952       
2013
2013
Export (in thousand USD)
Import (in thousand USD)
TABEL EXPORT IMPORT INDONESIA WITH OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES
 
The table shows that the amount of transactions among the ASEAN members vary as 
well. It is illustrated that the biggest portion of trading is with Singapore and then 
followed by Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. From these four countries, the 
average export import is above USD 200 million, while the other countries are under 
USD 100 million. By using this table, the author also wants to show that this data can 
be used as an approach to envisage the use of a cross-border payment system 
(RTGS) for ASEAN. By monitoring the data of cross-border transactions, the central 
banks can use that same data in the formulation of their policies in the context of 
capital flows management. The development of such an integrated system can also 
be useful in promoting the creation of a financial market within ASEAN. In the 
opinion of the author, the development of the integrated system, which is to facilitate 
trading transactions (such as the export-import transactions and the investment 
transactions among the ASEAN members) should become a priority because it will 
be way more beneficial for ASEAN compared to developing other payment systems.  
By pointing to these figures, the author also wants to highlight that the background 
and the implementation of TARGET was derived from the EMI’s main tasks. In the 
other words, it is a top-down policy (driven by policy makers) to support and 
strengthen the financial market integration within the EU by providing a faster, safer, 
and easier cashless Euro payment throughout Europe. So, by observing the similarity 
of the variation in the amount of transactions above, the author thinks that the 
establishment of an integrated high value payment system (RTGS) can be also a top-
down policy and should be considered as a priority project that will support and 
strengthen the financial market integration in order to attain the objectives of AEC 
2015. 
   
158 
 
From these perspectives, the author believes that technically and economically the 
establishment and development of an RTGS area should become a priority compared 
to other areas, because such plan is more feasible, applicable, relevant and more 
beneficial to be implemented in the near future. The other objective is to support the 
integration of financial markets in ASEAN; not to mention its ease and effectiveness.  
Why it is easier and beneficial? The author’s argument for choosing the RTGS as an 
integrated payment system transactions
583
 is because it is more feasible and 
beneficial, hence, its implementation should be prioritized to support the purpose of 
the financial market and economy integration in ASEAN. The following are: 
 Firstly, the RTGS is a worldwide payment system and is used in most 
countries for large-value payments
584
 including by the ASEAN member 
states, most of which already have the RTGS system, so the infrastructure 
itself already exists.
585
 They need to connect the RTGS of the respective 
members to communicate with each other, like the EU has already done 
with TARGET, but first of course they should have the same (standardized) 
platform by creating a design strategy and methodology for the integrated 
payment system. Picture 2 below provides the interlinking system that the 
author proposes to be implemented on the RTGS integration initiative for 
ASEAN. The name proposed for such an RTGS integrated payment system 
is ASEAN – Automated RTGS Transfer System (ASEAN-ARTS). The 
author also proposes that this interlinking should be discussed further by the 
working committee, which consists of technical and legal experts to 











                                                 
583
See the history of the EU establishing TARGET,  in Chapter 2 sub chapter 1 and 2. 
584
See World Bank, “Payment Systems Worldwide: A Snapshot”, World Bank Group, Financial Infrastructure 
Series, Payment Systems Development Groups, 2011, pp.14-15. See also, Morten L. Bech and Bart Hobijn, 
“Technology Diffusion within Central Banking: The Case of Real-Time Gross Settlement”, International 
Journal of Central Banking Vol. 3 No. 3, September 2007, pp.147. See Masashi Nakajima, Opcit. 
585
The existing infrastructures are different for each RTGS in ASEAN, depending on the characteristics of each 
country, but it could be re-designed to fit the ASEAN characteristics.  See the experience of the EU in Chapter 2 
sub chapter 2.2. Myanmar has not used the RTGS yet. 




Proposed Interlinking System for ASEAN-ARTS 
 
source: the author, adapted from SWIFT. 
 Secondly, the RTGS system has an international common standard and 
procedures to be complied with, based on a rule and procedure published by 
the BIS, which is known as the Principle of Financial Market Infrastructure 
(PFMI) and/or the Core Principles – Systemically Important Payment 
System (CP-SIPS).
586
 These international common standards and 
procedures will make the interlinking among the ASEAN member states 
RTGS system easier, because they refer to the same standard scheme 
system.   
 Thirdly, by using an integrated-RTGS, besides supporting the financial 
market integration and facilitating trade transactions and investments, the 
central bankers will be able to monitor every type of transactions like seeing 
through a magnifying glass, so that it can be used to oversee, to support the 
central bank’s policy in the context of capital flow management, and 
maintain monetary and financial stability of respective NCBs.
587
 
 Fourthly, this integrated RTGS can be further developed not only for trade 
transactions and settlements, but also to support the capital market or 
securities settlement (for payment vs payment and delivery vs payment, as 
stated in the capital market area of WC-PSS roadmap).
588
 
 Last but not least, since  the central banks are settlement agents and to meet 
the business needs for cross-border transactions, the creation of ASEAN – 
                                                 
586
See Chapter 1 sub chapter 2.3 and 2.4. 
587Andrew Dent and Will Dison, “Bank of England’s Real-Time Gross Settlement Infrastructure”, Bank of 
England, Quarterly Bulletin – Q3, 2012, pp.234.  See further at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb120304.pdf, last accessed on January 28, 2015.  See also Central 
Bank of Kenya Website, “Frequently Asked Questions :RTGS – KEPPS”, at https://www.centralbank.go.ke/ 
index.php/kenya-payments-and-settlements, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
588
The EU has developed TARGET into TARGET2 and still in progress for TARGET-2S for securities 
settlement. See foot note in Chapter 4 sub chapter 1.2.3. 
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Automated RTGS Transfer System (ASEAN-ARTS)
589
 is relevant. Since it 
is categorized as CP-SIPS, it needs a proper legal framework which directly 
applicable for the ASEAN member states.  
The author concludes that the recommended high value payment system is more 
feasible, relevant, and practical. Therefore, it should be part of key areas of 
development and be prioritized to be implemented in the near future rather than a 
retail payment system area (such as a debit or credit card payment) or a capital 
market area.
590
 Retail payment systems, such as a card payment (debit or credit card), 
are dealt with between at least four parties (private companies), i.e., the electronic 
payment instruments players such as banks (the issuing bank and the acquiring 
bank)
591
, merchants, telecommunication providers, and other private companies like 
Visa, Master card, Diners and Amex (network providers).  These last companies play 
a big role in the retail payment industry and are also business profit oriented. 
Considering many players that have to be dealt with, the author thinks that it will be 
more difficult and more time will be needed for the central banks to implement the 
integrated retail payment systems in the near future than the high value payment 
systems, because each of the parties will have their own interests. 
Moreover, with regard to the capital market area, for developing and implementing 
in Indonesia as an example, Bank Indonesia (BI) as a member of WC-PSS should 
make a cooperation and coordination with other authorities. In this area, BI has no 
authority to regulate and control that area/industry although it is also part of BI 
concern regarding the securities settlement. Such an area is under another authority: 
the Capital Market Supervisory Agency, under the ministry of finance.
592
  Thus, BI 
must work together with other related institutions like the Financial Services 
Authority, which means, that it needs more bureaucracy (inter-department) and of 
course this will be time consuming. Additionally, the availability and utilization of 
capital market instruments in Indonesian is very limited compared to those in other 
countries and is not ready yet to be integrated.
593
 Furthermore, the author observes 
that the capital market area is not the main area of the WC-PSS since there is an 
independent working committee set up by the ASEAN Capital Market Forum 
(ACMF), namely the Working Committee on Capital Markets Development (WC-
                                                 
589
The abbreviation of ASEAN-ARTS is a creation of the author. 
590
When we learn from the EU, the retail payment system integration is implemented later, which is almost a 
decade from the commencement of high value payment system (TARGET was in 1999) i.e. implemented and 
migrated to SEPA instrument since 2008 until 2016.  See further at https://www.ecb.Europa.eu/paym/sepa/about/ 
html/index.en.html, last accessed on January 28, 2015. The integrated securities settlement is still in progress as 
well. 
591
The issuing and acquiring card are usually, but not always, banks. 
592
Now, since 2014, the capital market and banking industry are under the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) or 
Financial Service Authority (FSA). 
593BAPEPAM, “Indonesian Capital Market Master Plan 2005 - 2009”, Capital Market Supervisory Agency, 
Ministry of Financial of the Republic of Indonesia, 2005, pp.37-38. 





 and this means that there is a possibility for an overlap between these two 
committees. 
Besides, it also seems to the author that the establishment and the development of a 
retail payment system area and a capital market area will take a longer period of time 
than the time needed for the author’s proposal (high value payment system area).  
For these two areas, especially for the capital market area, in Indonesia, for example, 
the payment system authority (the Central Bank of Indonesia) should firstly co-
ordinate internally with other national authorities (other related ministry 
departments) before working further with other ASEAN’s central banks.  Therefore, 
it would be reasonable and wise to put the high value payment system (the creation 
of ASEAN-ARTS) as a priority and to be a part of key areas of developments in the 
WC-PSS roadmap. 
Pertaining to the structure body of ASEAN-ARTS or other key areas of 
development, the author agrees that ASEAN does not have to adopt the whole or 
detailed methods like the EU when they created TARGET or SEPA with its all 
institutional bodies. This is because ASEAN will not, or at least not in the near 
future, become a region with full economic and monetary integration like the EU.  
So, the structure body itself, at first, does not have to be supranational. ASEAN may 
set up with a working committee or an institute responsible for ASEAN-ARTS’ 
development. Regarding the monetary integration, some scholars are optimistic that 
ASEAN will move to further deepen monetary integration.
595
 The author focuses on 
how ASEAN should make a structured legal framework for ASEAN-ARTS, like 
rules and procedures and how to implement it. Additionally, the author realizes that 
this initiative should consider the common objectives with different timelines and 
milestones for each country depending on its readiness and also take into account the 
economic and technical development gaps among the ASEAN member states. 
The author also identifies several key issues that should be taken into consideration 
by ASEAN regarding this proposal. Besides the key issues, the legal framework of 
such proposal is also important to be aware of.  So, the next sub chapter will discuss 
the legal framework and key issues which may arise in creating and developing this 
High Value Payment System (ASEAN-ARTS). 
                                                 
594See “Regional Cooperation in Finance”, Opcit. 
595
Pradumna B. Rana, “The next steps in ASEAN+3 monetary integration”, 27 May 2012, at http://www.voxeu. 
org/article/next-steps-asean3-monetary-integration, last accessed on January 28, 2015.  Pradumna Bickram Rana, 
Wai-Mun Chia and Yothin Jinjarak, “Monetary integration in ASEAN+3: A perception survey of opinion 
leaders”, Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, 16 November 2011, see further at http://web. 
waseda.jp/gsaps/eaui/educational_program/PDF_2/NTU_CHIA%20Wai%20Mun_Reading1_Monetary%20Inte
gration%20in%20ASEAN+3A%20Perception%20Survey%20of%20Opinion%20Leaders.pdf, last accessed on 
January 28, 2015. 
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1.3 Legal Basis of ASEAN-ARTS Initiative 
As we all already know, this initiative cannot be done with a flick of our fingers, but 
the author believes that this initiative is more feasible and workable, particularly since the 
system itself is owned and operated by central banks.  In preparing this proposal we should 
also see and consider the key issues that may arise in developing the ASEAN-ARTS. 
1.3.1 The Proposal of Integrated RTGS System for ASEAN (ASEAN-ARTS) 
The author proposes the integration of the RTGS system (ASEAN-ARTS) by means 
of interlinking all national RTGS of the ASEAN member states.
596
 It is feasible, 
according to the author, especially for a short period of preparation in order to face 
the AEC 2015. The author recommends that this system will be managed by the 
ASEAN WC-PSS and supported by technical and legal working groups, which will 
be developing the technical and legal architectures.  
In order to “interlink” the RTGS system, respective national RTGS systems of AMS 
should ensure their particular characteristics to comply with the common procedures, 
and ensure compatibility of member states national RTGS system with international 
open communication standards
597
, determined by WC-PSS or created by them in 
order to be able to exchange data securely and reliably and also allow payment 
orders to be transmitted from one system to another. To some degree, ASEAN may 
adopt the TARGET interlinking system user requirements
598
, which provide the 
requirements for the implementation of the interlinking system. ASEAN might adopt 
the same design strategy as TARGET, such as the user requirement references and 
building the system on decentralized individual RTGS based on the existing 
infrastructure.  ASEAN might also adopt the methodology for exchanging 
information such as classification of messages and free format messages. 
In principle, the ASEAN-ARTS would be a decentralized system performed by all 
National Central Bank of AMS.  The system should be irrevocable and final.  It 
should have a unique identifier type of transaction to allow message identification 
and facilitate error handling. The procedures used for communication among 
interlinking components should include features safeguarding against hazards to 
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. The system must have a contingency 
plan in the event of a disruption of the network and have security features, which 
provide a certain level security that must be defined for the system as a whole. So, 
the main goals of the ASEAN-ARTS initiative are to achieve a fast transaction and 
secure communication between these components and to support the economic 
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This interlinking is inspired from TARGET of the EU. 
597
The latest system is complied with the ISO 20022 and using swift format. 
598See further  ECB, “TARGET Interlinking Specification”, ECB, November 2001 Edition, June 2002. 
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integration by enabling businesses and individuals to make or receive electronic 
payments with greater convenience. Moreover, at the big picture, the ultimate goal is 
to support and strengthen the financial markets and to facilitate trade transactions and 
investment in order to meet the objectives of  the AEC 2015. 
1.3.2 ASEAN Legal Instruments: Hard Law vs. Soft Law 
One of the purposes of ASEAN is to create a single market with effective facilitation 
of trade and investment.
599
 It is obvious that the ASEAN Leaders have already 
considered the need of economic integration in order to strengthen the economy 
region and to make the business more efficient and effective. One of the 
characteristics of economic integration is free flow of goods, services and 
investment. This free flow requires legislation through technical regulations.
600
  
ASEAN needs legislation in order to ensure legal certainty among the member states. 
In order for members to comply with standardization, it needs a legal instrument to 
legally bind them. 
Interestingly, ASEAN has a unique characteristic which is regarded as a lack of 
binding arrangements because reliance on informal meeting and consensus 
mechanism. The way to achieve an agreement is more by way of musyawarah and 
mufakat (negotiation for consensus)
601
 rather than by court/formal decision.   
The former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, reaffirmed that: 
“ASEAN had made progress in an Asian manner, not through rules and 
regulations, but through musyawarah and consensus. Most important, 
ASEAN countries have made a habit of working together and of 
consulting each other over common problems”.602   
ASEAN has improved rapidly by having a lot of legal instruments explicitly stated in 
the ASEAN Charter, namely declarations, agreements, conventions, concords and 
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See Article 1(5) of the ASEAN Charter. 
600
This is why the EU has Treaties, Statute and Directive to provide a legal certainty for its member states. 
601Based on Koichi Kawamura´s paper, “Consensus and Democracy in Indonesia: Musyawarah-Mufakat 
Revisited”, Institute of Developing Economies, Discussion Paper no.308, 2011.  Musyawarah dan Mufakat is 
(deliberation and consensus) are a traditional decision‐making rule in Indonesia which has often been observed 
in village meetings.  This process is in order to achieve mutual agreement or to solve the problem in order to 
make decisions together in the settlement or solution of the problem. On the other hand, this system of 
musyawarah‐mufakat decreases political efficiency in the sense that it takes a long time to deliberate drafted 
laws in the parliament.  See further at http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/1091/1/ARRIDE_Discussion_ 
No.308_kawamura.pdf, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
602See Lee Kwan Yew, “Opening Address in Joint Communiqué Of The Fifteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
Singapore, 14-16 June 1982, see at: http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-securitycommunity 
/item/joint-communique-of-the-fifteenth-asean-ministerial-meeting-singapore-14-16-june-1982, last accessed on 
January 28, 2015. 





 Moreover, other legal terms have also been used besides those stated in 
the Charter, such as Joint Communique, MoU, memorandum of cooperation and 
protocol. 
Practically, ASEAN has a lot of arrangements regulated by Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), multilateral and/or bilateral agreements. This can be seen in 
the arrangements on FTA, ASEAN 3+ and ASEAN Single Window.  
Like other projects, the ASEAN-ARTS initiative will of course need a sound legal 
basis in order to have a rule of law. But, the author observes that to create this 
initiative by using MoU is ambiguous and confusing.
604
 The author proposes to use a 
treaty to provide legal certainty to this project and embrace all instruments binding at 
international law.
605
 ASEAN seems to seldom create a treaty for new policy/project 
or arrangements.
606
 In addition, the author observes that they have used many terms 
of legal instruments, which may cause harm to them and create confusion.
607
 
According to Article 52(1) of the ASEAN Charter, it stated that all treaties, 
conventions, concords, declarations, protocols and other ASEAN instruments which 
have been used before shall continue to be valid. It seems to the author that ASEAN 
should  homogenize its legal instrument become a structured legislation in order to 
simplify and to ease the member states to implement it in the future. 
Back to the economic integration and the single market where there will be no 
barriers within the ASEAN member states upon the commencement of AEC in 2015, 
the need for payment services, such as the ASEAN-ARTS initiative and retail 
payment are essential for the creation and development of the internal market in 
ASEAN so as to ensure smooth and free movement of goods, services and capital or 
investment. The need for smooth, fast and safe operation of the single market in 
payment services is also crucial because it deals with financial risks and it needs 
legal certainty that has a legally binding effect to the parties. Therefore, ASEAN 
urges to establish a legal basis for payment services at the community level, to ensure 
a level playing field for all payment systems, for all the ASEAN member states to 
comply with. The lessons learned from the EU have provided treaties and directives 
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See Article 2(1) of the ASEAN Charter. 
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See United Nations Website, “Definition of key terms used in the UN Treaty Collection”, at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml#memoranda, and see The 
Euclid Treaty Website, “Understanding the Difference between MoU and Treaty”, at 
http://www.euclidtreaty.org/treaties-and-mous/, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
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Ibid., United Nations Website. 
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ASEAN from its commencement until now, only have two treaties (using term `treaty´) i.e. Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (1976) and Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (1995).  Others are using 
Concord, Charter, Declaration, and Convention which make confusing. 
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They have lots of terms of legal instruments according to Article 52 (1) the Charter: treaties, conventions, 
agreements, concords, declarations, protocols and other ASEAN instruments, such as, plan and MoU.   
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to govern that condition.
608
  Moreover, the EU even puts tasks to the ESCB, the ECB 
and the NCB to promote the smoothing of a payment system in the form of treaty 
and statute as the legal umbrella in this regard.
609
 All of these regulations are legally 
binding. 
When looking at ASEAN, they make legal instrument for attaining its aims, which 
can be categorized into two types of legal instruments. The first one is known as the 
hard law, which has a direct binding effect such as charter, agreement, protocol, 
convention and treaty. The second one is called the soft law, which is known as a 
non-binding instrument e.g. declaration and MoU,
610
 but under the moral force the 
ASEAN member states should comply with it.  
The author is inspired by the insights of Jakob de Haan, et al., in relation to the use 
of instrument of law when they analysed the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) from 
the political economy perspective, focusing on the choice for soft law and drawing 
inferences from characteristics of successful fiscal rules at the state level in the 
US.
611
 The reasons for using soft law are as follows:
612
  
“First, soft law reduces negotiating costs which may make agreement 
possible. Secondly, soft law may reduce sovereignty costs, which 
states can limit the cost through arrangement that are non-binding or 
imprecise or that do not delegate extensive powers. Thirdly, in case of 
considerable “uncertainty”, soft law may be the most appropriate 
method of legislation. Lastly, soft law is a tool of compromise which 
provides flexibility in implementation.” 
The author agrees with their opinion that it is sometimes soft law, known as a 
compromising instrument of law because its flexibility in implementation. Soft law 
instruments are also usually considered as a potential stepping-stone for transforming 
into hard law in the forthcoming period.
613
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See Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on 
cross-border payments in the community and Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market. 
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See Article 105(2) TEC (was amended by Article 127(2) (TFEU)) and Article 22 of the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. 
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United Nations Website, Opcit.  The term of Declaration according to UN, are not always legally binding. 
611J. de Haan, H. Berger and D. Jansen, “The End of the Stability and Growth Pact?”,  De Nederlandsche Bank 




For example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) which was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948, and after eighteen years later, in 1966 had been drafted into two treaties by the 
representatives of the governments sitting down together in the UN and agreed on making the treaties i.e. the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  Since then, they become legally binding by countries that agreed to become 
parties to them. 
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The author observes that ASEAN in these circumstances and based on its 
characteristics, seem to prefer using soft law at the beginning because it is easier to 
reach a mutual understanding and can be reassessed over time, but particularly, 
because it has no strong legal impact. It had been attested from the step of ASEAN 
Declaration known as Bangkok Declaration in 1967 that the ASEAN Leaders 
affirmed their commitments to cooperate for regional interests and forty years later, 
in 2007, some issues have been adopted in the ASEAN Charter and became a legally 
binding instrument. The author argues that ASEAN is more comfortable using soft 
law than hard law. It seems to the author that soft law is more dynamic for the 
ASEAN Leaders in a sense that it can still be adjusted and reassessed before it is 
turned into a hard law, but this thought might be more suitable for the problems 
related to politics in that era where “informal resolution” was best fit for such 
situation at that time.  But later, soft law did not help them when disputes arise and 
they were seeking for international fora to settle their dispute. 
For almost three decades after its establishment, ASEAN experienced increasing 
economic cooperation through the creation of the Framework Agreement on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation 1992 which is also considered as an 




“Any differences between the member states concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Agreement or any arrangements arising therefrom 
shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties. Whenever 
necessary, an appropriate body shall be designated for the settlement of 
disputes”.  
 
This Article was expressively broadened by a Protocol on Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism in 1996, which was then perfected by the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism of 2004
615
 (the “Vientiane Protocol”). From this 
perspective, the author observes that the necessity of legal certainty becomes one of 
the considerations of ASEAN and indeed, the author agrees that it is urgently 
required for this cooperation. One of ASEAN’s aims at first was to accelerate the 
economic growth and to promote regional peace and stability, as stated on the 
Bangkok Declaration. It definitely did not mention any mechanism to achieve this 
aim.  However, after almost three decades, ASEAN has achieved the ability to 
maintain peace and security in the region and realized that it is about time to 
concentrate on domestic issues and put more effort into economic development, so 
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See further at http://www.asean.org/news/item/framework-agreement-on-enhancing-asean-economic-
cooperation-singapore-28-january-1992, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
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See further at http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-protocol-on-enhanced-dispute-settlement-mechanism, 
last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
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the economic sector must be prioritized. ASEAN’s success in handling politics and 
security disputes must be followed in the economic sector, but this sector, according 
to the author, should be treated in a different manner and with stronger legal 
framework. To support and promote economic development in ASEAN, it is really 
crucial to have a sound legal basis in order to provide legal certainty by creating a 
binding dispute settlement mechanism as the instrument to resolve any legal conflict, 
which may arise from economic cooperation. ASEAN needs a legal dispute 
instrument covering all the legal problems, especially in economic matters. Then, 
this was followed by the commitment of the ASEAN Senior Law Official Meeting 
(ASLOM) in 2004. This was stated in point 15 of the Joint Press Statement of the 9
th
 




“The 9th ASLOM discussed and agreed that there can be continuing 
exchange of views and experiences between ASEAN Member Countries on 
the harmonization of intellectual property rights, trade laws, legal 
cooperation in alternative dispute resolutions such as conciliation and 
mediation and on ways to streamline the procedures for the legalization of 
documents.”   
In this commitment, the author observes that the alternative dispute resolutions that 
they proposed still put emphasis on using of conciliation and mediation, which 
according to the author are less enforceable.
617
 However, it demonstrates that the 
requirements of a legally binding approach are increasing, but again, it needs full 
support and commitment from all elements of every ASEAN member states, 
especially the leaders of ASEAN. The question is, why is it crucially needed? 
Because the author notes that the member states are still reluctant to use the DSM 
and prefer going to other fora to seek justice in solving their problem with a definite 
decision, not merely a win-win solution.
618
 The author observes that in some cases, 
the member states need a certain and binding decision from an impartial decision 
maker which can be enforced, so that both parties must comply with the decision, 
even if one party will lose its rights – a legal certainty which apparently they would 
not encounter in their own dispute settlement mechanism. It seems to the author that 
ASEAN would appear less respectable by other countries outside its region for not 
trusting its own dispute settlement mechanism. 
                                                 
616
See further at http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/joint-press-state 
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on January 28, 2015. 
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This will be further analyzed by the author on the next sub chapter related to alternative dispute resolution 
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See chapter 3 sub chapter 2.7. 
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Since the enactment of the ASEAN Charter and towards the AEC 2015, expediting 
the process of integrating hard law in its legislation becomes the critical stepping 
point for the ASEAN member states. Why? There are some issues according to the 
author, with regard to the need for hard law, such as: 
 The creation of a single market will give people the freedom with no 
frontier to trade goods, invest their money and to enjoy it in conditions of 
security and justice accessible to all, and accordingly, they also will need the 
rules of law to carry out and to protect their activities. Thus, they need 
policies and laws designed to unify the diverse national interests; they need 
a law that governs and binds them and can be accepted and obeyed by all 
member states. By having a unified and legal binding regulation in the 
regional level and transposed into standardized national regulations, it will 
make the single market program easier to implement in ASEAN and 
consequently will stimulate economic growth. 
 Integration is associated with international relations, thus entails 
standardization, uniformity or harmonization, sanctions and enforcement, 
because many participants are involved from different nations and different 
legal systems. 
 The ASEAN Charter has already provided the settlement of dispute 
clauses.
619
 The author argues that ASEAN has already taken a risk by 
setting out the dispute settlement clauses in the Charter in order to 
strengthen the authority of the organization beyond the national interests, 
although there was still lack of implementation in using these dispute 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, these articles are expected to become a starting 
point to create more legally binding instruments that can enforce judgment 
efficiently and effectively. 
Regarding the ASEAN Charter, on the one hand, the Charter has already made its 
position by providing a legal personality and the settlement of disputes clauses, 
which encourage establishing hard law as legal instrument. On the other hand, the 
ASEAN Charter still provided the principles of settling the dispute through dialogue, 
consultation, negotiation and mediation, which refers to soft law. Some scholars like 
Shaffer and Pollack support the legal and political science scholars’ view that the 
interaction between hard and soft law can be complementary.
620
 They state that these 
scholars contend that hard and soft law mechanisms can build upon each other in two 
                                                 
619
See Chapter VIII of the ASEAN Charter. 
620Gregory Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, “Hard and Soft Law: What Have We Learned?”, Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 12-17, April 23, 2012, Cambridge University Press, 2012, see also further at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044800 last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
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primary ways: (1) non-binding soft law can lead the way to binding hard law, and (2) 
binding hard law can subsequently be elaborated through soft-law instruments.
621
 
The author to some extent supports this theory and it seems to match with ASEAN’s 
characteristics. However, with regard to legal certainty and protection to parties, such 
as in trading and payment transactions arrangement, the author prefers using hard 
law instead of a combination of the two.  
Looking at the European Union, they also have some experiences using soft and hard 
law for its policy. Some scholars investigated the EU Fiscal policy coordination as an 
example in which the EU use both soft and hard law together to achieve maximum 
effectiveness, known as hybridity.
622
 This system has been tried to face the difficulty 
and potentially contradictory imperatives, but has failed to work as originally hoped 
because the soft law could not prevent this development and the Union’s inability to 
deploy the hard law sanctions has forced the EU to reconsider the original design.
623
 
The author argues that learning from the EU experience, ASEAN should be wise and 
aware that using soft law or hybrid law is not recommended. The hard law is one that 
provides legal certainty. The author observes that the Charter should be reformed by 
restructuring the functions of the ASEAN policies and bodies to provide more 
support for the necessity of ASEAN to face the AEC 2015, especially in providing 
legal certainty in case of a legal dispute settlement. Woon concludes that in relation 
to this, is the creation of a formal system for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
the cornerstone of the dispute settlement regime of ASEAN is the Charter.
624
   
1.3.3 The Role of Public and Private International Law and Regional judgment for 
ASEAN-ARTS 
Since the establishment of the ASEAN-ARTS is related to the interactions among the 
legal systems and foreign elements, private international law will be used to address 
legal problems. It will deal with problems that may arise when transactions contain 
or involve a foreign element. Then the conflict of law rules and the rule of 
international jurisdiction will be used to ensure obedience to criterion set by an 
authority of the community and to safeguard their interests by averting any option to 
laws that may defeat community goals.   
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622David M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell, and Mark Nance, “Soft Law, Hard Law, and European Integration: Toward 
a Theory of Hybridity”, Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1002, November 2005. See also 
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It is obvious that in an economic integration there is an economic community of a 
region that cannot merely function based on a substantive rule. There will be a need 
for rules and procedures to deal with issues, which may arise in cross-border 
transactions. For this purpose, the ASEAN Community should develop rules in order 
to determine the applicable law and to determine which court has jurisdiction. Prof. 
M.H. ten Wolde and Henckel observe that private international law (PIL) seeks to 
regulate problems arising from the confluence of (national) legal systems.
625
 The 
efficient and equitable regulation of the judicial matters, complicated by legal 
diversity, is the primary purpose of PIL.
626
 
To get a better understanding of the origins of PIL, the private international law 
emerged and existed as early as the fourth century B.C., when the Greek city-states 
came into their prime and trade was active in the eastern Mediterranean.
627
 Some 
scholars also claimed that PIL was invented as a mechanism for the reconciliation of 
higher-level natural law with the existence of diverse laws in different Italian city-
states,
628
 and developed through its application to similar structural legal problems in 
various states, including France, the Netherlands, and Germany.
629
 Mills indicated 
that the early development of ideas of private international law was traced to with 
Roman law.
630
 It was around the time of the Italian renaissance, when there were 
international trade and commerce between European city-states and with the Middle 
East, which led to an increase in disputes with significant foreign elements.
631
 He 
noted that the first idea of private international law was probably the statutist 
approach which has two basic ideas, i.e. the idea of personal law, which is associated 
with individuals by virtue of their identity and the idea of local law, which is 
associated with a particular territory or region.
632
 By adopting a division between 
personal and territorial laws, the statutist approach followed and reflected the 
developing complexity of the political, social and economic order.
633
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Inc., 2005, pp.6. 
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Ibid. pp.32.  The idea of statutist approach was that each statute ‘naturally’ belongs to one of these two 
categories of laws.  If a law is personal, it ‘attaches’ to the person and applies outside the territory of the 
statutory authority.  If a law is local, it ‘attaches’ to the land and applies only within the territory of the statutory 
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The author observes that Europe has a big role in influencing other regions.  
European countries have lots of scholars who developed the rules of private 
international law with theories conflict of laws that may inspire other regions to 
adopt their concepts. Ten Wolde and Henckel affirmed that one of the greatest 
European scholars namely Friedrich Carl Von Savigny with his paradigm became the 
starting point for conflict of laws as we understand it today,
634
 which is to apply the 
law that has the closest connection.
635
 
Related to the ASEAN-ARTS initiative, it is known that the parties
 
 consist of the 
ASEAN Central Banks as operators, which represent their respective governments 
and participants of the system.  In this regard, it is apparent that this initiative is not 
only related to the individual or company’s economic transactions but also to 
regional state relations.  In other words, this would be the domain of public 
international law to address the National Central Banks despite the fact that there are 
also some issues of the private international law (PIL) to be addressed.   
The author is inspired by Ten Wolde and Henckel’s statement related to PIL:636 
“Private international law is intended to ensure that such relationships 
are not handicapped by the differences existing between legal systems 
when legal disputes cross national borders.  Decisional harmony, the 
creation of uniformity in determining the applicable law, and the 
certainty that it offers is seen by many as the ultimate purpose of the 
conflict of laws.” 
Uniformity or a unified system of choice of law, according to Baarsma, offers a 
number of advantages over the situation in which every national state has its own 
system.
637
 Moreover, she also emphasizes that unification of the choice of law would 
grant better protection to the legitimate expectations of the parties.
638
  It is clear that 
PIL provides a better solution for conflict of law between parties from different 
states. 
Additionally, public international law also relates to this cross-border payment 
system.  It appears to the author that there is a need to use a right combination of 
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public and private international law for implementing the ASEAN-ARTS initiative.  
The author agrees with Mills’ statement that:639  
“Private international rules, although formally part of national law, 
constitute a type of distributed network of international ordering. This 
order both reflects and replicates underlying international norms, 
which are also reflected in rules of public international law. Public 
international law rules define the conceptual framework and terrain 
within which private international law seeks to achieve its own 
specialized international function: the reduction of conflict between 
regulatory systems in private disputes. Within this framework, 
differences in private international law rules correspond to competing 
ideas combining international and national influences.” 
The central bank itself in this case will play a role as two personifications: First, as 
an agent of the state, and second, as a legal entity. In the first one, the central banks 
play a role in a public international law, representing their respective governments in 
making regulations and in the second one, the central banks play a role in private 
international law as one of the parties to be ruled, as an entity, and as a participant.   
Public international law is needed and is particularly important because there will be 
clauses on rights and obligations that must be transposed either by those legislatures 
or by executive measures into domestic law. Gerrit Betlem states that in public 
international law one cannot find a comparable authoritative formulation of the 
principle that, under public international law, courts should construe their domestic 
law in conformity with international law.
640
  It means that the community law should 
be obeyed by the domestic or national law.  
In relation to private international law, the parties should have a choice of the 
applicable law when disputes arise among them.
641
 If the parties have chosen the 
applicable law for implementing this initiative, it must be applied and be complied 
with as the governing law of the parties. The chosen law must be effective which 
means it should be recognized by the national law of the parties and should not 
infringe the public policy or mandatory rules of the parties.   
Furthermore, the regional judgments
642
 should be enforced by the judicial national 
courts of the respective member states.
643
 Judgments from other ASEAN member 
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Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligation (Rome I). 
642
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states are not always recognized and cannot always be executed in the other member 
states. These are the challenges for ASEAN member states. Thus, the respective 
national jurisdictions need legislation that provides them the ability to enforce a 
regional judgment from the ASEAN country. It is necessary to have the rules 
governing jurisdiction and recognition and as well as enforcement of judgment which 
are governed by the community legal instrument which are binding and directly 
applicable. 
In this case, the author suggests that there should be a judicial cooperation and 
dissemination in advance between the community and the respective national court, 
and this should also be examined and assessed by the member states of community 
periodically to ensure all the national courts are ready to apply the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the ASEAN-ARTS. The ASEAN member states also need to reform 
their respective national legislation in order to enable the national courts to enforce 
the regional judgment which are not recognized under their law, so it will not be 
subjected to varying national laws, which might result in different effects of regional 
judgment. With this reform it is expected that they will have the same application 
and interpretation of law, so that the national courts may not refuse to enforce 
regional judgment. 
The description above demonstrates the importance of the public and private 
international law as well as the enforcement of regional judgment issues for ASEAN. 
It also demonstrates that the effectiveness of the private international law will lead to 
the achievement of the community purposes. In other words, the private international 
law plays a key role in fostering economic integration by providing solutions for 
dispute settlements in economic region. The author also concludes that the central 
banks of each member state should play a bigger role in coordinating the parties 
involved for this initiative not only at the domestic level but also at the regional 
level.  
1.3.4 Legal Approach for The ASEAN-ARTS Initiative from International Standards 
The implementation of the ASEAN-ARTS will work efficiently with the application 
of international standards, like adopting international policy guidance by the BIS and 
other related international institutions, like the World Bank and the IMF. Since every 
member state is part of the principles/rules of those mentioned institutions, the 
implementation of this initiative should be going smoothly.   
The first one of the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment System (CP-
SIPS) states “The System should have a well-founded legal basis under all relevant 
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jurisdictions”.644 ASEAN in this case should have unified basic rules applicable to 
payment system for all member countries. By using one of these standards or 
creating its own model law on payment and settlement systems as a guideline for 
members, it will be helpful to make sure that the system developed to implement the 
ASEAN-ARTS are expected to be parallel and compatible with the developments in 
other ASEAN countries. It is known that the RTGS systems of the EU also comply 
with the international standards, so ASEAN may refer to the guidelines, 
specifications and user requirements of TARGET as a benchmark for establishing 
and developing the ASEAN-ARTS.  
Another very inspiring example is the development of a regional payment system in 
Central America, known as Sistema de Interconexión de Pagos de Centroamérica y 
República Dominicana (the SIP).
645
 The SIP have created a treaty as an umbrella for 
its regionalized payment system. The SIP also has model of laws such as finality of 
payments, and irrevocability of payment orders as its instrument of law.
646
 
Besides the international standards, there are also contractual agreements and other 




As a result in relation to this initiative, the author proposes to use a treaty for the 
ASEAN-ARTS initiative. A treaty will take into account the smooth implementation 
of such initiative, not only in the region but also in other countries outside of the 
region to show that ASEAN is emphasizing a rule of law basis and to show that this 
is a serious commitment of ASEAN as a first step by having a structured legal 
instruments of an integrated payment system to face the AEC 2015. This is going to 
be a special task for all ASEAN Central Bank Governors and the WC-PSS with the 
support of the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Financial Minister Committee to 
propose to the ASEAN Leaders a formulation of a Treaty on “The Establishing and 
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Implementation of the ASEAN-ARTS Initiative” to support the economic and 
financial market integration in ASEAN to Face the AEC 2015.
648
   
Why a treaty? Because a treaty will provide legal certainty and it is going to be a 
legal umbrella and formal agreement that will legally bind the ASEAN member 
countries, defining the objectives, tasks, rules, rights and obligations of introducing a 
policy area of cooperation. The author also would like to remind that this is also to 
simplify and homogenize the re-use of the standard term “treaty” which has been 
used the first time on February 24, 1976 i.e. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC). This will be consecutively followed by lower level authorities, such as the 
ASEAN Governors Central Bank, to make more detailed regulations covering all the 
rules and procedures of the game including the governing law and transposition 
clauses. The commitment of the ASEAN Leaders by a treaty becomes a powerful 
legal decree and serves as a legal umbrella for the next law-making process at the 
lower level. Furthermore, the functional bodies can adopt legislation at the domestic 
level, which should interpret the domestic law in conformity with this treaty.   
Since the interlinking system of the ASEAN-ARTS is done through “interface”649 
among the ASEAN National RTGS of National Central Banks, the author suggests 
that a bilateral agreement among the ASEAN National Central Banks will be ideal 
for them.
650
 The author prefers the use of bilateral agreements among the NCB and 
between NCB and participants, because: first, the NCB should open an account in the 
respective NCB. Secondly, the RTGS system is also based on the contract between 
the operator and the participants, because the participants also should open an 
account in their respective NCB.
651
   
To compose the agreement and related arrangements, ASEAN would need a working 
committee/group, which will be based on shared (legal, technical and operational) 
agreements between National Central Banks.
652
  Such agreements will consist of 
more detailed aspects i.e. general description of ASEAN-ARTS, the rights and 
obligations of the parties, the access criteria, liquidity, finality, intraday credit, 
compensation, liability, governing law and jurisdiction. 
The author concludes that in essence, the key points to implement this initiative 
smoothly is coordination and cooperation, by, firstly, putting this initiative into a part 
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of the ASEAN program, initiated by all Governor Central Banks via WC-PSS. 
Secondly, by having a political will and a full commitment from the Leaders of the 
ASEAN member states and their staff, including the ASEAN member states 
Governors of Central Banks, to create a treaty for establishing and implementing 
such policy/project and then, certainly followed by the respective member states 
adopting it into a national law. This is important and necessary, because it will 
involve the national bodies/institutions of respective members, not only the executive 
body but also the legislative body and judicial body, including private entities like 
banks and related financial companies. Lastly, there will be a dissemination and 
education to all the elements in all respective member states, so that they will be 
aware of such initiative. 
1.3.5 Governing Law: Choice of Law for the ASEAN-ARTS – The Proposal 
The ASEAN-ARTS is a system, which will be performed by all the ASEAN member 
states central bank by using their national RTGS. The characteristic of this cross-
border transaction is a fund transfer of money, which takes place from one bank to 
another on a "real time" and on "gross" basis. Since this system is used for cross-
border transaction, basically the parties are from different legal systems. The RTGS 
itself will be a highly secured credit transfer in the central bank money, since the 
system is considered as CP-SIPS.
653
 It can be assumed that there is no credit risk and 
settlement risk
654
 unless there is insufficient fund, or the system defaults, and make 
the transfer delayed. In this system, the payer must have sufficient funds in his/her 
bank before such transaction starts and the system must be reliable and safe.  
Commonly, a dispute may arise when the money is not transferred and received into 
the payee’s account or is delayed. This happens when the system is not working (due 
to technical malfunction) or if there is no sufficient fund.  In this case, the payee is 
the party who suffers loss or damage.
655
 
The ASEAN-ARTS system mainly has a public character
656
, but to some degree, it is 
of a contractual nature.
657
 Thus, there is a principle of the freedom to contract, so that 
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the arrangement in the contract becomes the rule of the parties involved that must be 
complied with. However this contract has a special character and is separated and 
therefore differs from common commercial contracts,
658
 because this is a specific 
transaction (fund transfer), which runs on a specific system. Moreover, basically, this 
system will be created, regulated, and operated among the ASEAN central banks 
representing the respective governments. So this is what the author calls an 
interconnection between the public and private international law (public-private 
relationship).
659
 The general rule is not so complicated as other rules of law, because 
this payment transaction will be final and irrevocable, and completed in seconds or 
minutes.
660
 Usually the cross-border transfer by commercial bank is T+1 or more, 
especially via correspondent banks. By implementing this ASEAN-ARTS the 
transaction will be concluded in seconds or minutes, not days.
661
 So that is why the 
author proposes this RTGS cross-border system to become a priority project to 
support and answer the need for an integrated payment system for achieving the 
objectives of AEC 2015.   
The RTGS system itself, basically, has already been tested and has a very secured 
system with the risk mitigation. The interlinking among the NCBs RTGS will 
become the tasks of the working committee (WC-PSS). They have to sit and work 
together and share their knowledge and technical experiences to make it work 
properly.      
Related to loss or damage in this system, it shall be limited to the party´s direct 
damage or loss i.e. the amount of the transaction in question and the loss of interest 
thereon.
662
 So, for such loss or damages, the harmed party needs to be protected. In 
this case, the author sees that the payee becomes the weak party and has the right of 
reward to get nominal damage and loss of interest when he/she does not receive the 
money in the same day. As described above, this cross-border payment system is one 
of many transmission of funds from a payer to a payee in another jurisdiction, 
therefore, the issues about how to determine the applicable law to govern the rights 
and obligation of the parties, especially for solving the breach of this kind of 
payment transaction is also very important to be discussed. The protection of the 
harmed party is the priority in this system. Related to legal risk, the FMI states that a 
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system should identify and analyse potential conflict of law and develop rules and 
procedures to mitigate this risk. In that case, this system should govern the applicable 
law to facilitate a dispute that may arise and needs a choice of law principles 
approach due to conflict of laws, since this system is used in multiple jurisdictions.  
In this case, the ASEAN Leaders and/or the Governor of Central Banks should be 
concerned about this particular aspect and should govern rules and procedures to 
resolve the problem of determining the applicable law. The unification of the law, 
especially the choice of law issues should be the priority for the ASEAN. Since this 
is going to be an international agreement, it will be wise to set forth such a clause in 
their agreement to evade the ambiguity in determining the applicable law, like the 
EU did.
663
 The author argues that this becomes a good first step and a good example 
for a wide-range of issues of dispute settlements in other regional commercial 
projects. 
Additionally, the ASEAN member states are the member of CPSS and FMI of BIS. 
The members comply with the principles within their regulatory frameworks, at least 
for the systems that are deemed to be systemically important in order to manage the 
risk more effectively and efficiently. The ASEAN-ARTS is considered to be a 
Systemically Important Payment System (SIPS) and that is why it should comply 
with the CP-SIPS and PFMI from BIS.  The BIS as an International Institutions has 
an international standard that can be a guideline for this initiative.   
Furthermore, the BIS and the IMF could provide an expert team which examines and 
assesses the RTGS system in order to comply with the principles and prepare a 
public report as background documentation to the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) with the member country. These two institutions described above, 
beneficially support the member countries to get to full compliance to the CP-SIPS 
and the PFMI.   
Besides the CP-SIPS and PFMI, ASEAN member states also may refer to the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law as an 
option. This organization has produced numerous model laws and has successfully 
influenced countries to adopt these model laws and drive the national law to apply in 
line with these model laws. The ASEAN member states could also study and may 
adopt the UNCITRAL model law such as UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Credit Transfers.
664
 This model law regulates the obligations of the parties,
665
 
                                                 
663
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See further “UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers” at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
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consequences of failed, erroneous of delayed credit transfers,
666
 and completion of 
credit transfer.
667
 The UNCITRAL formulizes a harmonized rule on commercial 
transactions and provides technical assistance in law reform projects.
668
 Moreover, 
this organization also has a guideline governing the rights and obligations of the 
parties and also the liability for the losses due to a delay or an error of a credit 
transfer.
669
 This model legal rule was published to influence and persuade the 
development of national practices and might be drafted and adopted by the states. In 
addition, this model law was also created to unify and/or harmonize the law 
governing international trade or transactions that the states might wish to adopt to 
govern their international credit transfers. This also implies that the model law of 
UNCITRAL could create a unified or harmonized standard of protection for the 
losing parties and can be one of the options for ASEAN member states to adopt.   
Related to the conflict of laws in the ASEAN-ARTS initiative, the issue of 
determining the law governing a transaction as well as the question of which forum 
decides a dispute arising out of any such transaction must be addressed only if there 
is an element of internationality or different jurisdictions.
670
 In relation to the 
applicable law, what is the most suitable approach to determine the law governing 
this payment transaction if there is conflict of laws? Prof. M.H. ten Wolde and 
Henckel distinguish three types of conflict rules
671
 i.e. (1) multilateral conflict rules; 
(2) unilateral conflict rules; and (3) independent of substantive conflict rules. Related 
to this system, it seems to the author that it is more connected to the approach of the 
multilateral conflict rules, which refer to the reference rule containing the connecting 
factor. Within PIL, the interpretation of rules of law and the creation of law 
concentrates on finding the right connecting factor, which in this case is the 
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669
See further “UNICTRAL Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers”, at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
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Prof. Sudargo stated that such concept, called “the Most Characteristic Connection” 
principle, is the best approach to be used to determine the applicable law for 
international contracts where the applicable law is the law closely connected or 
having the most significant relationship to the occasion.
673
   He also emphasized that 
this approach also uses the term “centre of gravity” but in the `soft´ manner and is 
considered as the modern approach and followed by other scholars and jurisprudence 
of many countries.
674
 Furthermore, he stated that:
 675
 
“in the exploring towards the most characteristic point link or the 
‘types’ or ‘functional’, we do not only see the location factors, but also 
the sociological factors.”  
In the EU, the method of determining the applicable law is strongly connected to the 
basis for the legal dispute.
676
 The law of the country where the legal relationship has 
its centre of gravity is to apply.
677
 Additionally, the EU also has a regulation in the 
absence of choice of law, namely where the applicable law cannot be determined; the 




The author concludes that the most characteristic connection for ASEAN-ARTS is 
related to protect the weaker party who will incur the damage/loss if the transaction 
failed. This approach seems to be the best option for this system, since the EU also 
uses this approach for settling disputes for TARGET2.
679
   
Furthermore, Sudargo Gautama recalled that this choice of law should not breach 
what is known as Public Order.
680
 Any choice of law should not be transformed into 
an evasion of law (wetsontduiking).
681
 However, according to Sumampouw, such 
choice of law should also be concerned to the other parties’ interests and/or public 
interests, but in the contract, the interests of the parties have a big influence in 
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The original of his statements: “Jadi dalam melakukan pencarian ke arah titik taut yang paling karakteristik 
atau ‘typis’ atau ‘funksional’ ini, bukan kita hanya melihat faktor tempat, tetapi juga kepada faktor sosiologis.” 
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Art. 4(2) Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 (Rome I). 
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determining the applicable law.
682
 The author concludes that as long as the contract 
does not hamper or breach the public interests or public order, then it can be carried 
out as the law of the parties involved. In this case, the author does not see that this 
initiative will contradict public order or public policy. 
It appears to the author that this approach is the most suitable to the ASEAN-ARTS 
system. Since the payee is the party who is economically aggrieved,  the term of “the 
economically aggrieved connection” fits to be used for this system. So, when the 
money is not delivered to the payee account at a certain time, then the payee will 
economically suffer losses for not getting the benefit of the money at that time and 
becomes an aggrieved party. From the EU experience in governing the applicable 
law for TARGET, they also govern the disputes concerning payments between 




1.3.6 Governing Law: The Choice of Forum for ASEAN-ARTS – The Proposal 
Once again, when the payment system has to cover different elements/nations, the 
legal issues arising will be difficult to resolve due to different law for each territorial 
authority. Each country feels that this issue falls under its sovereignty to solve the 
problems, and the following question will arise: which forum or court will take the 
case? 
When discussing about the word of court, many scholars compare it to the alternative 
dispute settlement, which they think is a less time-consuming process and will cost 
less money. Erica Garay, in her official law firm’s website states that generally, 
parties choose alternative dispute resolution mechanism (arbitration) over litigation 
because arbitration is usually faster, more efficient and less expensive than litigating 
a dispute in court.
684
 Barbara Kate Repa, has also observed that arbitration is 
generally far less costly than proceeding through litigation because the process is 
faster and usually less complex than a court proceeding.
685
 Louise Elmes sees more 
advantages of using arbitration proceedings i.e. neutrality (impartiality factor), 
enforceability (award judgment), flexibility (agreed procedure) and confidentiality 
(regarded as private).
686
 Joachim Frick also adds that further advantages of 
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arbitration includes the expertise of arbitrators, and the neutrality of procedures. The 
nationality of arbitrators, the applicable law, the venue and language, its privacy, 
simplification and speed, the facilitated enforcement of the awards, and the enhanced 
predictability are also the advantages of using the arbitration.
687
 
It seems to the author that litigation in court is not a proper instrument to solve 
problems related to payment systems dispute with a unique characteristic, especially 
like the RTGS system. This payment system needs fast solutions and confidentiality 
in resolving the disputes, using expert personnel in a more private setting, but still 
legally binding and resulting in a judgment enforceable in other 
jurisdictions/countries.    
In this global economic era, when business transaction problems arise, the author 
argues that an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a good instrument for dispute 
resolution of commercial matters. ADR means any method of settling disputes aside 
from the courtroom. Love states that ADR has emerged as an alternative to court 
litigation that may offer a more efficient and less expensive avenue for resolving 
disputes.
688
 Furthermore, she observed that according to data from the World Bank’s 
Doing Business project, the time required to enforce a contract (from the moment the 
plaintiff files the lawsuit until payment is made) ranges from about five months in 
Singapore and seven in New Zealand to more than four years in Guatemala, 
Afghanistan, and Suriname.
689
 Moreover, she discovered that the cost ranges from 
less than 10 per cent of the contract value in Iceland, Luxembourg, and Norway to 
more than 100 per cent in countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, and Sierra 
Leone.
690
 In addition, she also concluded that ADR can resolve different types of 
disputes, not only commercial matters, but also other disputes such as between 
employees and management, between investors and the state or even between 
businesses and the government (such as tax disputes).
691
  
The author observes that out-of-courtroom resolution schemes are more attractive 
and suitable for businesses than litigation proceeding because these mechanisms are 
confidential so may not trouble their relationship, they are more cost-effective and 
less time-consuming for businesses than conventional litigation. However, Louise 
Elmes reminds us that although arbitration proceedings remain the most popular 
choice, it is worth to consider particular needs against the potential advantages and 
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disadvantages of both forums before taking a decision.
692
 The author agrees with her 
statement to put both forums into consideration. However, related to payment 
system, especially for cross-border payment transactions in RTGS, this does not 
apply, because it should be remembered that RTGS as a cross-border transaction 
mechanism is separated and different from commercial relationships. It is about the 
clearing and settlement mechanism, therefore it needs a specific dispute resolution 
mechanism, which provides particular expert personnel,
693
 neutrality, confidentiality 
and flexibility and moreover, can be enforced in other jurisdictions. The author 
prefers to say that it needs something like a “bank out-of-court”, a specific arbitration 
court which consists of members from each state as judges/arbitrators.
694
 Concerning 
these conditions, the out-of-courtroom resolution is a more proper instrument to use 
than court litigation. 
There are two most major forms of ADR i.e. Mediation and Arbitration.
695
 Gavin 
Smith finds that mediation and arbitration are characteristically fitted for commercial 
disputes, because they provide a less public forum for dispute resolution and they 
have a great impact on the profitability and reputation of businesses.
696
  
Mediation, is a voluntary basis and uses a third party as a mediator who is also an 
expert in settling dispute and is impartial to both parties. The EU has a specific 
directive, defining mediation as:
697
  
“Mediation means a structured process, however named or referred to, 
whereby two or more parties to a dispute attempt by themselves, on a 
voluntary basis, to reach an agreement on the settlement of their dispute 
with the assistance of a mediator.” 
                                                 
692
Louise Elmes, Opcit. 
693
The author suggests that the mediators and the arbitrators are from the registered bankers who know the legal 
aspects. 
694
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ASEAN-ARTS. 
695
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It seems to the author that mediation is not about winning or losing a settlement 
based on rights and obligations, but is rather about settling a dispute to result in a 
win-win solution for the parties involved. The function of the mediator is more about 
facilitating and guiding rather than making a decision. 
Lukasz and Alejandro also make a good statement:
698
  
“The main idea behind mediation projects is not only to provide 
alternatives to litigation but to modify the whole dispute resolution 
system, including litigation, to make it more suitable for the parties in 
commercial disputes.” 
From the description above, the author can conclude that mediation is an alternative 
dispute settlement to reach a (new/amended) agreement for disputants. There is no 
decision by third party – the third party is only facilitating the process of settlement 
or merely assists them in reconditioning the settlement so both parties are 
comfortable with the revised agreement and then lets the parties try to construct a 
solution among them.  
The other option is an arbitration as already mentioned above. It is also an interesting 
mechanism that people choose for settling a dispute. According to Clayton Utz, the 
definition of international commercial arbitration is:
699
 
“a process by which parties from different states can have their 
disputes determined by an impartial tribunal appointed by a commonly 
agreed method.” 
The outcome is binding and can be enforced in other countries as a result of an 
international law called the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).
700
 Additionally, Gaurav states that this 
convention provides a simple and effective method of recognition and enforcement 
of foreign awards.
701
   
Erman Rajaguguk states that arbitration is more favourable for businessmen than 
litigation due to various reasons, including:
 702
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“1. publication of dispute is one of the things that disfavour for 
businessmen; 
2. the legal system of a local court is unfamiliar to foreign counterpart; 
and also  
3. there is a doubt to the capability of local court and/or a mistrust 
from foreign counterpart to the local court’s decision on cases 
which have foreign elements.”  
Additionally, Huala Adolf stated that there are five reasons why businessmen prefer 
to use the arbitration forum.
703
   
“First, they do not have to follow the strict and rigid formalities; 
second, the arbitration is relatively cheaper; third, the decision is more 
satisfying to them since they more believe to the arbitrators whom they 
have chosen themselves with their expertise; fourth, the confidentiality 
among the disputants is preserved; and fifth, from the commercial or 
business perspective, this mechanism is considered as the perfect choice 
for them, so that the disputants could still maintain their good 
relationship.”  
Furthermore, other scholars argue it is far easier to enforce arbitration awards across 
national boundaries than judgments of national courts.
704
 T. Mulya Lubis and 
Maurice also argue that ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand have systems allowing and enabling winning parties to 
enforce arbitral awards in the same manner as judgments obtained in local courts, 
subject to leave of those courts.
705
 Moreover, they also say that these countries are 
members of the New York Convention, which provides that foreign awards obtained 
in member states may be recognized and enforced locally, subject to the very limited 
grounds recognized in the convention upon which a court may refuse enforcement.
706
 
Furthermore, they also argue that a court may refuse enforcement for several reasons: 
the arbitration agreement is invalid; a breach of due process; the award does not 
comply with the terms of the arbitration agreement; irregularities in the selection of 
arbitrators or the proceedings; enforcement is against public policy.
707
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“… that foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards will not be 
discriminated against and it obliges Parties to ensure such awards are 
recognized and generally capable of enforcement in their jurisdiction in 
the same way as domestic awards. An ancillary aim of the Convention 
is to require courts of Parties to give full effect to arbitration 
agreements by requiring courts to deny the parties access to court in 
contravention of their agreement to refer the matter to an arbitral 
tribunal.”  
In addition, Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel states: 
709
 
“As far as public international law is concerned, for commercial 
arbitration, the only really relevant treaty is the New York Convention 
which ‘only’ deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, while the other traditional instruments play no major 
role today.” 
The author conclude that the New York Convention of International Arbitration 
Awards which has been ratified by 149 member countries,
710
 is providing an 
effective and efficient solution and moreover can be enforced, so that the member 
states which signed the Convention are required to fulfil the arbitral judgment in their 
respective state. On the other hand, it should be understood, that the local court may 
refuse the enforcement judgment due to reasons mentioned above. The author sees 
that this seems unfair for the party who has the right to execute the judgment. For the 
sake of fairness and in order to provide legal certainty, the judgment shall be 
executed in advance and should not be delayed; meanwhile, the request for 
cancellation of the judgment can be run simultaneously. Sutiarso also affirmed this 
with his opinion that in accordance with the legal certainty theory, a plea of 
examination of cancellation of the judgment process should not delay the execution 
of a final and binding arbitral award.
711
 In this case, the author observes that the role 
of arbitrator(s) is very important. They must be cautious and accountable in 
formulating the decision, so that the dictum of decision does not cause or give rise to 
new problems that may be refused by the court. 
                                                 
708
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Additionally, unlike a judicial process, arbitration is conducted by impartial 
arbitrators who are appointed by the disputants based on standards that suits their 
special needs and lies on the characteristic of the contract. Arbitration usually 
consists of either one arbitrator or mostly a tribunal of three arbitrators
712
 who have 
expertise and are impartial to the disputes and have been empowered to make 
decisions. The judgments can be enforced due to the New York Convention.  
There is also another model law such as the UNCITRAL model law on International 
Commercial Arbitration as an option.
713
 This option provides a model law acceptable 
to states with different legal, social and economic systems, contributing to the 
development of harmonious international economic relations.
714
 This model law, like 
other laws related to arbitration, has the rule to restrict the power of the court to 
intervene.
715
 This model law also has a binding judgment, recognized and enforced 
by the competent court.
716
 It covers all stages of the arbitral process from the 
arbitration agreement to the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award and 
reflects a worldwide consensus on the principles and important issues of international 
arbitration practice.
717
 It is acceptable to states of all regions and the different legal or 
economic systems of the world.
718
 The author observes that this model law may also 
be adopted in ASEAN. 
From the description above, the author outlines the differences of mediation, 
arbitration and litigation. in table 5 below 
Table 5 
The difference among Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation 
No. Features/ 
Characteristics 
Mediation Arbitration Litigation 
1.  Type of decision/ outcome Non-final/consensual  Final and Binding Final and Binding 
2.  Selection of referee(s) By parties  By parties By court 
3.  Referee’s expertise Specialized expertise Specialized expertise General expertise 
4.  Cost  Less costly Less costly Costly  
5.  Time-consuming Less time Less time More time 
6.  Confidentiality Private Private  Public 
7.  Neutrality Impartial Impartial Domestic Court  
                                                 
712
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8.  Awards/Judgment Less enforceable719 More enforceable Less enforceable 
Source: the author 
The table above shows that the arbitration is suitable for parties or businesses who 
prefer processes which result in a final and binding decision, is less-time consuming, 
suits with the characteristics of the contract/agreement, is impartial, offers privacy 
and is controlled by parties, and most of all, can be enforced in the other states. It is 
interesting to note that Hartley, argues that in certain situations at least, litigation in 
an efficient and impartial court is the favoured solution.
720
 However, since he does 
not explain in more detail why litigation is a favoured solution, the author argues that 
this would only be fit for certain cases, such as international loan agreements which 
he analyses in his book.
721
 




“When cross-border business transactions lead to cross-border 
controversies, arbitration before an international panel of arbitrators—
as opposed to litigation in the courts of a particular country—is usually 
the contracting parties' dispute-resolution mechanism of choice.” 
In this case, the author concludes that arbitration has become a distinguished dispute 
resolution mechanism for cross-border transaction problems. The author proposes 
that the arbitration is suitable for the ASEAN-ARTS initiative as well and can be a 
good choice as an alternative jurisdiction of competent mechanism for settling other 
related cross-border problems in ASEAN.  
Why does ASEAN-ARTS need arbitration?  Based on the characteristics of the 
ASEAN-ARTS we could assess why the mechanism of arbitration will be the best to 
resolve a particular problem. 
The ASEAN-ARTS initiative is purposed to support the economic integration and 
enhance the financial market of ASEAN. In addition, the spirit of the ASEAN 
economic integration provides a legal certainty for the parties and a binding legal 
system, which could protect the customers. This spirit as a result, will become one of 
the objectives of the ASEAN member states to convince and attract the third parties 
to be involved in the ASEAN financial markets that ASEAN has the competence and 
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a structured legal framework for cross-border transactions.  The ASEAN-ARTS itself 
is a system which has a specific characteristic namely to transfer money from one 
country to another or a fund transfer between different states and this system is about 
the settlement mechanism. If a problem arises in the system causing delay or 
cancellation of the transfer so that it cannot be settled and the beneficiary (the payee) 
does not receive the money, the harmed party must be protected and will need legal 
certainty for getting his/her rights. Thus, the need for legal certainty and legal 
protection for parties in the ASEAN-ARTS is in line with the objectives of economic 
integration and the objectives of AEC. 
However, the ASEAN member states may combine the implementation of mediation 
and arbitration accordingly, depending on the problem.
723
 If the problem is not of 
substantial matter and is easy to solve, then they could implement mediation at the 
first stage. When we look at the EU, they have a mediation directive
724
 to resolve the 
commercial matters. In this directive, the mediation outcome is possible to be made 
enforceable by request to the court or other competent authority.
725
 The author utters 
that the mediation outcome is not automatically enforceable like arbitration unless by 
request to the court. The EU has also prepared for certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal 
market, which governs out-of-court settlement.
726
 Related to the out-of-court 
settlement, European Commission also has a recommendation known as a 
Commission Recommendation on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible 
for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes.
727
 In this journal, the Commission 
recommends to promote extrajudicial settlement dispute procedures such as 
mediation, conciliation or arbitration where this out-of-court instrument may be set 
up by public authorities, businesses/professionals in the legal sector, professional 
bodies or civil society organizations.
728
 The author observes that the EU’s concern is 
to provide a legal framework for the consumer in order to ensure legal certainty and 
consumer confidence, so that it must lay down a clear and general framework to 
cover certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market. In this 
case, ASEAN should also be concerned to prepare such regulations in order to 
provide a legal framework and legal certainty as well as consumer confidence in 
facing the free movement of goods and services in ASEAN. 
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On the other hand, a conventional adjudicative mechanism according to the author’s 
opinion also could not resolve these disputes at its best, because even though the 
decision is legally binding, it is time-consuming and costly, not to mention that the 
judgment itself is less enforceable. Moreover, unlike ADR, in this mechanism 
everything is on the public record, which is opposite to the nature of this business of 
the ASEAN-ARTS, while ADR can remain confidential for public coverage where 
one of the business characteristics is maintaining long-term business relationships. 
In order to smoothen the implementation of arbitration and/or mediation, the 
respective ASEAN NCBs should address at least three things. Firstly, it is best to 
have rules and procedures, like a code of conduct, to be taken into consideration as 
the main stage. Böckstiegel, who has experience as an arbitrator for many years, 
suggested to discuss as early as possible in the beginning, before the case to have 
what is called the "Rules of the Game" that should be applied for the procedure at 
hand.
729
 Additionally, he has observed that in this situation, it is important to realize 
that there are differences in the legal culture of the parties and of the arbitrators, 
otherwise misunderstandings and conflicts in the management of the case are 
inevitable.
730
 Firstly, transparency of rules and procedures of arbitration and/or 
mediation for this dispute settlement are required in order to solve problems on such 
specific matters. Secondly, there should be a list of registered arbitrators/mediators 
consisting of legal experts, who would be best from the expertise of the NCB and 
commercial banks, and/or from legal expert practitioners.
731
 Thirdly, a dissemination 
and education for related bodies in respective ASEAN member states should be 
carried out periodically, in order to smoothen the enforcement of judgment. 
For arbitration itself, there are two types of arbitration i.e. Institutional Arbitration 
and Ad hoc Arbitration. For ASEAN-ARTS, the author proposes that Ad hoc 
Arbitration is the best fit for settling the case. The Ad hoc method not only waives 
the administration cost but could also be tailor made with a specific design of a 
mechanism for the specific contract between the parties like ASEAN-ARTS, so that 
it will suit their particular needs. Many model clauses are recommended by 
institutions, such as model law by UNCITRAL and International Chambers of 
Commerce (ICC) Arbitration Rules. The first model provides an excellent and well-
tested procedure for ad hoc arbitration.
732
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2. Key Issues Related to the ASEAN-ARTS Initiative 
In the development of the ASEAN-ARTS initiative, some issues might arise. The 




- Organizational Structure 
Like other establishments, to smooth the initiative, an appropriate organizational 
structure for implementing and operating ASEAN-ARTS is urgently required and 
the most basic foundation. Since this system is established on governmental basis 
among the ASEAN member states, of course the organizational structure will 
involve and consist of all the ASEAN member states with at least a need for legal 
and technical group contributing to the legal and technical issues. Related to legal 
issues, it needs to be established in the national law of each AMS in order to 
provide a legal judgment of dispute settlement that may arise among the ASEAN 
member states. It is shown in principle no. 1 of FMI and 10 CP-SIPS. 
- Standard Rules and Procedure 
With regard to technical issues, this system should have security and operational 
procedures. It needs to have common and standard mechanisms for authentication, 
identification and authorization. It is also necessary to have data protection, 
especially since this system is going to be sharing data of transactions among the 
ASEAN member states, so it is more important and relevant to have provisions for 
legal protection and binding agreements. 
- The Access Criteria 
This issue is regarding the participants, which is also important to be considered. 
Since this system will be implemented in regional countries with different types of 
participants, it will be prudent to make common participants criteria or 
standardization on who could enter and participate in this system. The access 
criteria must be equal among the ASEAN member states. 
- The Pricing Policy 
The pricing also needs to be discussed among the ASEAN member states. 
Recently, they have different pricing for each cross-border transaction. This issue 
should be raised in order to have a uniform understanding of the pricing policy 
among the ASEAN member states. 
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- The Multi Currency  
The ASEAN-ARTS initiative could be using US dollar, which it is commonly 
used for trade all over the world. But, since ASEAN wants to use their own local 
currencies/multi currencies for trade settlement,
734
 it would also be possible for 
the ASEAN-ARTS initiative to use the local currencies as well for cross-border 
transactions. In this case, the local/multicurrency risk issue should be taken into 
consideration. The author suggests that this issue be discussed not only among the 
central banks but also involving commercial banks and/or correspondence banks 
and other appropriate stakeholders such as academics to get a better solution in 
settling the currency issues for squaring the settlement; for example having a 
bilateral settlement mechanism among the members to reduce foreign exchange 
risks and to avoid a potential longer-term impact on market liquidity, or mitigating 
the exchange currency risks, for example by hedging against foreign exchange 
currency risks or by having an FX swap arrangement.
735
    
- The Intraday Credit and Cross-Border Collateral Arrangement 
With regard to the intraday liquidity that is needed in cross-border transactions, 
the ASEAN member states should consider to have a cross-border collateral 
arrangement to support intraday and/or overnight credit. This arrangement should 
be taken into consideration to all member states. 
- The Zero-Hour Rules, Finality Settlement Rules and Related Regulations 
When a cross-border transaction in ASEAN-ARTS is going to be implemented, 
the issue of zero-hour rule
736
 and finality settlement should be taken into account 
and should be addressed in relevant legislation. Moreover, it should consider the 
amendment of bankruptcy and insolvency laws in respective members 
accordingly, to provide the legal certainty for finality settlement and to prevent the 
unwinding payment mechanism that may still be used in some ASEAN 
countries
737
 that would create systemic risks. Furthermore, related regulations, 
such as electronic commerce regulation, consumer protection regulation, payment 
systems regulation, are also important to take into account in order to support the 
                                                 
734ASEAN Secretariat, “Ways to Promote Trade Settlement Denominated in Local Currencies in East Asia: Case 
Studies of Thailand, Singapore, EU and NAFTA”, ASEAN +3 Research Study Group,  ASEAN Secretariat, 
Jakarta, 2010.  See at: http://www.asean.org/archive/documents/ASEAN+3RG/0910/FR/16c.pdf, last accessed 
on January 28, 2015. 
735
An FX swap agreement is a contract in which one party borrows one currency from, and simultaneously lends 
another to, the second party. Each party uses the repayment obligation to its counterparty as collateral and the 
amount of repayment is fixed at the FX forward rate as of the start of the contract.  See at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0803z.htm, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
736
The zero-hour rule is a provision in the insolvency law of some countries whereby the transactions conducted 
by an insolvent institution after midnight on the date the institution is declared insolvent are automatically 
ineffective by operation of law. 
737
Indonesia, for example, is still using the zero hour rule mechanism for payment system. 
   
193 
 
ASEAN-ARTS initiative. In this case, the author sees this not only as a task for 
central bank, but also for the government and its related ministries to provide 
contribution for creating and/or amending related regulations to implement 
regionalized cross-border transaction and to support the trade settlement as well as 
payment settlement system to fulfil the goal of AEC 2015. The author concludes 
that in the development and implementation of ASEAN-ARTS, there will a need 
for wide-ranging governance coordination and commitment. 
- Mechanism of Dispute Resolution  
This mechanism should be placed in prudent manner as well.  Since ASEAN 
already has the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), with the current Protocol 
namely Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
(ACDSM), the question is, could the ACDSM deal with the resolution for an 
ASEAN-ARTS dispute? The author argues that it may be efficient and effective if 
it can be solved as a part in the ACDSM, but this should be discussed further 
among related officials to have some adjustment and arrangement. In this case, the 
payment system group and the legal group of ASEAN-ARTS should outline for 
AMS the legal procedures applicable to consumer disputes settlement and the out-
of-court procedures committed to such disputes. Each AMS should also have 
some expertise on this mechanism to be appointed as an arbiter or mediator.
738
 
- Collaborative Oversight of ASEAN-ARTS  
Related to creating an integrated payment system, collaborative oversight 
payment systems engagements need to be taken into consideration by the ASEAN 
members, besides the oversight of respective domestic payment system.  The 
scope of oversight may come from the coordination of sharing information, cross-
border crisis management
739
 and Business Continuity Oversight.
740
. 
- Holiday Calendar and Operating Hour. 
When this initiative is implemented, it is also crucial to determine together the 
holiday calendar or the closing day for the ASEAN-ARTS activities in order to 
have the same closing day for all of the ASEAN member states who participate in 
                                                 
738
This has already been discussed in the previous sub chapter. 
739
BIS in its report realizes that the global financial crisis which began in August 2007 illustrates the importance 
of effective cross-border crisis management for the complexity of international financial transactions expanded 
at an unprecedented pace in the years preceding the crisis, while the tools and techniques for handling cross-
border bank crisis resolution have not evolved at the same pace.  See further on Report and Recommendations of 
the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group , BIS, 2010,  at http://www.bis.org /publ/bcbs169.pdf, last accessed on 
January 28, 2015. 
740
ECB has a Business Continuity Plan for Systematically Important Payment System (SIPS) in 2006 which is 
related to the resiliency of payment system infrastructure.  For example, how to mitigate from  terrorist attack or 
power outages.  See further at https://www.ecb.Europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/businesscontinuitysips2006en .pdf, last 
accessed on January 28, 2015. 
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this initiative.  The author realizes that each ASEAN member states has its own 
particular holidays, so this is also important to be considered. Furthermore, the 
ASEAN countries are in different time zones, so it should also be determined 
which time zone to use as a reference for implementing it.  
- The Non-State Actors and the Former High Level Official 
As mentioned above, parties outside the central banks also play a key role in 
implementing this system. This should be underlined during the consultation in 
order to establish and develop ASEAN-ARTS not limited to government bodies 
among the ASEAN member states, but also embracing appropriate stakeholders, 
comprising of businesses industry, public community, related industry 
associations, academic, technology specialists and former high level officials, 
known as Non-State Actors (NSA).  The NSA plays a key role in supporting this 
initiative The role of NSA has been demonstrated when Bank Indonesia was 
planning to establish and implement the BI-RTGS in 2000 which was fully 
supported by banking associations and academics. The banking association on 
behalf of the participants have even made the rules of play called the bye-law for 
BI-RTGS.
741
 Moreover, the role of former High-Level Officials, such as Mr. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mr. Mahathir Muhammad, Mr. Rodolfo Severino, 
Mr. Ong Keng Yong, Mr. Surin Pitsuwan, and Mr. Pushpanathan, is also very 
important and needs to be considered. They have had experiences in developing 
ASEAN and are therefore valuable resources to refer to for action and thoughtful 
contribution for attaining the AEC 2015.     
- Others 
Other relevant measures, such as technology requirements and specifications and 
also mitigation and/or back up system should be put in place in order to ensure the 
accuracy and integrity of data. These measures should comply with the FMI and 
CP-SIPS Principles. 
3. Summary 
From this chapter, the author concludes that ASEAN has defined the AEC blueprint 
and the ASEAN Central Bank Governors followed it up with more comprehensive and 
specific measures by creating the WC-PSS related to payment system cross-border 
transaction. 
                                                 
741
Bank Indonesia as a payment system authority allows them to have technical agreement for themselves and 
Bank Indonesia also acts as an advisor during the making process of the bye-law.  This bye-law arrangement 
might be adopted for the ASEAN-ARTS initiative among the banking association of ASEAN member states.  
This is expected that the ASEAN banking association may create a self-regulatory organization for them in the 
future. 
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The author also concludes that the WC-PSS’s policy needs to be adjusted by putting 
the high value payment system cross-border transaction project (ASEAN-ARTS) as a priority; 
as such project would provide the infrastructure for regional settlement of trade, capital 
market and retail payments as well. The RTGS cross-border transactions provides lots of 
benefits and is more feasible, relevant and can be prioritized to implement in the near future 
compared to capital market and retail payment area. 
In relation to the ASEAN-ARTS initiative, it needs a legal basis. A treaty is the best fit 
for such initiative, since it will embrace all instruments binding at regional law level.  The 
ASEAN-ARTS initiative should also comply with the CP-SIPS and the FMI. 
With regard to the dispute that may arise in implementing the ASEAN-ARTS 
initiative, ASEAN should have regulations that govern the choice of law and choice of forum 
for settling the dispute. Since the characteristic of such initiative is credit transfer, the 
governing law should be the law of the country where the payee is located, because this party 
is considered as a weaker party who is economically aggrieved and needs to be protected. 
In connection to the forum for dispute settlement, ASEAN should facilitate and 
provide arbitration, which is a more efficient and less expensive option for resolving the 
dispute. Arbitration also provides a legal certainty because it results in a legally binding 
judgment, which is enforceable in other countries that have ratified the New York Convention 
of International Arbitration Awards. 




THE ROLE OF INDONESIA IN ASEAN AND  
IN PAYMENTS SYSTEM INTEGRATION: FACING THE AEC 2015 
 
1. Introduction  
ASEAN was established by five founding member countries, and Indonesia is one of 
the leading countries with a big influence in ASEAN. Besides a leading role in establishing 
ASEAN, Indonesia was also the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 
1955 and this organization became an instrument for the third world countries to show 
resistance against the east and west bloc influence.
742
 Furthermore, NAM was created for 
freedom and de-colonialism. Since ASEAN was established in 1967, Indonesia has also taken 
a leading role for the development of ASEAN until now. Vice president Mohammad Hatta at 
that time was the first pioneer who put the Indonesian foreign policy foundation, known as 
“Free and Active” (bebas dan aktif).743 Donald Weatherbee explains that “bebas dan aktif” is 
not a policy or strategy.
744
 It is a quality of policy in the way it is formulated and carried out: 
with national interests being defined independently, then pragmatically promoting those 
interests.
745
 The next sub chapter will explore the role of Indonesia in ASEAN and payment 
system integration for supporting AEC 2015. 
2. Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN 
Since Soeharto rose as a leader in 1967, Indonesia has proven to be a significant 
regional influence and, as a result, played a global role by emphasizing the non-aligned 
movement and diminishing great power influence from the region. This can be seen in 1983, 
when Indonesia proposed the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), but 
due to the unfavourable political environment in the region at the time, this proposal was only 
kept on the table. However, after a decade of negotiating and drafting efforts by the ASEAN 
Working Group on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)
746
, the SEANWFZ 
                                                 
742
The Non-Aligned Movement was founded and held its first conference (the Belgrade Conference) in 1961 
under the leadership of Sukarno from Indonesia, Gamal Abdel Nasser from Egypt, Jawaharlal Nehru from India, 
Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana, and Josip Broz Tito from Yugoslavia. See further its evolution at: 
http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement, last accessed 
on January 28, 2015. 
743Anthony Smith, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
vol.21, no.2, August 1999, pp.239. 





ZOPFAN was signed in 1971 by the foreign minister of the ASEAN member states which they stated their 
determination to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a 
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Treaty was finally signed by the heads of states/governments of all 10 regional states in 
Bangkok on 15 December 1995.
747
  
In the process of integration, the founding members of ASEAN (ASEAN 5) and new 
members, Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam, better known as BCLMV, 
recognized the challenges they faced both inside and outside the region. Hadi Soesastro gives 
an example that Vietnam was not free from potential insurgencies, and Indonesia introduced a 
concept called national resilience to the region, and proposed that ASEAN strives to build its 
regional resilience.
748
 He emphasizes that Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN has been mainly 
in the political field but has not exercised economic leadership.
749
  In addition, Hadi also 
implies that Indonesia was known as “Mr. No” due to its tendency to say no to various 
economic integration plans at that time, until suddenly it changed its policy and became “Mr. 
Go” when agreeing to go ahead with AFTA 1992.750  It seems to the author that since then, 
Indonesia became an active leader, not only in politics but also in economics and even social 
cultural area.  
Indonesia, during President Soeharto’s administration, also played a leading role not 
only in ASEAN but also in Asia Pacific by hosting and chairing the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Bogor summit in 1994
751
 which was known for the Bogor Declaration or 
Bogor Goals where the APEC Leaders announced their shared commitment to achieve free 
and open trade and investment by 2010 for industrialized economies and 2020 for developing 
economies.
752
   This was then followed up in 1997 by an ASEAN vision 2020 which resolved 
                                                                                                                                                        
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers, and 
also stated that Southeast Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation 
which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship. See further “Joint Press Statement 
Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting To Issue The Declaration Of Zone Of Peace, Freedom And 
Neutrality Kuala Lumpur, 25-26 November 1971”, at http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-
security-community/item/joint-press-statement-special-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-to-issue-the-declaration-
of-zone-of-peace-freedom-and-neutrality-kuala-lumpur-25-26-november-1971, last accessed on January 28, 
2015. 
747
See on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website at http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/southeast-asian-
nuclear-weapon-free-zone-seanwfz-treaty-bangkok-treaty/, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
748Hadi Soesastro, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN and Its Impact on US-Indonesia Economic Relationship”, 
submitted at a Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, U.S. Senate, 
September 15, 2005.  See further at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005_hr/050915-
soesastro.pdf, last accessed on January 28, 2015.  It was began in the early 1990s when the changed external 
environment brought a significant change in ASEAN economic cooperation. ASEAN leaders agreed to pursue 
regional economic integration through the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Indonesia’s agreement was critical 






See further at http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/1994/1994_aelm.aspx, last accessed 
on August 5, 2014. APEC has 21 members. The word 'economies' is used to describe APEC members because 
the APEC cooperative process is predominantly concerned with trade and economic issues, with members 
engaging with one another as economic entities.  See at http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-
Economies.aspx, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
752
See further at http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2010/2010_aelm/bogor-goals-
assessment.aspx, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
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to chart a new direction towards the year 2020 called “ASEAN 2020: Partnership in Dynamic 
Development” which will forge closer economic integration within ASEAN.753   
In July 1998, the Thailand Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, at the annual foreign 
minister meeting in Manila suggested that the “flexible engagement”754 be adopted, but 
Malaysia and the newer members opposed this suggestion.
755
 He proposed this idea because 
the crisis in 1997 has given ASEAN the motivation to change and respond to new challenges 
by proposing an idea called flexible engagement to encourage ASEAN to play a more pro-
active role on issues that would potentially affect the region as a whole. Only the Philippines, 
which was hosting the meeting, gave strong endorsement to Pitsuwan’s proposal, but other 
ASEAN members were lying low, adopting a wait and see attitude.
756
 Even in the next 
ASEAN meeting, Thailand was being accused as carrying a western agenda, namely the US 
foreign policy objectives.
757
 Finally, but certainly not less importantly, several ASEAN 
governments objected to the adoption of a flexible engagement as a corporate policy for fear 
that its practice could undermine regime security.
758
    
The author observes and admits that this flexible engagement proposal is indeed an 
excellent idea to support the objective of AEC 2015, but it can be understood that in that era, 
it is also a very sensitive issue because the ASEAN leaders seldom talked openly. They 
preferred talking in door-to-door meeting as opposed to having an open session.
759
 
                                                 
753
See further at http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-vision-2020, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
754
Dr. Surin explained in his speech at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand 11 August 1998. He 
explained that “Flexible Engagement” is meant to encourage ASEAN to play a more pro-active role on issues 
that have the potential to affect the region as a whole, whether those issues are international, regional or 
domestic.  For example, if a dialogue partner pursues economic policies that ASEAN perceives as detrimental to 
its interests, it should be within its rights to call for changes in that policy, as it has been doing with Japan.  Or if 
a certain member country complicates ASEAN’s relations with its dialogue partners, ASEAN should similarly 
have the right to consult with the country concerned on how to resolve the situation in a manner satisfactory to 
all. See also:   Jurgen Haacke, “The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: 
Intramural Challenges to the ‘ASEAN Way’”, The Pacific Review, vol.12, no.4, 1999, pp.583. Flexible 
engagement involves publicly commenting on and collectively discussing fellow members' domestic policies 
when these have either regional implications or adversely affect the disposition of other ASEAN members.  
755Anthony Smith, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN: The End f Leadership?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol.21, No.2, August 1999, pp.250. 
756
Kavi Chongkittavorn, “ASEAN Needs ‘Flexible Engagement’”, The Nation newspaper, 21 July 1998, pp3., 
see at: http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=437&dat=19980721&id=9KwuAAAAIBAJ&sjid=czADAAA 
AIBAJ&pg=5018,1740979, last accessed on January 28, 2015.  
757
Ibid. After suggesting the idea of “Flexible Engagement”, in the next ASEAN meeting there have been thick 
accusations flying around the region that Thailand is carrying out a western agenda which is trying to echo the 
US’ foreign policy objectives.  See also: the Irrawady at http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=1166, 
last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
758
Jurgen Haacke, Opcit., pp.595. 
759
ASEAN Leaders prefer talking bilaterally or tour diplomacy with other members to get supporting of a 
proposal or to solve an issue. 
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After Soeharto’s regime ended in 1998, Indonesia had a few changes of presidency 
until 2004.
760
  There were uncertainties in Indonesia’s domestic politics and economics.761  
However, since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) took office as president in 2004 and 
especially in the second term, his government gave full attention to Indonesia’s role in 
ASEAN as the organization trudged the road to community.
762
 Zhida sees that since SBY’s 
administration, Indonesia has gradually emerged from the shadows of the collapse of 
Soeharto’s regime, as well as the economic and financial crisis.763 Zhida further explains the 




1. Strengthening its role in ASEAN affairs by actively leading the building of an 
Economic, Security, Social and Cultural Community by 2020, which was 
approved in the 9th ASEAN Summit in October 2003. In November 2007, 
Indonesia played a key role at the 13th ASEAN Summit and the ASEAN Leaders 
approved the ASEAN Charter, which clearly defines the strategic objectives of the 
ASEAN Community, and adopted the AEC Blueprint, which will translate 
ASEAN into a single, unified market. Secondly, Indonesia is enhancing relations 
with neighbouring countries by settling disputes with Malaysia on territorial 
issues in the Sulawesi Sea and with Singapore on maritime boundary line. 
Thirdly, Indonesia has helped mediate internal conflicts within ASEAN by 
mediating a boundary dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. Lastly, Indonesia 
is playing a constructive role in the South China Sea issue by pushing the China-
ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting in July 2011 to reach consensus on the 
guidelines to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China 
Sea (DOC).  
2. Enhancing relations with great powers by signing a joint statement with the 
visiting Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2005, declaring that the two countries 
would establish a strategic partnership. In the economic field, bilateral trade 
volume has witnessed an annual growth rate of over 10%, with the bilateral trade 
value in 2011 surpassing USD 60 billion. China is Indonesia’s largest source of 
imports, except oil and gas products, and its second largest export market and 
trading partner. China takes an active role in infrastructure construction in 
Indonesia, and it has increased its investment in Indonesia. Moreover, the two 
                                                 
760
After Soeharto regime in 1998 there were 3 presidential succession until 2004. Habibie (May 1998-October 
1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (October 1999- July 2001) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (July 2001-October 2004).  
761During such period, there were East Timor’s separation, Aceh War, ethnic violence, the breakdown of law and 
order and the financial crisis. 
762
Donald E. Weatherbee, Opcit., pp.6-7. 
763Jiang Zhida, “Indonesia’s “Confidence” Diplomacy under the Yudhoyono Government”, China Institute of 
International Studies, 31 December 2012.  See further at http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2012-
12/31/content_5638110.htm, last accessed on January 28, 2015.  
764
Ibid. Summarizing the four platform of Zhida’s. 
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countries conducted close cooperation in advancing the China-ASEAN relations 
and in addressing the international financial crisis. 
Besides China, Indonesia is also conducting international relations with U.S. by 
fighting against terror after the 9/11 tragedy and signing the comprehensive 
partnership agreement during President Obama’s visit to Indonesia, consolidating 
cooperation in the areas of economy, trade, education, military, climate change 
and democratization in 2010.  India also became part of Indonesia’s diplomacy 
approach by signing the joint declaration on establishing an Indonesian-Indian 
strategic partnership with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005.    
Indonesia’s government under Yudhoyono administration has also established 
partnerships with Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, France and Germany. 
The country’s great power diplomacy has gained more flexibility for Indonesian 
diplomacy, providing more opportunities for Indonesia to play a bigger role on the 
international stage. 
3. Carrying out multilateral diplomacy. Indonesia has regained confidence on the 
international stage and is engaging actively in multilateral diplomacy as a result of 
the enhancement of its comprehensive strength, by becoming the sole ASEAN 
member and actively representing developing countries in the G20.
765
  
Indonesia is taking an active part in the global governance and is playing a 
positive role in climate change, sustainable development, disaster relief, 
peacekeeping and other major international issues. Indonesia wishes to play a 
leadership role in the global effort to address climate change. President 
Yudhoyono urged more “synergic action” to best implement the concept of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” in addressing climate change. 
Indonesia is the most vulnerable country to tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions, floods, landslides, droughts and forest fires, and President Yudhoyono 
called on the international community to strengthen cooperation on disaster 
mitigation and relief. Yudhoyono also pushed forward the establishment of an 
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster 
Management, in order to coordinate the cooperation in disaster rescue. 
                                                 
765
In the G20 London Summit and Pittsburg Summit held in 2009, Indonesia has played a key role when 
President Yudhoyono put forward a number of proposals, including reforming the existing international financial 
institutions, stressing the recovery of the global economic balance, raising the economic growth rate, improving 
the economic, trade and investment environment, and advancing sustainable economic development. He 
demanded that developed countries open up markets (especially the agricultural market) to developing countries, 
increase technological transfers and direct investment. At the same time, he also called for the developing 
countries to fight corruption, establish better government, and increase education input to create a favorable 
environment for overseas investment. 
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4. Shaping and promoting Indonesia’s national image of “democracy, pluralism and 
peace” is an important part in the building of Indonesia’s soft power influence, 
and it is regarded as Indonesia’s strategic interest. 
Under the initiative of President Yudhoyono, the first Bali Democracy Forum was 
held in 2008
766
, which was designed to transform ASEAN with democratic 
principles and provide useful experiences for other countries to learn from in their 
democratization process. The purpose of the forum is to share experiences and 
practices of democratic development, and to promote regional and international 
cooperation in the field of peace and democracy.   
Indonesia has also actively participated in UN peacekeeping missions with the 
aim of building an image as a peacemaker in the world, by sending its troops to 
southern Lebanon and Congo. Indonesia therefore became the largest contributor 
in Southeast Asia to UN peacekeeping missions. 
3. Indonesia’s Role in Payment System for Supporting AEC 
As previously described in the beginning of this chapter, in April 2010, the ASEAN 
Central Bank Governors Meeting in Vietnam has decided to endorse the establishment of the 
Working Committee on Payment and Settlement System (WC-PSS) to coordinate the 
modernization of national payment and settlement systems to support regional financial 
integration. It aims to develop and harmonize the region’s financial infrastructure in par with 
international best practices to facilitate the free flow of goods, services, skilled labour, 
investment, and the freer flow of capital under the AEC.
767
 Bank Indonesia (BI)
768
 played a 
prominent and active role by hosting and chairing the informal meeting of the ASEAN 5 WC-
PSS in Bali in May 2010
769
 followed by the first meeting of WC-PSS in Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia in June 2010.
770
 Indonesia has been actively leading this committee and together 
with other member states, forming five specific areas of payment and settlement systems to 
determine areas for future enhancement, development, and harmonization.
771
 The committee 
realizes that the ASEAN members are at different stages in the development of payment and 
                                                 
766
This forum was participated by all ASEAN member countries as well as other Asian, while the United States, 
Canada and other Western countries were invited to attend as observers. 
767
See on WC-PSS website at http://www.aseanwcpss.org/aseanwcpss/Documents/Informal_Agenda%20 
Informal%20Meeting%20WC%20PSS%20Bali%20Mei%202010.pdf, last accessed on January 28, 2015. 
768
Indonesia, represented by BI, has become a co-chair since 2010 until present, with the first chairman, Ronald 
Waas then continued by Boedi Armanto and currenty by Rosmaya Hadi. Ronald Waas was replaced in 2012 due 
to his promotion as a Deputy Governor of BI.  There are actually two co- chairs with the second chairman is 
from Bank of Thailand and now from Bank Negara Malaysia. 
769




See the WC-PSS website, at http://www.aseanwcpss.org/aseanwcpss/Documents/WCPSS%20Studies%20 
Executive%20Summary.pdf, last accessed on January 28, 2015. See further in previous sub chapter on the 
Establishment of WC-PSS. 
   
202 
 
settlement system and thus would have different needs.  To meet this condition, they have 
conducted standardization and also provided support to each other through capacity building 
or technical assistance for less developed payment system.  To integrate the payment and 
settlement system for all the ASEAN members of course is a long-term achievement beyond 
2015.   
From the description above, the author observes that Indonesia has played a prominent 
role in ASEAN and is active in multilevel tasks to promote the essence of the ASEAN 
Community, especially AEC, as well as in developing payment system integration for facing 
the AEC. Pakpahan shares his opinion and sees that Indonesia’s position is strategically 
important because of its involvement in ASEAN, in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the 
Group of 20 (G20).
772
 He emphasizes that Indonesia realizes that ASEAN is crucial in order 
to maintain a balance of power between the US, China, India and Russia within the EAS. The 
involvement of those countries would promote commercial and investment activities in this 
region.   
The author concludes that Indonesia has indeed taken a significant role in the South 
East Asia region, even in the East Asia region and Asia Pacific not to mention the Asia Africa 
Forum (Non Aligned Movements), The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC),
773
 and even the G-20. It is because Indonesia is the world’s biggest archipelago 
country with lots of resources so that Indonesia can play a prominent role and have big 
influence among the ASEAN member states.  It has been shown that Indonesia is the sole 
country in Southeast Asia to become a part of G20 countries and the sole ASEAN member in 
Southeast Asia to be one of the founding members of the Non Aligned Movement.  
In the payment system area, Bank Indonesia has also played a key role in coordinating 
the ASEAN members to have a framework of integrating the payment system within the 
ASEAN member states to support the AEC 2015. Rosmaya Hadi from Bank Indonesia, in 
Jakarta Post said that BI has active discussions with its counterparts in developing a more 
integrated national payment system before having an integrated payment system within the 
ASEAN region.
774
 Furthermore, the Indonesian banking industry will have a new real-time 
                                                 
772Baginda Pakpahan, “The role of Indonesia in ASEAN, in East Asia Summit and in G20”, Jakarta Post online, 
October 4, 2011, see at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/10/04/the-role-indonesia-asean-east-asia-
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gross settlement system (RTGS) in which bank customers can carry out multicurrency 
transactions on a real-time basis. Moreover, she also adds that the Indonesian central bank and 
its counterparts in five ASEAN members, including Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand, had agreed to prepare for an integrated payment system.
775
 So, Indonesia has also 
played a key role in integrating the payment system area. The author has great expectations 
that Bank Indonesia could also encourage the ASEAN members to support the initiative of 
ASEAN-ARTS, proposed by the author. 
4. Reforming the ASEAN Charter 
ASEAN has the ASEAN Charter, which stipulates the dispute settlement mechanism, 
but until now, the DSM is far from the hope to be utilized. The member states prefer settling 
through amicable settlement than push the dispute to judgment. The effectiveness of the 
dispute settlement of the Charter needs to be reviewed. As we can see, since the enactment of 
ASEAN Charter in December 2008 until now, the decisions resulting from disputes amongst 
the ASEAN member states (AMS) are ineffective and unsatisfactory. The principles of non-
interference and consensus/negotiation as stated in the Charter seem to be an obstacle and 
discourage them in achieving its objectives. Hwee argues that the Charter also does not 
address the implementation deficit that ASEAN suffered because of its lack of institutional 
mechanisms to ensure or enforce compliance with decisions taken.
776
 Moreover, many 
agreements made, need an effective resolution when the dispute occurred and this will open 
greater number of dispute cases to be solved. 
To make a single market work in the EU, the EU embarked on a comprehensive 
legislative program involving the adoption of hundreds of directives and regulations, 
significantly increasing the supranational power of the EU.
777
 
The author agrees with Hwee’s opinion that in order to create an effective and efficient 
single market, ASEAN should deepen its integration and commitment by making a 
comprehensive legislation for certainty and compliance and also strengthen the institutional 
body(s) to carry out the tasks. The history of the EU legislative activities is characterized by 
distinct events of enlarging and deepening its monetary integration into a European Union by 
reforming the treaty revisions of the past 20 years. It is also characterized by increasing the 
competencies of the EU across various policy fields and expanding qualified majority voting 
in the Council of Ministers, while also steadily increasing the influence of the European 
Parliament in the EU Legislative politics since the Single European Act in 1987 until the 
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Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
778
  De Haan argues that the Single European Act was a major step in 
the European economic integration process which  aimed to complete the European 
Community’s internal market by removing all barriers to the free movement of capital, labour, 
goods and services among its member states.
779
  It was also influenced by Delors declaration 
in front of the European Parliament that “in 10 years 80 per cent of the legislation related to 
economics, maybe also to taxes and social affairs, will be of Community origin” which has 
been repeated on many occasions by himself and has also been widely quoted or paraphrased 
by scholars alike, reported and distorted by journalists, politicians and officials of the 
European Institutions.
780
     
The aim of the creation of the ASEAN Charter is to give a legal personality to 
ASEAN.  This is a basic need of integration, not just mere co-operation. In the past, we 
understand that the reasons for the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 were political/security 
issues. Roberts in his opinion also argues that the modern state formations of Southeast Asia 
were primarily through colonialism.
781
 ASEAN countries were colonized by European and 
US powers.
782
 After World War II, they obtained their independence and autonomy in various 
ways. Since then, they needed cooperation amongst them to protect the region’s peace and 
stability by establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).  As the economic alliances 
emerged, the ASEAN economic cooperation did not want to be left behind by other regions, 
like the European Union.  Furthermore, ASEAN in its ASEAN Vision 2020 had made a 
commitment i.e. free flow of goods, services, investment, capital and skilled labour. They 
needed to deepen the integration to compete in the global market. Suryadinata states that the 
final target of the ASEAN States must be integration instead of co-operation.
783
  
From the experiences of five years after the promulgation of the ASEAN Charter, we 
have seen that the ASEAN Charter has been weak in empowering the institutional and legal 
competence for obtaining its purposes. Although ASEAN has an ASEAN Charter governing 
the ASEAN human rights body and has adopted the ASEAN human rights declaration at the 
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 ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Paul Gerber, considers it a flawed instrument.
784
 He 
notes that unlike a convention, this declaration is not legally binding, although it does carry 
moral weight and is often a precursor to a binding treaty, like the UDHR led to ICCPR and 
ICESCR.
785
   Nevertheless, the author sees that this Human Rights Declaration was a step 
forward, which may lead to the emergence of the convention.
786
  
To give more power to ASEAN in pursuing the AEC 2015, the Charter should be 
adjusted in order to strengthen the existing bodies by giving the authority to manage related 
programs and to provide more legal power to facilitate the economic integration within AMS. 
For the adjustment, the Leaders of the ASEAN member states have already anticipated this 
development by giving room to review the clauses of the Charter as stipulated in Article 50 
which states “This Charter may be reviewed five years after its entry into force or as 
otherwise determined by the ASEAN Summit”. This article gives mandate to a review and to 
examine the effectiveness of the Charter for improving the institutional and legal framework 
to meet the needs of AMS in the future. The author argues that this is a good opportunity for 
the ASEAN Leaders to use such clause and review the Charter. The author observes that the 
lack of institutions becomes a serious issue for ASEAN to deepen the economic integration. 
On the other hand, since 2008, the global financial market and political atmosphere has 
changed dramatically. The countries outside of ASEAN, such as China, Japan, Korea, even 
the EU and the US are looking to ASEAN as a potential huge market. These changes of 
global economic conditions must be utilized by ASEAN, which needs several reforms and 
expansions to strengthen ASEAN’s institution for regionalism to carry out the implementation 
of all the initiatives they have taken, especially to attain the AEC 2015. 
Despite some scholars’ pessimism on ASEAN reform, there are other scholars who 
still see its bright future. Shada Islam, for example, argues that the Charter, which governs the 
establishment of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) to ASEAN, is ‘an 
important step forward in enhancing the institutional capacity of ASEAN’.787 He also argues 
that Indonesia has the gravitas and institutional capacity to lead ASEAN into new areas, 
besides Malaysia, which will be the ASEAN chair in 2015.
788
 The author agrees with Shada 
and is also optimistic that ASEAN could reform in order to achieve the AEC commitments. It 
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is shown that after the global crisis of 2008,
789
 ASEAN could recover very well. Related to 
the ASEAN’s survival of crisis, Mustapa Mohamed stated that:790 
“This is (the 2008 crisis) not the first time ASEAN is faced with a crisis.  We 
recovered from 1998 crisis, then September 11 crisis that had an impact on many 
ASEAN member states. The 2008 crisis affected the stock market, the confidence, 
not the real economy. In the short term, we will find not much impact, but if it lasts 
longer, let’s say between three and six months, if the US cannot resolve its 
problems and Eurozone countries cannot find a way out of the debt crisis, then we 
may see some impacts on ASEAN economies.  However, there are two reasons why 
I believe that we can mitigate the impact of the crisis. First, our economies are 
doing well. We see domestic consumption increasing in most ASEAN countries. 
Second, Asia is doing quite well. We have China, India, and Korea, these are 
major markets for ASEAN countries. They are not facing a crisis. We will survive.”   
From his statement, the author argues that ASEAN’s economic developments  are 
doing well and  ASEAN can still do business with the eastern countries, like China, India, 
Korea, and Japan   which also have huge markets for ASEAN countries. The global economic 
and political environments have transformed extremely due to the global financial crisis in 
2008.  
The ASEAN countries are facing the challenges, both individually and collectively as 
a region, but they could survive because they have learnt from the first crisis in 1997. They 
worked closes together and brought the three North East Asian countries (China, Korea and 
Japan, known as ASEAN +3) that were not affected by the crisis into some finance 
cooperation in order to increase their economic growth. This cooperation was then followed 
by the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which was established by the ASEAN Plus Three 
Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM+3) in 2000. Since then, ASEAN has been declaring 
numerous projects, like the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA), the ASEAN Investment Agreement (AIA) and the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) to keep up with global developments.   
Benny Teh points out that as these initiatives become more sophisticated, 
institutionalization beyond the state would be inevitable or else there will be further 
disparities and unevenness if left to the devices of individual states.
791
 He also suggests that 
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ASEAN has to reinvent itself by further rethinking and reconfiguring the norms of 
sovereignty and consensus decision-making to best support the complexities of 
institutionalism that is increasingly seen as inevitable in a growing ASEAN.
792
 
The author concludes that it is a good moment for ASEAN to reform the ASEAN 
Charter by strengthening and enlarging the function of the ASEAN Secretariat and delegating 
more power to them to have a wider combination as an independent body with executive, 
legislative and judicative functions to administer the activities of ASEAN and also by 
increasing and improving its human resources. Of course, the author realizes that it needs 
more financial support and more quantity and quality of human resources to implement it. As 
Vikram Nehru states, ASEAN has formed a task force to bolster ASEAN Secretariat. 
Indonesia should urge the task force to be innovative and propose fundamental changes to 
make the secretariat capable of coordinating effectively across its many functions. Then it 




Furthermore, empowering the dispute settlement body is also relevant and should be 
taken into consideration, in order to provide legal certainty and trust as an organization.  The 
dispute settlement mechanism should be broadened by another mechanism, which would be 
best suited for settling economic, social cultural and even political disputes. Alternative 
dispute resolution settlement mechanism could answer challenges in the future. This also 
needs more legal expertise input from the member states. For example, by implementing the 
ASEAN-ARTS initiative, the member states should have a list of experts willing and able to 
become mediator or arbiter to settle the disputes. The expertise may come from banks or other 
financial institutions or even from the NCB. 
Once again, this reform of Charter depends on the willingness and commitment of the 
ASEAN Leaders to make it happen. When we look at the EU, on the one hand, they have 
amended the treaties many times
794
, with the current treaty, namely the Lisbon Treaty (The 
first official name for the Lisbon Treaty was the "Reform Treaty")
795
. They started with 
economic co-operation until they became an economic union. On the other hand, ASEAN’s 
economic integration will not be as deep as the EU’s. However, the development of 
Europeanization should become an inspiration for ASEAN to attain the ASEAN economic 
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integration. Since the EU has Europeanization, in the future why shouldn’t ASEAN have an 
“Aseanization” to some degrees by reforming the Charter?   
Nevertheless, the author admits that ASEAN does not need to adopt all the EU has done, 
especially to create a union, which are far beyond of ASEAN’s mind right now, because 
creating this stage requires time and effort, and it is not an easy task for ASEAN at the present 
time. ASEAN should focus on the implementation of the AEC 2015.  
5. Summary 
From this chapter, the author concludes that Indonesia has made significant 
contributions to the development of ASEAN. Indonesia represents ASEAN and other 
developing countries by actively participating in G-20. Moreover, regarding the payment 
system, Bank Indonesia, on behalf of Indonesia, has also played a leading role in coordinating 
the payment systems project to promote more efficient cross-border payment services and 
ultimately the integration of systems in the region. Indonesia had a key role supporting the 
future AEC. 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The final chapter of this dissertation will summarize the general conclusions of the 
issues, which have been discussed in detail in earlier chapters. The purpose of this dissertation 
is to provide a better understanding of the effect of globalization, the AEC 2015, the 
development of ASEAN, the background of the EU and the ECB with its TARGET, and 
finally, the background of ASEAN’s initiative on the implementation of an integrated RTGS 
(ASEAN-ARTS) in ASEAN to support the AEC’s objectives. 
One of the AEC’s objectives which was stated in the AEC Blueprint is the 
enhancement of the financial resilience and competitiveness in the region, by having greater 
integration of the financial markets. To support a greater integration, tools will be needed to 
facilitate the economic integration. A resilient payment system is one of the tools that 
supports the integration of the financial market.  ASEAN could learn from the EU and its 
famous TARGET, but it should be taken into account is that the political-economic entities of 
ASEAN and the EU have their own characteristics. 
This dissertation describes the EU experience from the beginning of its establishment 
until further development of the TARGET. It also examines whether or not the EU’s approach 
can and should be adopted by ASEAN. it has been discussed and explored that the EU draws 
its policies by treaties and/or formal agreements, while ASEAN prefers using informality and 
loose arrangements. The EU has institutions and binding commitments, whereas ASEAN 
relies on personal relations among the leaders and on settling issues by consensus and by 
reaching common interests.
796
   
The author concluded that the EU and ASEAN which significantly differ from each 
other and that they have their own specific character. Therefore, it can be said that ASEAN 
cannot simply use or adopt literally the EU’s model in order to achieve its objectives. 
However, in certain aspects, the author is of the opinion that ASEAN may learn from the 
EU’s experience and methods in creating the TARGET system to some degree, like adopting 
its leaders’ willingness, commitment and legal structure. All these aspects should be taken 
into consideration in order to further strengthen and deepen the financial integration within 
the ASEAN countries. 
With regard to the legal aspects, signing a binding agreement is one of the factors that 
provides legal certainty and also provides legal protection to the parties involved. According 
to Tom Tyler’s study on human’s behaviour, the relationship between legitimacy and 
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compliance was found to be linear and has a significant correlation.
797
 He concludes that the 
more binding or the higher the standard of the law,
798
 the more people obey and comply with 
such law. As an example, Severino observes that ASEAN has some arrangements that are 
technically binding, like the ASEAN Tourism Agreement of 2002 and other variety of 
framework agreements, but most of them need implementing agreements in order to be 
carried out, whereas only a few have been concluded or even negotiated.
799
 In this regard, the 
author observes that the roles and commitments of the leaders on the legal aspects turn out to 
be crucial and it is a key for reaching the goals of a project. These roles and commitments also 
encourage the lower levels to follow and comply with the regulations which are decided by 
the leaders. The legal dispute mechanism should be modified by providing an alternative 
mechanism which has better enforceability of the dispute settlement. Moreover, full 
commitments are not only required from the leaders but also from their administration such as 
the central bank, the ministry of finance and the other ministries. Furthermore, there should be 
an obligation to incorporate such regulations into national law, with which the ASEAN 
member states will comply. ASEAN may learn from the EU also with regard to the judicial 
construction.  
The author has also noted that the EU has strong and binding rules such as treaties, 
conventions, regulations, and directives. These regulations were transposed into 
domestic/national legislation so that the EU law will be recognized and enforced by other EU 
member states.
800
 One of the good examples that can be learnt from is the involvement of the 
EU Services Directive in the transposition process. Ulrich Stelkeus and his colleagues have 
studied the involvement of the parties in Netherlands on the implementation of the Services 
Directive.
801
 They observed that besides the respective ministries involved, the private 
partners such as the social partners and unions, were also consulted during the decision-
making process of transposition.
802
 The Netherlands has also initiated a screening of their 
legislation to ascertain whether any inconsistency with the Services Directive exists in their 
                                                 
797Tom R. Tyler, “Why People Obey the Law”, Princeton University Press, 2006, pp.57. 
798




The EU Member states also have a Council Regulation (Reg. 44/2001), best known as Brussels I Regulation, 
which replaces the Brussels Convention 1968, an international convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments. The Brussels I Regulation employs a harmonized approach to ascertaining which of the EU 
member state courts should have jurisdiction to proceed a dispute and how judgments from courts in one EU 
member state should be recognized and enforced in another EU member states. This regulation obliges the 
member countries to transpose the EU regulation into national law.  The Regulation 44/2001 has been 
superseded by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 ("Recast Brussels I Regulation") which shall apply from 10th January 
2015. 
801Ulrich Stelkens, Wolfgang WeiB and Michael Mirschberger (Ed), “The Implementation of the EU Services 
Directive – Transposition, Problems and Strategies”, T.M.C Asser Press, Springer, 2012, pp.437-438. 
802
Ibid., pp.448. 





 These measures are good examples in the decision-making process of a 
regulation for a project in ASEAN. 
From the description above, the author concludes that when ASEAN decides to start 
drafting a treaty or a regulation, it should have a clause, which requires that it be transposed in 
a national law or directly applicable, in order to be recognized and enforced in the respective 
member state’s jurisdictions. Once the regulations have been transposed in each national law 
and recognized in all concerned jurisdictions, then the regulations shall apply to all related 
courts, which could resolve the conflict of law issues. 
With regard to the initiative of the ASEAN-ARTS, this mechanism will implicitly 
comply with the PFMI and the CP-SIPS, principle no.1.
804
 Of course this system needs a well-
managed dissemination and education effort to relevant bodies i.e. all ministries, parliament 
and courts, as well as the private sectors in order to increase awareness before the 
implementation of such regulations. ASEAN should become an organization that is based on 
the rule of law. 
Furthermore, legally binding decisions, finality of judgment and enforceability are 
essential to any dispute resolution process between parties. The author suggests that 
arbitration is one of the suitable mechanisms to answer these challenges, because the United 
Nations New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 allows the enforcement of an arbitral 
award in member countries who joined this conventions. Moreover, ASEAN has already had 
consultation and mediation as a dispute settlement mechanism. The arbitration dispute 
mechanism can also strengthen ASEAN for settling disputes. This would provide more 
options for member states to settle their dispute, without seeking out other fora. So, the author 
suggests to modify and to refine the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of ASEAN by providing 
more options for settling disputes. 
In relation to the process of transposition of regulations into national law, the author 
observes that the role of non-state actors are also a critical part of the equation. A smooth 
coordination between  related ministries as well as with the legislative body is also one of the 
major factors for a successful transposition of the regulations into national law. Additionally, 
a better dissemination and education to the society should also be taken into account, as 
public awareness about such regulations. 
With regard to the creation of the regulations at a transnational level, ASEAN should 
have a competent authorized body to administer, monitor, and create binding rules for a 
project. While observing the EC’s authority, the author has become inspired by the insight of 
the theory of Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz. They are of the opinion that an 
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integration is the process by which the EC gradually, but comprehensively, replaces the nation 
state in all its functions.
805
  On the one hand, since ASEAN has the ASEAN Secretariat, the 
author notes that it is necessary to empower, widen and enlarge the ASEAN Secretariat’s 
authority in the policy-making, in order to efficiently and effectively carry out its 
administration. On the other hand, there should be a willingness from the ASEAN leaders to 
render their power to some degree to the ASEAN Secretariat and utilize the existing 
body/bodies for coordination.   
Above and beyond, the ASEAN Charter is one of the fundamental regulations that 
need to be reformed. The ASEAN Charter should provide more room for ASEAN as an 
organization to play bigger roles within its region. Restructuring the functions of the ASEAN 
bodies is also one of the important steps in facing the AEC 2015, and in facing the challenges 
of other regions. The author believes that the competence of the ASEAN Secretariat in 
managing the administration of the region will represent all members’ interests in dealing 
with the global world in the future. Nevertheless, the author acknowledges that this matter is 
one of a very delicate and sensitive nature for the ASEAN Leaders, not only due to the need 
of surrendering political power in favour of the Association, but also due to since it means 
partially giving up their sovereignty. These appear to be the main reasons for the reluctance of 
the ASEAN leaders to adopt a supranational governance. However, the demands triggered by 
the political, the economic, and the legal globalization, are unavoidable for ASEAN, and it 
has to develop new institutions and/or to restructure its current bodies which eventually could 
bring stability and legitimacy to the association. The author is inspired by the statement of 
Capannelli and Tan, which are of the following opinion:
806
 
 “Several reforms and innovations are needed to strengthen Asia’s institutions for 
regionalism. The governance of existing institutions should be strengthened and made 
more effective and participatory, giving larger space to civil society and the private 
sector to contribute to defining their priorities and agenda, together with government 
agencies. Regional institutions should also be given more delegated powers to act on 
behalf of their member countries in order to improve regional commons, as well as 
more financial and human resources. Regional stakeholders should consider phasing 
out institutions which have already accomplished their mandate or which are no more 
effective, and creating new institutions whenever needed. At the same time, it bears 
reminding that regional institutions are rooted in regional order. Institutional efficacy 
as such is equally dependent on the ability and willingness of their members, 
especially great powers and influential stakeholders, to collaborate.” 
From the description above, the author has drawn several conclusions.  
                                                 
805
Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz, "European Integration and Supranational Governance", Opcit., 
pp.299.  They both were inspired by two of the founders of the integration theory, Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas. 
806Giovanni Capanelli and See Seng Tan, “Institutions for Asian Integration: Innovation and Reform”, ADB 
Working Paper Series No.375, ADBInstitute, 2012. 
   
213 
 
- First, the author wants to emphasize that ASEAN is not the EU, so ASEAN 
cannot be compared to the EU and ASEAN cannot use the EU as a model; 
however, to a certain extent, ASEAN may learn from the EU, for example from its 
legal structure.  ASEAN is not aiming at becoming fully integrated, like the EU is, 
but solely at forming a single market for ASEAN.    
- Secondly, ASEAN should put the rule of law in place again.807 A legally binding 
agreement such as a treaty should be re-established and should become one of the 
characteristics of ASEAN in order to provide legal certainty and a structured legal 
framework for every future project created by ASEAN. So, a legal structure and a 
legal framework are one of the very important elements for establishing and 
implementing a project. Every project of ASEAN should be based on community 
legislation, or as the author prefers to call it, the ASEAN law, so that the ASEAN 
member states could adjust their national laws in conformity with such a legal 
umbrella. Moreover, in order to prevent contradictions between the community 
law and national laws, the community legislation should be considered as a 
supremacy law.  So, the community law, which has a direct effect and is part of 




- Thirdly, the strong need of restructuring of policies and the functions of the 
competent bodies in the ASEAN organization is necessary to bring more 
legitimacy and stability to the association. Singh argues that regionalization will 
be achieved only through audacious attempts to institutionalize democratic norms 
as well as enhanced mechanisms pooling sovereignty.
809
 So, ASEAN must have 
the necessary policies and infrastructure in place in order to cope with the need for 
financial integration and single market in attaining the AEC 2015. In the future, 
ASEAN should consider having an institutional body or set of bodies, which 
could manage the regions’ matters. For settling any disputes, for example, 
ASEAN would need to empower the Dispute Settlement Mechanism to become an 
entity like a Region Judicial Forum, by complementing an effective compliance 
mechanism with legally binding decisions which are able to force members to 
comply, so that every dispute between member states can be settled in such a 
forum.    
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- Fourthly, the necessity of a strong political will from the governments as well as 
from other elements such as the legislative and judicial bodies are required to 
support this project, especially with regard to legal aspects. A well-managed 
dissemination and education to the public in order to provide awareness and 
readiness of the society regarding the project should also be taken into 
consideration. 
- Fifthly, the cooperation of public-private partnership is an utmost requirement in 
order to increase and enhance the financial integration within ASEAN. Private 
sectors are more aware of the problems in the field. Their participation in the 
policy-making process is indispensable. Additionally, the non-state actors or 
known as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), also play an important role 
in bringing and influencing issues at a regional level. Their role is to influence 
policies through participation in the entire policy-making process.
810
 Lastly, 
former high-level officials also play a key role to support and to influence the 
policy-making process. The author observes that they have the skills and 
knowledge that could influence and assist the policy makers in taking a 
decision.
811
 The role of these two elements will foster a greater ASEAN economic 
integration. 
- Last but not least, this analysis also finds the necessity of empowering the 
ASEAN Secretariat with more legal power, institutional mechanism, regional 
autonomy and human capitals as well as increased funding, are fundamental in 
order to perform ASEAN’s programs efficiently and effectively and to pay more 
attention to attracting the countries outside region to cooperate with ASEAN. 
ASEAN still remains powerless with no central role, and it is understaffed and 
lacks finance.
812
  Reforming the Charter is not a sin; it can be done by achieving 
willingness and full commitment for a very good collaboration and coordination 
among members, especially their leaders and their administrations. 
With regard to the initiative of ASEAN-ARTS, the author recommends that it becomes 
one of the tools to be considered in the support of the AEC 2015 in line with this proposal. 
This dissertation also provides a better understanding on the necessity of creating a payment 
system (RTGS) integration in ASEAN by explaining the background behind the creation of 
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TARGET. The author would like to ensure that the proposal of establishing ASEAN-ARTS is 
applicable and relevant for supporting ASEAN’s objectives to face the challenges of AEC 
2015. ASEAN may learn from the way the EU governs, through the rules and procedures of 
TARGET and implements it by making some adjustments and filtrations in accordance with 
ASEAN’s identity and characters. It is acknowledged that TARGET is one of the best systems 
for payment transactions and settlement. It has a systematic scheme, in terms of both 
structural organization and regulations. Good examples are its regulations which are 
directives or guidelines govern a (requisite) clause, namely transposition clause, which the 
member states or the NCBs should comply with.
813
 Moreover, they have a statute, which 
states that the regulations shall be binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in all 
Euro area countries.
814
 These regulations make TARGET becomes one of the best payment 
systems in the world for providing a structured legal framework. 
With respect to the ASEAN-ARTS initiative, the author has several conclusions and 
recommendations, which include the following: 
- This initiative is applicable and relevant to supporting the objectives of the AEC 
2015 and the objectives of the WC-PSS. The author suggests to make this 
initiative part of the Blueprint of the WC-PSS on the trade settlement area. 
- This initiative should be based on a legally-binding regulation, which has a 
governing law, jurisdiction and transposition clauses. These provisions will 
provide legal certainty to all members, and finally these will protect the 
customers. Moreover, the rules and procedures must also be part of the regulation. 
It is expected that such a legally-binding regulation may also be transposed into 
national law to fulfil compliance with the Principle of Financial Market 
Infrastructure (PFMI) and the Core Principle on Systematically Important 
Payment System (CP-SIPS), especially principle no.1. This legal unification will 
simplify the process of disputes in multiple jurisdictions. 
- It appears to the author that the existing dispute settlement mechanism lacks 
enforceability of its judgments. ASEAN should empower the dispute settlement 
body as a proper judicial body, which all members must comply with and whose 
decisions are enforced by all the ASEAN members in resolving regional disputes. 
This will be done by conducting an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, 
which shall provide legal certainty to the parties. ASEAN needs a more attractive 
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mechanism that fits the needs of its members. An ad hoc arbitration
815
 might be a 
good option/choice of forum due to its effective and efficient process, its legally 
binding judgments and its ability to be recognized and enforced in all 
jurisdictions. This mechanism, which is in accordance with the New York 
Convention, might also be a good alternative mechanism for settling a dispute not 
only for ASEAN-ARTS, but also for other commercial disputes in the region. 
Chen and Howes observe that there is no comparable international treaty for the 
enforcement of foreign court judgment.
816
 It seems to the author that it will be a 
good start and good step for ASEAN to have an alternative competent legal 
mechanism that may solve the problems/disputes in the future, so that they do not 
have to look for other organs outside ASEAN to settle their own problems. 
- The author has also observed that in the implementation of TARGET, besides 
regulations created by the ECB, there are also related regulations that support 
TARGET as well as other payment systems and economic/commerce activities in 
general. For example, there are the  Payment System Directive (PSD), the 
Settlement Finality Directive (SFD), the electronic commerce regulations, the 
Rome Convention and the consumer protection regulations. The author also 
recommends the creation of such a regulatory framework, which shall be put into 
consideration by ASEAN in support of the implementation of payment systems in 
general.   
- In the long term, if ASEAN would also like to implement  full integration in the 
monetary and economic sectors, like the European Union, the creation of an 
ASEAN Central Bank (ACB) as one of the very crucial institutions should also be 
put on the table.  Such vision, of course, has a lot of requirements and elements to 
be prepared, inventory of problems and stages that need to be measured, including 
economic convergence that should be assessed with certain criteria, the price 
stability, the exchange rate fluctuation and the financial condition of the 
government.
817
 This vision cannot be carried out without caution and good 
planning. The author hopes that the recommendation on creation of an ACB and 
the possibility of implementing the ASEAN Union could stimulate further 
research. 
As far as the role of Indonesia is concerned in ASEAN and in the creation of a 
payment system in supporting programs of the AEC 2015, the author has already described 
that Indonesia has an important and leading role, representing itself and other members as 
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well, by being actively involved in every international fora, including being appointed as a 
member of the G20 organization and as a co-chair of the WC-PSS for the period 2010-2015. 
It has been proven that Indonesia has played a key role in ASEAN. The author has faith in the 
capability of the new Indonesian leader, Joko Widodo, to represent Indonesia and to continue 
the country’s role in attaining the AEC 2015, because Indonesia is not only a big and strategic 
country but it also has great influence by representing ASEAN in other international formats. 
Indonesia has demonstrated its role from the beginning of the ASEAN commencement until 
now and it is acknowledged by other ASEAN members as well. 
With regard to the challenges of Indonesia related to the domestic arrangements in 
facing the AEC 2015, the author observes that Indonesia is ready to face the AEC 2015. The 
following are a few factors that support Indonesia’s readiness to face the AEC 2015: 
1. Indonesia has the capacity to become a regional champion in the AEC.818 This can 
be seen from its economic growth amidst a global crisis.   
2. Indonesia also has a touristic sector which is characterized by strong 
competitiveness compared to other ASEAN member countries.
819
 However, this 
sector needs infrastructure and transportation improvements in order to attract more 
international tourists. 
3. Indonesia has the availability of cheap labour.820 The author observes that this 
sector must be upgraded so that a high productivity employment is achieved by 
providing trainings, skills, and education for the workers. 
4. Indonesia has immense natural resources that can be utilized appropriately.  This 
sector needs deregulations from the respective institutions to foster and sustain a 
conducive national competitiveness. 
5. With respect to the payment system infrastructure, Indonesia, and in particular 
Bank Indonesia, has already prepared and developed its BI-RTGS into BI-RTGS2, 
which is expected to conduct delivery vs. payment and payment vs. payment. In its 
development, BI-RTGS2 is in accordance with the interoperability standard by 
adopting the ´swift format´ based on ISO 20022 (technology XML).
821
 
Rendering an account of these factors, the author concludes that Indonesia needs a 
good strategy and synergy from all elements, not only from the governments, the legislature 
and the judiciary, but also from non-state actors such as businessmen, associations, 
professionals and even citizens, which must have common perceptions to face the AEC 2015.  
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This noble goal needs dissemination and education from authorities to the public in order to 
provide awareness and better understanding among all individuals on the importance of facing 
the AEC 2015. 
Finally, the author hopes, that this dissertation will contribute to the development of an 
(clearer understanding on the importance of the) integrated RTGS payment system which will 
further enhance the economic integration within ASEAN. 
 
 
 
